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ABSTRACT Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are very different to other developing 
countries. Relative to GDP they have the highest levels of foreign trade and aid receipts of all 
developing countries. Remittances from abroad are a far more important source of income for 
SIDS, and some depend very heavily on export revenues. The quality of governance varies 
tremendously among SIDS, they are over-represented among countries classified as fragile states 
and many are prone to state failure. These and other factors combine to make SIDS highly 
vulnerable to external economic shocks. Achieving development in SIDS is as a consequence an 
especially complex task that requires an understanding of the roles played by aid, trade, 
remittances and governance in these countries. This paper looks at these issues, along with 
providing various stylised facts about SIDS. In so doing it serves as a background and broad 
contextual setting for the papers that follow in this Special Issue on 'Fragility and Development in 
Small Island Developing States'. 
I. Introduction 
The United Nations currently classifies 52 countries and territories as Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) (UN, 2009). More than 50 million people live in these 
countries, 43 of which are located in the Caribbean and the Pacific regions. SIDS is a 
diverse group in a number of respects. It includes countries that are relatively rich by 
developing country standards, such as Singapore and Bahamas, but also some of the 
poorest countries in the world, including Comoros and Timor-Leste. 1 
All SIDS are vulnerable to economic shocks and natural hazards to a degree that 
few other countries or regions are (McGillivray et al., 2008; Attz, 2009; Heger et al., 
2009; Naude et al., 2009a, 2009b). 2 This is generally not compensated for by 
sufficient state or household resilience (Chowdhury, 2009). Relative to GDP they 
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receive the highest levels of foreign aid of all developing countries, remittances from 
abroad are a very important source of income and some depend very heavily on 
export revenues. The quality of governance varies tremendously among SIDS and 
many are prone to state failure. These and other factors combine to make SIDS 
highly vulnerable to external economic shocks and especially susceptible to natural 
disasters and climate change. 
It follows that achieving and sustaining development in SIDS is a complex and 
demanding task. Among its prerequisites is an understanding of the roles played by 
aid, trade, remittances and governance. What is the impact of aid on growth and 
related outcomes? How should aid be allocated among SIDS? What are the impacts 
of trade shocks on current account balances? What drives remittances to SIDS and 
what are their macroeconomic impacts? What is the relevance of governance to 
growth in SIDS and what are the costs of state failure in them? These issues are 
addressed in the papers that follow in this Special Issue. This paper provides a broad 
background contextualisation, providing a case as to why SIDS should be seen as 
especially vulnerable to external shocks, and why aid, trade, remittances and 
governance are dominant issues in development in these countries. It does this by 
providing stylised facts on these and other variables for SIDS and other developing 
countries. 
This paper consists of three more sections. Section II provides some stylised facts 
on SIDS and other developing countries. Section III presents an overview of the 
papers that follow in the Special Issue. Section IV briefly concludes. 
II. SIDS: A Development Profile 
Most countries in the SIDS classification provided by the UN are islands, developing 
countries and have sufficiently small populations to be classified as a small 
developing state. They differ, however, in a number of respects. As mentioned, they 
differ in terms of material living standards, measured by GDP per capita. GDP per 
capita, as shown in Appendix Table A2, ranges from US$ 28,000 in Singapore to 
only US$ 369 in the Comoros. Human development outcomes, including those in 
health and education also vary substantially (UNDP, 2009). Yet, as relatively small 
economies they have much in common. The most central unifying feature is that due 
to their smallness they need far more than other economies to look beyond their own 
borders to drive economic growth and development. Prior to examining this feature 
of SIDS let us first look at their growth performance relative to other countries. 
The SIDS group of countries has maintained a reasonable rate of real GDP 
growth in recent decades. As is shown in Table 1 and Figure I, they have achieved an 
average annual yearly growth rate of real GDP over the period 1985 to 2007 of 3.3 
per cent. 3 All countries in the developing country (DC) and least developed country 
(LDC) groups have performed a little better over the same period, recording rates of 
real GDP or 4.2 and 4.1 per cent, respectively. 
There is considerable variation in growth rates among SIDS, however, as Table 1 
and Figure 2 reveal. This reinforces the point about heterogeneity within the group. 
Of all country groups shown, SIDS located in the Pacific region record the lowest 
average and by far the most volatile GDP growth for the period under consideration. 
Pacific SIDS growth rates range from 2.0 to 9.1 per cent and the volatility, as 
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measured by the coefficient of variation shown in Table 1, is more than twice that of 
all developing countries and the SIDS group as a whole. Volatility in GDP growth 
rates is also higher in SIDS located in Africa and the Caribbean, respectively, than in 
all developing countries. 
Let us now go behind the GDP numbers and look at some of their drivers. It is 
well known that SIDS rely heavily on trade to drive growth. Heger et al. (2009) for 
instance show that in the Caribbean a single commodity accounts for an average of 
45 per cent of exports, and the top five export commodities for between 70 per cent 
Table 1. Real GDP growth descriptive statistics, 1985 to 2007 
Country Group Minimum Maximum Average Coefficient of Variation 
Small Island Developing States 
African SIDS 
Pacific SIDS 
Caribbean SIDS 
Least Developed Countries 
All Developing Countries 
1.2 
0.7 
2.0 
1.2 
0.3 
2.1 
5.5 
7.4 
9.1 
5.2 
9.1 
7.4 
Source: Calculated from data in World Bank (2009a). 
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Figure 1. Real GDP growth, 1985 to 2007. 
Source: Constructed from data in World Bank (2009a). 
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Figure 2. SIDS real GDP growth by region, 1985 to 2007. 
Source: Constructed from data in World Bank (2009a). 
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and 96 per cent of countries' exports. This creates economic vulnerability to changes 
in export demand and commodity prices . 
Figure 3 and Table 1 show that trade flows, expressed as the sum of commodity 
exports and imports relative to GDP, are far higher in SIDS than in all other DCs 
and the LDC group over the entire period 1980 to 2007. Commodity exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP in any one year were no less than 95 and as high as 
141 per cent, and averaged 110 per cent for the entire period. The equivalent 
numbers for all developing countries were 64, 94 and 78 per cent, respectively. For 
the LDC group they are 49, 77 and 59 per cent, respectively. More pertinent is 
volatility in trade given its implications for vulnerability to external shocks. As 
Table 2 shows, SIDS trade is more volatile than for other developing countries. The 
coefficient of variation for SIDS trade relative to GDP for the period 1980 to 2007 is 
10.23, compared with those for the all DCs and the LDC group of 7.56 and 8.80, 
respectively. It is little wonder, therefore, that SIDS growth is more volatile than for 
these other groups of countries. 
Trade related volatility will be a function of a number of variations, in addition to 
the level of trade relative to a country's GDP and concentration of commodities 
exported. It will also depend, one would expect, on the extent of concentration of 
export markets. Figure 4 shows the destination of commodity exports of Pacific 
Island countries and Timor-Leste, each of which are SIDS, for 2007. More than half 
of all exports of these SIDS go to three countries only. One-third goes to a single 
country, Australia. By relying on such a small number of exports markets these SIDS 
are clearly very vulnerable to economic down-turn in one or more of them. 
Perhaps more striking are data on aid and private remittances to SIDS. These 
flows are most unlike trade in that they do not result from commercial activity. They 
result from conscious decisions of foreign donor governments and private overseas 
citizens to transfer resources to SIDS. Many SIDS rely very heavily on these 
transfers, more so than other countries. SIDS citizens look heavily to overseas 
labour markets. Those finding employment abroad send often relatively large 
amounts of money to relatives living at home and foreign governments provide 
extremely large amounts of official development assistance to SIDS. 
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Figure 3. Trade flows, 1985 to 2007. 
Source: Constructed using data in World Bank (2009a). 
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The preceding points ~re substantiated by Figure 5, which shows levels of official 
development assistance (aid), private remittances and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Aid to SIDS during the period 1980 to 2006 was the equivalent of 16 per cent 
Table 2. Trade flow descriptive statistics, 1980 to 2007 
Country Group Minimum Maximum Average Coefficient of Variation 
Small Island Developing States 
Least Developed Countries 
All Developing Countries 
94.5 141.4 
49.3 77.0 
63.9 94.3 
Source: Calculated from data in World Bank (2009a). 
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of GDPs, compared to only 1 per cent on average for all other developing countries. 
Private remittances from abroad to the former group of countries are the equivalent 
of 8 per cent of GDP during this period, while for the latter they are 3 per cent. 
Remittances and aid to the LDC group were the equivalent of 9 and 6 per cent of 
GDP, respectively, during 1980 to 2006. 
There is considerable variation within the SIDS group in terms of aid, remittance 
and FDI flows. SIDS in the Pacific receive very large amounts of aid and remittances 
and low amounts of FDI relative to GDP. Aid and remittances to these countries are 
indeed far higher, at the equivalent of 23 and 11 per cent of GDP, respectively. African 
SIDS observe higher levels of FDI relative to GDP, at 19 per cent, than the other 
groups of SIDS. The Caribbean SIDS depend less on aid, remittances and FDI, with 
these flows being no higher than the equivalent of 6 per cent of GDP. Figure 6 
reinforces just how important quantitatively remittances are to Pacific Islands, relative 
to others. It shows the 10 highest remittance receiving countries in the world, when 
these inflows are measured as a percentage equivalent of GDP. Two of these countries 
are SIDS located in the Pacific, Tonga and Samoa. Remittances to these countries are 
the equivalent of just under 44 and 23 per cent of GDP, respectively. 
Good governance has been shown time and time again in empirical studies to be a 
robust determinant of economic growth. There is also some empirical evidence, and 
a widespread belief in aid donor circles that governance is an important determinant 
of aid effectiveness. It is also reasonable to expect that building resilience to external 
shocks will crucially depend on the quality of governance in SIDS. The information 
in Table 3 should therefore be of concern. 
The donor community for a number of years considered a state to be fragile if its 
World Bank Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA) score was critically 
low. Two CPIA thresholds were used. One corresponded to a score that would put a 
country in the bottom two CPIA quintiles in the year in question. Another classified 
a country as fragile if it had a CPIA score of 3.0 or less (Branchflower et al., 2004; 
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Table 3. Policy and institutional performance assessments 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of IDA Recipient Countries 76 77 75 76 
Proportion of IDA Countries that are SIDS (%) 21 23 24 24 
Proportion of SIDS in Bottom Two CPIA Score Quintiles (%) 30 33 27 30 
Proportion of SIDS with CPIA Score of 3.0 or less(%) 30 33 35 35 
Average CPIA Score - SIDS 3.34 3.27 3.29 3.30 
Average CPIA Score - All other IDA Countries 3.33 3.32 3.22 3.33 
Source: Calculated from data in World Bank (2009b). 
McGillivray, 2006; Feeny and McGillivray, 2009). This criterion is also used by the 
World Bank to classify a nation as a low-income country under stress (LICUS). The 
World Bank (2009b) publishes CPIA scores for countries that receive aid grants from 
its International Development Association (IDA). As Table 3 shows there were 
between 75 and 77 of these recipients between 2005 and 2008. Between 21and24 per 
cent of these countries were SIDS. While SIDS during these years typically had only 
slightly lower overall average CPIA scores than other IDA countries, they are over-
represented in the fragile state category countries. That is, while between 21 and 24 
per cent of IDA recipient countries were SIDS, SIDS constitute between 27 and 35 
per cent of recipients that are fragile according to the above classification criteria. 
III. Special Issue Overview 
This Special Issue contains a further seven papers. The second paper in the Special 
Issue is 'Assessing the Economic Vulnerability of Small Island Developing States and 
the Least Developed Countries' by Patrick Guillaumont. Guillaumont considers 
three questions that in subsequent papers underlie various more specific concerns 
with aid, trade, remittances and state failure in SIDS. These relate to why 
vulnerability matters for development in SIDS, how economic vulnerability is to be 
measured and the implications of measuring economic vulnerability for the 
allocation of aid. Guillaumont provides answers to these questions by analysing 
the situation in SIDS in relation to the broader LDC category. A basic premise of 
the paper is that aid dampens the negative effects of vulnerability on growth and aid 
is more effective in vulnerable countries such as the SIDS. In support of the 
comments made above about the vulnerability of SIDS, Guillaumont finds that on 
the basis of the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) values vulnerability is higher in 
SIDS than in LDCs and that SIDS and LDCs are more economically vulnerable 
than other developing countries. He does, however, find that EVI values for SIDS 
are diminishing over time. 
The third paper, 'Terms of Trade Shocks and the Current Account in Small 
Island Developing States' by Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, explores deeper into one 
of the most fundamental causes of economic vulnerability in SIDS, export 
instability. Santos-Paulino focuses on how shocks to the terms of trade impact on 
their current account balances. Using a panel data vector autoregression (VAR) 
modelling approach, Santos-Paulino proceeds to quantify the impact of terms of 
7 
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trade changes on the current account in a sample of 14 SIDS. She finds that these 
have a negative impact on current account balances and real output. The current 
account does recover after a lag, suggesting a J-curve type reaction of current 
account balances to adverse terms of trade shocks. Finally, Santos-Paulino 
considers the policy implications of this finding, pointing to the importance of 
strengthening initiatives such as the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility, and 
the Stabex Scheme under the Lome (and Cotonou) conventions (relating to aid 
issues also discussed by Guillaumont). 
The fourth paper, 'The Short Run Macroeconomic Impact of Foreign Aid to 
Small States' by Henrik Hansen and Derek Headey, is the first of three looking 
intensively at foreign aid to SIDS. The paper applies a VAR modelling approach to 
explain the short-run macroeconomic responses to unexpected aid shocks. A key 
issue addressed is the observed volatility and smoothing of aid, and how this relates 
to absorptive capacity and spending, and the need for prudential policy decisions in 
the recipient economy. The study reports that aid-dependent countries typically 
appear to smooth aid receipts, which is important to mitigate contemporaneous 
shortfalls in foreign assistance and other flows such as export earnings. Again, this 
reiterates a core message evident in the previous two papers. 
The fifth paper, 'Aid and Growth in Small Island Developing States' by Simon 
Feeny and Mark McGillivray, examines the impact of aid on real per capita 
income growth in SIDS. Various econometric procedures are employed. The 
results suggest that foreign assistance is effective at fostering economic growth in 
SIDS but with diminishing returns. The paper also finds some evidence that 
foreign aid is less effective in SIDS that can be considered as highly fragile 
(namely, those in the bottom CPIA quintile), and that these countries face greater 
absorptive capacity constraints. It finds no evidence that the impact of aid on 
growth in SIDS is contingent on the quality of their policies and the performance 
of their institutions, except for those countries that are fragile, as fragility is 
effectively measured in governance terms through the CPIA. Since there seem to 
be diminishing returns in the impact of aid on growth in SIDS, meaning that the 
marginal effect of aid on growth falls as aid exceeds a given level, Feeny and 
McGillivray also consider whether aid volumes to SIDS are appropriate from a 
growth efficiency perspective. They find that while some SIDS receive far more 
aid than would be justified on a growth perspective, there is some scope for 
increases in aid to SIDS as a group. 
The impact of aid on the macroeconomy is further examined in 'Aid and Dutch 
Disease in the South Pacific and in Other Small Island States' by David Fielding. A 
weakness of studies looking at the impact of aid on growth is that they typically 
cannot tell us why aid might have had a particular impact on growth. As such one is 
left to speculate as to the processes or channels through which aid might influence 
growth. Fielding's study in part compensates for this by looking at whether aid can 
lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate in SIDS, that is, whether it induced 
Dutch Disease effects. There are strong a priori grounds for expecting that aid to 
SIDS, especially those in the Pacific, might have Dutch Disease impacts given the 
level of these inflows relative to GDP. Fielding uses VAR modelling techniques to 
address this question. Results suggest that, on average, a relatively closed middle-
income economy with inefficient government is more likely to suffer from Dutch 
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Disease effects of aid. Combined with the results obtained by Feeny and 
McGillivray, this suggests that real exchange rate appreciations have offset to some 
extent the positive impact of aid on growth in some SIDS. 
The seventh paper is 'Remittances in Small Island Developing States' by 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Susan Pozo and Carlos Vargas-Silva. The paper is 
concerned with the impacts of natural disasters and foreign development aid on 
remittances to SIDS and the impact of remittances on the real exchange rates of 
these countries. The authors use a VAR econometric modelling approach and data 
for 19 SIDS to analysis these impacts. They find that a natural disaster in SIDS is 
associated with higher levels of remittances to these countries. The paper's findings 
for the link between aid and remittances are particularly interesting. Aid donors do 
not seem to allocate aid on the basis of the level of remittances received by SIDS. 
As such these donors neither treat aid as a substitute nor a complement to 
remittances. The providers of remittances however seem to treat these flows as a 
substitute for aid, by granting lower levels of remittances than would otherwise be 
the case when aid increases and higher levels than would otherwise be the case 
when aid decreases. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. find no evidence of an association 
between remittances and the real exchange rate in the sample of SIDS under 
consideration. 
The final paper is 'Paradise Lost: The Costs of State Failure in the Pacific' by 
Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffier. It was pointed out above that 
SIDS are over represented among IDA recipients in the fragile state groups. 
Chauvet et al. attempt to quantify the cost of state failure among Pacific Island 
SIDS, defining a 'failing state' as one that is assigned to the above-mentioned 
LICUS group for at least four years continuously. They distinguish between three 
costs of state failure defined in this way: (i) the costs to the citizens in terms of 
poor policies and governance; (ii) the costs to the citizens in terms of conflict and 
uncertainty; and (iii) the (spillover) costs on their neighbours due to poor policies 
and conflict. As the authors note, because SIDS are islands there are fewer 
spillover effects, but the countries affected suffer more given that their openness 
will exacerbate the flight of capital and skilled labour. Thus, compared to other 
fragile states (where the major costs are those imposed on neighbours), the costs 
of state failure in SIDS are almost totally borne by the country itself. In this 
context, it follows that any possible case for intervention rests on humanitarian 
criteria rather than on protecting the interests of the other countries in the Pacific 
reg10n. 
Overall, the papers show that policy and institutional performances in SIDS are 
correlated with other aspects of vulnerability. Hence, development outcomes are 
affected by both the intrinsic institutional constrains and resources endowments, 
alongside to the international dimensions of vulnerability, channelled by trade, 
finance and migration. A number of studies look at aid-exchange rate and/or aid-
growth relationships, and although the results can be generalised for SIDS and other 
fragile developing states, some are related to specific areas like the South Pacific. For 
instance, Fielding's results regarding the impact of aid on the macroeconomy 
discussed above could be interpreted as more negative than others (for example, 
Hansen and Headey's, and Feeny and McGillivray's). This can be attributed to 
different specifications or approaches to a relationship and/or samples. 
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IV. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a profile of Small Island Developing States (SIDS). It 
pointed out that largely owing to their smallness, SIDS have to rely very heavily on 
factors beyond their borders to drive growth, in particular exports, aid and 
remittances. The paper also indicated that the quality of governance varies 
tremendously among SIDS, they are over-represented among countries classified 
as fragile states and many are prone to state failure. 
The paper also provided a background and broad contextual setting for the papers 
that follow in this Special Issue on 'Fragility and Development in Small Island 
Developing States'. The topics covered in the Special Issue provide a useful 
illustration of the type of research that can be conducted on SIDS. More research on 
these countries is certainly warranted given the huge challenges they face. Hopefully 
this issue will stimulate that research. 
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Notes 
1. Singapore - an export dependent SIDS - despite being a global financial and manufacturing hub, is also 
vulnerable external economic shocks. The country was particularly affected by the global financial 
recession and collapse in world trade, experiencing a decline in GDP growth rates during 2008-2009 
(ADB, 2009). 
2. Appendix Table Al and A2 provide a listing of all current SIDS and data on economic and 
demographic data, respectively. 
3. Data in all Figures shown in this paper are taken from World Bank (2009a). 
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Appendix 
Table Al. Countries classified as small island developing states 
Caribbean 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
British Virgin Islands 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Montserrat 
Netherlands Antilles 
Puerto Rico 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United States Virgin Islands 
Source: UN (2009). 
Pacific 
American Samoa 
Cook Islands 
Federated States of Micronesia 
Fiji 
French Polynesia 
Guam 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru 
New Caledonia 
Niue 
Northern Mariana Islands 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Other 
Bahrain 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Guinea-Bissau 
Maldives 
Mauritius 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Timor-Leste 
Note: We use in this paper the UN (2009) classification for Small Island Developing States. 
See also http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm. Not all SIDS are strictly speaking 
islands, as the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau for instance in the above list illustrates. 
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Table A2. Economic indicators in selected small island developing states, 2006 
GDP 
per capita Trade (% GDP) 
(US$ 
million, Exports 
Area 2000 (goods & 
Population (Sq. Km.) prices) Total Services services) Agriculture 
Africa 
Cape Verde 530,269 4,030 1,447.0 75.0 58.9 19.9 8.6 
Comoros* 628,410 1,861 369.3 51.3 2.7 12.6 
Guinea-Bissau* 1,694,653 36,120 130.1 89.0 42.6 63.6 
Maldives* 305,340 300 3,244.2 84.9 
Mauritius 1,26,692 2,040 4,709.2 132.9 55.3 61.8 5.3 
Sao Tome & 158,013 960 15.8 
Principe* 
Seychelles 85,032 460 7,408.3 316.7 106.4 136.4 3.0 
Asia and Pacific 
Fiji 834,278 18,270 2,202.0 113.4 48.9 15.1 
Kiribati* 95,067 810 486.7 
Marshall Islands 58,316 180 2,282.5 
Micronesia 110,961 700 1,850.7 
Palau 20,162 460 6,701.8 131.8 67.8 3.5 
Papua 6,324,097 462,840 656.1 157.5 89.5 35.5 
New Guinea 
Samoa* 181,293 2,840 1,712.6 37.0 11.6 
Solomon Islands* 495,362 28,900 763.8 33.5 
Singapore 4,588,600 699 28,964.2 433.0 88.2 230.9 0.1 
Timor Leste 1,061, 129 14,870 300.6 
Tonga 102,214 750 1,666.4 33.7 27.5 
Vanuatu 225,898 12,190 1,275.0 57.9 
Caribbean 
Antigua & 84,814 440 10,753.9 
Barbuda 
Bahamas 331,140 13,880 17,353.8 63.6 
Barbados 293,942 430 
Belize 303,991 22,970 3,769.2 121.6 44.3 59.9 12.3 
Cuba 11,257,013 110,860 
Dominica 72,793 750 
Dominican 9,725,569 48,730 2,889.3 75.9 18.0 34.5 12.0 
Republic 
Grenada 105,668 340 4,127.l 42.3 
Guyana 738,548 214,970 1,062. l 41.2 
Haiti* 9,611,554 27,750 411.3 45.4 13.5 11.0 
Jamaica 2,675,800 10,990 3,091.1 43.4 
St. Kitts and Nevis 48,790 260 8,660.3 52.2 
St. Lucia 167,975 620 4,791.8 53.4 
St.Vincent & 120,325 390 3,733.9 50.6 
the Grenadines 
Suriname 457,686 163,270 2,875.8 25.1 
Trinidad and 1,333;050 5,130 10,657.2 94.7 57.6 0.4 
Tobago 
Source: World Bank (2009a). Only UN member countries are included in table and *denotes 
LCD status. 
Assessing the Economic Vulnerability 
of Small Island Developing States 
and the Least Developed Countries 
PATRICK GUILLAUMONT 
FERDI-CERDI, Clermont-Ferrand, France 
ABSTRACT M aero vulnerability of the small island developing states (SIDS) as well as of least 
developed countries ( LDCs) has been an increasing concern for the international community. 
This has led to the design of an economic vulnerability index (EV!) to assess the structural 
economic vulnerability resulting from natural or external shocks. We first explain how 
vulnerability affects growth, development and poverty reduction, particularly in small developing 
countries. We then examine how the EV! has been designed and how it can be used to compare 
SIDS and LDCs. We argue that EV! is a relevant tool not only for identification of LDCs, but 
also for geographical aid allocation to favour vulnerable countries, including LDCs and SIDS, 
even though not all SIDS qualify as LDCs. 
I. Introduction 
Vulnerability of people in developing countries has been extensively studied at the 
micro level in the broad framework of poverty analysis. Less attention has been 
devoted to the analysis of macroeconomic vulnerability of developing countries, 
which is often considered as a policy weakness rather than a structural feature 
resulting from exogenous factors. However in recent years the structural nature of 
macroeconomic vulnerability has been underlined for two categories of countries, 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), leading to international policy recommendations. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the structural economic vulnerability of these 
two categories of countries, using an Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) set up at 
the United Nations by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP). Relying on 
recent work on the effects of exogeneous factors on instability, and some of our 
previous papers on the design of such an index, we explain the rationale of the EVI. 
Then we use this index, as well as a new retrospective measurement of its value, to 
compare the levels of vulnerability in LDCs and SIDS and their evolution. We also 
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argue that this index can be used not only for the identification of LDCs, but also, in 
a complementary manner, as one of the main criteria of aid allocation making it 
useful for SIDS as well as for LDCs. 
In the next sections, we consider four successive issues. We first present the source of 
the concern about macroeconomic vulnerability and the meaning given to this concept. 
Second, we explain why economic vulnerability matters, particularly in low income 
small countries. Then we examine how to design an economic vulnerability index for 
comparing SIDS and LDCs. Finally we draw the main implications of this comparison 
for international cooperation policy, underlining how the economic vulnerability 
index can be used both for identifying LDCs and for aid allocation policy. 
II. Sources of the Concern and Semantics 
Several reasons account for the fact that during the last 15 years renewed interest has 
been focussed on macroeconomic vulnerability and related issues in developing 
countries. This interest may have been triggered by highly visible events such as the 
sociopolitical problems that have disrupted economic growth in a number of African 
countries or the financial crises in Asian and other emerging countries. The renewed 
interest also reflects international concern about the structural characteristics of 
specific groups of countries, as has been expressed in various UN meetings and 
resolutions. Two groups of countries thus have been considered with respect to 
vulnerability. The first, and the only official group, is the category of the least 
developed countries (LDCs), established by the UN General Assembly in 1971. The 
second - a large and more informal group - is small island developing states (SIDS). 
The need to assess the vulnerability of both country groups through an appropriate 
indicator has been highlighted, in particular by UN bodies, including the General 
Assembly. The wish was expressed for an index of vulnerability, either to assess the 
vulnerability of the SIDS or to identify the LDCs. From 2000, such an index, the 
economic vulnerability index (EVI) has been set up, then refined by the Committee for 
Development Policy (CDP) to be used as one of the criteria for identifying LDCs (see 
more details in Guillaumont, 2008, 2009). 
SIDS and LDCs constitute two very different, although overlapping, country 
groups. At mid 2007, among the 50 LDCs, 12 (24%) were SIDS; three of which have 
been graduated from the list or are graduating. 1 These 12 countries represent more 
than 35 per cent of the 37 independent SIDS (there are 52 SIDS when dependent 
colonies are included). Most of the SIDS countries (85%) do not qualify as low-
income; some, in fact, have very high income. Among the LDCs, the majority or 58 
per cent (39 countries) are fairly small countries (with population sizes smaller than 
those of the larger SIDS; Cuba has a population of 11 million). This also means that 
45 per cent [(39-12)/(50-12)] of the LDCs not classified as SIDS are small countries. 
In brief, the two categories refer to countries that differ significantly in other 
characteristics but which face, to a large extent, problems associated with small size, 
in particular high economic vulnerability. 
The economic vulnerability of a country can be defined by the risk of a (poor) 
country seeing its development hampered by the natural or external shocks it faces. 
Here we consider two main kinds of exogenous shocks as well as two main sources of 
vulnerability: (i) environmental or 'natural' shocks, such as earthquakes or volcanic 
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eruptions, and the more frequent climatic shocks, such as typhoons and hurricanes, 
droughts, floods, etc., and (ii) external (trade- and exchange-related) shocks, such as 
slumps in external demand, world commodity prices instability (and correlated 
instability of terms of trade), international fluctuations of interest rates, and so on. 
Other domestic shocks may also be generated by political instability or, more 
generally, by unforeseen political changes. These shocks, however, are not 
considered here, as far as they seem less 'exogenous'. 
Vulnerability can be seen as the result of three components: 
(1) the size and frequency of the exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post 
vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante vulnerability); 
(2) exposure to shocks; 
(3) the capacity to react to shocks, or resilience.2 Resilience depends more on 
current policy, is more easily reversed, and is less structural. But there may also 
be a structural element in the resilience component of vulnerability. 3 
Thus, a distinction can be made between structural vulnerability, which results from 
factors that are independent of a country's current political will, and the vulnerability 
deriving from policy, which results from recent choices. For instance, the vulnerability 
of the Asian countries in the mid-1990s, after the 1997 crisis, was very different from 
the vulnerability of small economies or that of small islands which export raw 
materials. It is less structural, more the result of policy, thus more transient. This 
feature is clearly evident when vulnerability is measured according to the probability 
of a financial crisis that can be estimated mainly from financial and policy variables 
(see, for instance, Goldstein et al., 2000). If an index is to be used in selecting certain 
countries for the allocation of long-term support by the international community, 
what needs to be measured is naturally the structural vulnerability, which essentially 
results from the size of the shocks that can arise and the exposure to them. 
For the purpose of this paper, another distinction needs to be made between 
economic vulnerability and ecological fragility. The UN's initial concern over 
vulnerability included both economic vulnerability and ecological fragility, but it 
quickly became clear that the two notions should be analysed separately. For 
instance, losses in biodiversity reflect ecological fragility and are not necessarily 
major elements of economic vulnerability. On the other hand economic vulnerability 
could be induced by natural factors, that is, by the environment ('the relative 
susceptibility of economies to damage caused by natural disasters' UN, 1999). Thus, 
environmentally-induced economic vulnerability can be considered either as 
economic vulnerability or ecological vulnerability. 4 
III. Why Vulnerability Matters, Particularly in Small Countries 
This section summarises the reasons why economic vulnerability may be detrimental 
to development, particularly in small countries (for a more extensive review, see 
Guillaumont, 2006, 2009). Here we refer to a dynamic definition of vulnerability-the 
risk of economic growth being clearly and durably reduced by shocks (or the risk of 
the long-term average rate of growth being reduced by shocks). 5 It is a handicap to 
growth. Another somewhat broader dynamic definition is the likelihood of negative 
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and lasting effects of shocks on poverty reduction, either due to their impact on 
growth or direct effect on poverty. We review the links between vulnerability and 
growth according to the three main components of vulnerability explained above 
(shocks, exposure and resilience), and then add some comments on the direct effects 
on poverty. 
Shocks: the Negative Impact of Instability on Growth 
Focusing on instability and in particular on 'primary instabilities'. The negative 
impact of 'one-sided' natural shocks such as earthquakes, typhoons or floods is well 
recognised. The damage is often huge, first in terms of the number of deaths, and 
second in the destruction of physical capital, and the debate revolves about the 
measurement of the size of these losses. But when the shocks are 'two-sided' (up-and-
down cycles) - as many, particularly external, shocks are - their overall impact may 
be less clear. Depending on the measurement method used, the positive and negative 
shocks tend to equalise. The very nature of instability is a succession of booms and 
slumps (of export prices, external demand, rainfall, and so on). This is why we 
consider here mainly the impact of instability rather than the impact of separate 
shocks. The impact of these successive up-and-down cycles is not neutral. Their 
impact may result either from an asymmetry of reaction to positive and negative 
shocks (even their time profile may not be symmetrical) or from the uncertainty 
generated by previous cycles. Thus, there are both ex post and ex ante effects of 
instability (as underlined by Gunning, 2004). Ex post effects may be easier to 
evidence than the ex ante ones, as these depend on a perception of risk. Thus, most 
measures used in cross-section literature rely on ex post concepts. 
Two empirical studies offer a test for macro vulnerability, considering the 
instability of growth but without a specific and separate examination of its main 
sources. One is the well-known study by Ramey and Ramey (1995). They show a 
significant link between the instability of the rate of economic growth and the average 
rate of growth itself (testing exogeneity of the instability). But this instability can be 
due to policy as well as to structural factors, which is why the volatility of growth 
cannot be an approximate indicator of structural vulnerability (cf. infra). 6 Another 
recent and systematic attempt to assess the link between output volatility and growth 
is by Hnathovska and Loayza (2004), who present findings of both a higher sensitivity 
of growth to volatility in low-income countries and a higher impact of volatility over 
the last two decades than during the previous ones. The authors also show that 
volatility is more detrimental when institutions are poor (through a multiplicative 
variable), but do not assess the impact of structural vulnerability as such.7 
A main source of structural vulnerability in developing countries is export 
instability. Its effects have been examined over the years in the literature with growth 
regressions. There now seems to be a consensus emerging from several studies to 
conclude that export instability (or in some studies, terms of trade instability) has a 
negative effect on growth.8 More significant effects are noted when the (positive) 
effect of export growth and the (negative) effect of export instability are tested 
simultaneously and when the export instability (size of the shocks) is either weighted 
by the average export to GDP ratio for the period (Guillaumont, 1994; Combes and 
Guillaumont, 2002) - a ratio which, ceteris paribus, is higher the lower the 
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population size - or is an instability of the export to GDP ratio itself (Dawe, 1996). 
Thus, the exposure to shocks is taken into account. 
The effects of export-earnings instability are not the only kind of instability that 
have been tested. Several primary instabilities, mainly exogenous, have a negative 
impact on the rate of growth (Guillaumont et al., 1999). This is evident in the 
instability of the terms of trade, weighted by the average export to GDP ratio, or 
that of the real value of exports, similarly weighted, and political instability. The 
instability of agricultural value added (unweighted) also appears to be a negative 
factor (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001). In a recent study, rainfall variations in 
African countries during 1981-1999 are also shown to have an impact on growth and 
on the subsequent likelihood of civil conflict (Miguel et al., 2004).9 
Instability Channels to Growth 
The effect on factor productivity is greater than on investment. A large part of the 
literature on the effects of export instability has been devoted to its effects on savings, 
and these are ambiguous. Instability may enhance precautionary savings, an as-
sumption mainly relevant for private savings, and dependent on the degree of risk 
aversion, but also generate ratchet effects mainly on public consumption. It can be a 
deterrent to private sector investment because of the perception of risk. This is not the 
case with the public sector, which is often pushed to invest in boom periods, possibly 
with the help of procyclical borrowing, resulting in higher public indebtedness. Not 
surprisingly, the net result on the overall rate of investment is ambiguous. 
In contrast, the effects of instability on productivity growth are clearly negative 
and are a disincentive to GDP growth, as evidenced by several studies. 10 In the cross-
section growth regressions mentioned earlier, instabilities - either the so-called 
'primary instabilities' (Guillaumont et al., 1999) or instability of the rate of growth 
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995) - essentially reduce the total factor productivity growth 
rate. In fact, instability of the terms of trade appears to increase, rather than reduce, 
the rate of investment (Guillaumont et al., 1999) which makes the effect on the 
growth residual alone stronger than the total effect on growth. 
Instability is channelled through intermediate economic instabilities. The primary 
instabilities (terms of trade, agricultural production, political instability) influence 
growth through two important intermediate channels, namely, instability of the rate 
of investment and of relative prices. These two intermediate instabilities have 
negative effects on growth and are related to policy, which is weakened in this 
manner by structural vulnerability. 
First, instability of the rate of investment is a factor of lower average capital 
productivity (Guillaumont et al., 1999). As a result of the declining marginal 
productivity of investment, the gain in total output from a high level of investment is 
smaller than the loss resulting from a low investment level. This effect, illustrated 
during boom periods by projects that are oversized, under-prepared and of limited 
productiveness, mainly concerns public investment. But it also appears through the 
negative effects of volatile foreign direct investment (Lensink and Morrissey, 2006). 11 
The second intermediate instability, that is of the relative prices, proxied by the 
instability of the real effective exchange rate (REER), also appears to have a strong 
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negative effect on the rate of growth. It is assumed to blur market signals and induce 
a misallocation of investment. This negative effect of the REER instability has been 
presented in several papers (for example, Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Guillaumont 
et al., 1999). 
Instability of real producer prices - whether due to macro policy resulting from 
REER instability or the passing of world agricultural prices fluctuations to farmers -
is generally considered to be a factor in the lower average agricultural output, 
noticeably through its effects on the adoption of new techniques. 12 At a macro level, 
the effects of real producer prices instability on agricultural production growth have 
also been significantly tested on samples pooling several products in a number of 
countries. 13 
Thus it seems that external instability induces negative effects through shifts in the 
rate of investment and in the real exchange rate, either via its impact on public 
finance when retained at the government level or at the producer level when price 
:fluctuations are passed through to producers. 
Primary instabilities are high in both the SIDS and LDCs. Intermediate instabilities 
are high mainly in LDCs. For both groups the primary instabilities have been 
relatively high during the past decades in comparison to other developing countries. It 
seems that these high primary instabilities have been channelled more clearly to 
(intermediate) investment and real exchange rate instabilities in the LDCs than in the 
SIDS: whereas similar investment instabilities are observed, real exchange rate in-
stabilities are significantly higher in the LDCs than in other developing countries, and 
significantly lower in SIDS (again in comparison to other developing countries). 14 
This might be a reflection of the small relative share of non-traded goods in the SIDS, 
suggesting different channels of transmission for primary instabilities. 
Instability is also channelled to growth through political instability. The primary 
instabilities, and the induced intermediate ones, are a factor in political instability 
and civil war, and through these events also a significant factor in slower growth. 
Some studies have examined the economic factors influencing these events, the 
results of which can be re-interpreted or modified when economic instability is taken 
into account. A reasonable assumption is that the instability of exports, higher if 
exports are primary, exacerbates the frustration. When the instability of exports, 
weighted by the openness rate, is introduced in the Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
conflict occurrence model, the coefficient of determination increases significantly, 
while the share of primary commodities in exports, supposed to reflect the risk of 
rent-seeking behaviour, becomes insignificant (Guillaumont et al., 2005). Other 
exogenous shocks may have similar effects on the risk of conflict. 
Moreover, political instability, according to several definitions, appears to be 
higher in the LDCs than in other developing countries, which is not the case for 
SIDS compared to non-SIDS (Guillaumont, 2009). 
Exposure: Major Influence of Country Size 
A main structural factor in greater exposure to exogenous shocks is, of course, the 
smallness of a country. The size of a country can be measured in several ways, the 
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most meaningful of which is the number of inhabitants. In some cases (possibly with 
regard to natural shocks) area size could be a more relevant measure of the exposure 
to shock, but for assessing the main economic consequences of the size of a country 
independently from its income per capita, the most common measure is its 
population. 
The vulnerability issue is confronted with the old and renewed debate on the 
consequences of the size of nations. 15 Naturally country size has many consequences, 
not all of them related at first glance to vulnerability, as for example, scale economies 
in many sectors of activity, industry as well as government (the unit costs of public 
administration are expected to be higher in smaller countries). However, when 
investigating the channels through which size matters for development, the links with 
vulnerability become clear. There are at least three main channels (or intermediate 
variables) through which small size influences exposure to vulnerability: (i) trade 
intensity; (ii) government size; and (iii) social cohesion. 
The first variable - exposure to external shocks - is well-reflected by the export to 
GDP ratio. The smaller the (population) size, the higher (ceteris paribus) is the trade 
to GDP ratio (and the more 'dependent' the economy). Country size is the main 
structural factor determining the trade to GDP ratio, next are the main determinants 
of 'natural openness' and the main factor to be neutralised if an index of 'openness 
policy' is drawn from the observed ratios (Guillaumont, 1994). It is clear that the 
larger the share of exports in GDP, the greater the impact of a given export shortfall. 
This is why a better estimation of the impact of export instability (and of export 
growth as well) is obtained when the export instability variable (as well as export 
growth) is multiplied by the export to GDP ratio, that is when it is a 'weighted' 
instability. While natural openness, reflected mainly by smallness, increases exposure 
to trade shocks and subsequently the negative effect on growth, a policy of openness 
is not only a positive factor of growth but also of greater resilience (Guillaumont, 
1994; Combes and Guillaumont, 2002). 16 
Moreover, the diseconomies of scale associated with smallness result in greater 
difficulties to diversify at low cost. As a consequence, in adopting protectionist 
measures, small low-income countries face a higher risk of implementing inefficient 
or costly policies. For the same reason, a global protectionist trend is likely to be 
more damaging for small countries. Alesina and Spolaore (2004) test this effect in a 
cross-section growth regression through a multiplicative variable of the (log of) 
population and openness. The coefficient of this multiplicative variable is found to be 
significantly negative, while the coefficient of each of the two variables added 
independently to the regression is significantly positive. 
Another reason why smallness is considered to be a factor of slower growth is its 
assumed impact on the size of government. The assumption of a (negative) 
relationship between (population) size and the relative size of government activities 
is successfully tested by Alesina and Spolaore (2004). An interpretation is given by 
Rodrik (1998) who argues that a high trade-to-GDP ratio (related itself to 
population size) leads to an extension of the role of the state in efforts to provide 
more insurance to its citizens. The relationship can also be linked to the stronger 
effect of public revenue instability on public consumption. If large-scale government 
activities induce higher costs, this may again be the source of vulnerability resulting 
from smallness, and thus likely to hinder growth. 
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Third, country (population) size may impact on vulnerability and growth through 
social cohesion. Smallness may have the advantage of allowing greater social 
cohesion, that is less ethnic, linguistic or religious fragmentation. If social 
fragmentation is a negative growth factor and if fragmentation increases with 
population size, then smallness is an advantage, not a handicap. It needs to be noted 
that fragmentation as a handicap is not unrelated to vulnerability: it is assumed to 
negatively impact on growth because this structural factor influences the exposure or 
resilience to shocks (Rodrik, 1999). Reality may be more complex, and several 
studies indicate non-linear relationships where linear ones are assumed. In particular 
social polarisation, rather than social fragmentation, may be a handicap (and a 
factor of vulnerability) (Arcand et al., 2002). Polarisation does not increase with 
population size, but rather decreases with size (at least beyond a low threshold). 
Thus smallness may appear to enhance, not lower, vulnerability. 
As indicated by several cross-country regressions, when appropriate control 
variables are used, the (log of) population size is a significant positive factor of 
growth (Alesina and Spolaore, 2004; Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Milner and 
Weyman-Jones, 2003) and a negative factor of export instability (Easterly and 
Kraay, 2000). The observation that smallness hampers growth may be due to higher 
vulnerability, scale diseconomies or a combination of both. 
Other factors of exposure to shocks are to be considered in addition to smallness of 
population size. These are related to the structure of the economy and the location of 
the country, as primary economies and remote countries are more exposed to 
external and natural shocks. The extent of country exposure is examined in the next 
section. Let us note here that as in the case of smallness, remoteness is a structural 
handicap not only because it is a factor of vulnerability17 but also because distance 
remains an important obstacle to trade in spite of decreased transport costs (Brun 
et al., 1999, 2005; Carrere and Schiff, 2004). 
Resilience: Policy, Human Capital and the Poverty Trap 
Policy, shocks and resilience. First, policy is weakened by structural vulnerability: 
overall instability of income transmitted to public revenue is a factor of public deficit 
and indebtedness, of instability and low productivity of public investment, of real 
exchange rate instability, and so on. The intermediate instabilities are policy 
variables that transfer primary instabilities to growth. The hypothesis of an impact 
of structural vulnerability on policy is supported by the inclusion of a vulnerability 
indicator in a model where the explained variable is a composite indicator of macro 
policy (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001). Also the effect of primary instabilities on 
political instability was noted above. Primary instabilities can also be expected to 
impact on the quality of institutions. 
Nevertheless, policy is a major determinant of resilience. Structural vulnerability 
has an impact not only on the quality of economic policy, but its direct effects (on 
growth) also depend on policy. The main factors of resilience with regard to shocks 
are policy and institutions, in other words, the capacity of a country to cope 
effectively with exogenous shocks. This is why structural vulnerability needs to be 
distinguished from overall vulnerability, which includes an autonomous policy 
component essentially through the resilience. Indeed, institutions and policy 
21 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
themselves are influenced by other far-reaching factors, as Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
argue, in an explanation of their impact on the volatility of growth and the 
occurrence of crises. 
One important policy-related element of resilience is the capacity of a country 
to maintain an appropriate level of competitiveness. Even if it increases a 
country's exposure to external shocks - as also small size does but only more 
significantly (natural openness) - outward-looking policy enhances its resilience. It 
means that in the growth regressions, the smaller the absolute value of the 
(negative) coefficient of the (weighted) export or terms of trade instability, the 
more outward-looking is the policy (Guillaumont, 1994; Combes and Guillau-
mont, 2002). Thus three effects of a more open trade policy can be identified: the 
well-known positive effect of the growth of exports, the negative effect of the 
increased exposure to instability (the export-to-GDP ratio weighting the export 
instability), and the positive effect of a smaller impact of a given export 
instability, which means greater resilience. As argued in the last part of the paper, 
foreign aid can be another important factor of resilience. 
Human capital, resilience and the poverty trap. Another important factor of 
resilience is the level of human capital. The capacity to react to shocks - whether 
through appropriate policy, the search for competitiveness, or the adaptation of 
activities - depends on the level of education and health. It appears that the lower the 
level of human capital, the higher the impact of structural economic vulnerability on 
growth. In other words, vulnerability and weak human capital reinforce each other 
(Guillaumont, 2009): this may be considered as the empirical support on the 
rationale of the LDCs category, which defines low-income countries as being 
disadvantaged by structural weakness (high vulnerability) and low level of human 
capital. And because of this compounded handicap, they are likely to be locked in a 
poverty trap. 
This characteristic clearly distinguishes the LDCs from the SIDS. The small size of 
the SIDS makes them often highly vulnerable, but with better resilience because the 
level of human capital is on average higher than in the LDCs. In fact, this country 
group has been able to grow faster and to reach a higher level of income per capita. 
More on poverty effects of structural vulnerability. Instability from faltering growth 
has deleterious consequences on the pace of poverty reduction. Apart from its effects 
on growth, it also has direct social effects for two reasons. First, there is a feeling of 
frustration that is generated by income shortfall after a period of a rapid expansion 
that creates new needs and exaggerated expectations. This is illustrated above by the 
risk of civil war or crime. The other reason is due to poverty traps, linked to the 
asymmetry of reactions of health, education, and employment to income 
fluctuations. Insofar as instability lowers growth, it deters the reduction of poverty 
normally expected from growth, but in a given average rate of growth also induces 
an anti-poor bias. 
First, income instability lowers child survival. Probably the best single indicator of 
the social development in low-income countries is child mortality under five, made 
available through demographic and health surveys. Child mortality is a sensitive 
indicator, and is likely to reflect the strong asymmetric effect that can be expected 
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from income instability. If a rise in mortality results from an income shortfall, it will 
not be compensated in future periods with an equal income increase. Also, due to the 
existence of a lower limit to child mortality, the best functional form, where the 
dependent variable is expressed as a logit (Grigoriou and Guillaumont, 2003), 
implies an asymmetry in the up and down effects of income variations for the 
relevant range of mortality values. From 1980 to 2000, the effect of previous income 
instability on child survival appears to be significantly negative (Guillaumont, 2006; 
Guillaumont et al., 2008). 
Second, income instability delays poverty reduction. The macro vulnerability 
appears as a neglected factor in the cross-country research on the determinants of 
the level and evolution of poverty. The main concern has been the assessment of the 
growth and inequality elasticities of poverty, 18 but without a similar concern for the 
effects of income instability on poverty reduction (Guillaumont, 2006; Guillaumont 
and Korachais, 2009). 19 A reasonable assumption, however, is that income 
instability pushes people into a poverty trap (the poor encountering health 
problems, children leaving school, workers exiting the labour market, and so on) 
so that a rise in average income has less effect on poverty reduction than a fall in 
income (see, for instance, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000 in the context of Latin 
America). This effect is expected to lower the absolute level of the average growth 
elasticity of poverty, and/or to increase poverty independently of income growth and 
inequality change: income instability must then be introduced both additively and 
multiplicatively with income growth. Measuring poverty change in a sample of 
multi-year spells and controlling for relevant factors (rate of growth of income per 
capita, initial level of poverty, and so on), we obtain significant coefficients for the 
impact of income instability on poverty. This effect corresponds to an increase in 
inequality which is captured only partially by the change in the Gini coefficient 
(another control variable). 20 It is worth recalling that in addition to this distribution 
impact, volatility reduces the average rate of growth. Indeed, stability is good for 
growth, which is also 'good for the poor', but stability also makes growth better for 
the poor. Stability of growth makes it pro-poor. 
IV. How the SIDS and the LDCs Compare When a Structural Economic 
Vulnerability Index is Designed 
An indicator is needed to compare the structural vulnerability of LDCs and SIDS. 
Since the indicator is to be applied to both categories, we use the economic 
vulnerability index (EVI) which was initially designed and subsequently revised by 
the CDP.21 After reviewing the rationale of this choice, we compare the two groups 
of countries with regard to the shock components of the EVI index, its exposure 
components, the EVI itself, and finally with respect to resilience elements not 
included in EVI. To test the significance of the difference we use the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test. Whereas comparison of LDCs, as well as of SIDS, to other 
developing countries is unambiguous, comparisons between LDCs and SIDS raise a 
specific problem due to the fact that the two categories are partly overlapping. For 
that reason, the significance of the differences are tested by only comparing the 
'LDCs not SIDS' and the 'SIDS not LDCs'. We also consider how the overlapping 
group of LDCs-SIDS compare to the LDCs not SIDS and to the SIDS not LDCs. 
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Choosing an Index: EV! 
Here we refer to the present design of the economic vulnerability index (EVI), a 
composite index set up and applied by the CDP in 2000 as a criterion for the 
identification of LDCs, at the triennial review of the list of LDCs, and subsequently 
revised. It was applied in 2003 and 2006 (UN, 2000, 2003, 2006). Revisions were 
made before the two last triennial reviews of the LDCs list (see UN 2005, and the 
recommendations presented in Guillaumont, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). Thanks to 
collaboration between the UN DESA and CERDI, a retrospective EVI has been 
calculated covering three decades according to EVI's last revision in 2006 
(Guillaumont, 2007). The results, commented on below, are presented separately 
from the 2006 review figures (Table 1) and from the retrospective dataset (Tables 2, 
3, 4). 
The present EVI is a composite index calculated from seven component indices, 
made up of three shock indices (for external shocks, instability of exports of goods 
and services; for natural shocks, instability of agricultural production; and a 
homeless due to natural disaster index) and four exposure indices (smallness of 
population size, remoteness, export concentration, share of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries). Using an arithmetic average, equal weight is given to the sum of shock 
indices and the sum of exposure indices. In the shock indices, equal weight is given to 
natural and external shocks, while in the exposure indices equal weight is given to 
population size and to the total of other indices.22 Naturally, there are several other 
ways, some possibly more logical, how these component indices can be weighted and 
averaged (Guillaumont, 2006, 2009), but the arithmetic average has been chosen by 
the CDP for reasons of simplicity and transparency. 
Here we consider a composite index rather than a single one, such as growth 
volatility, commonly used in econometric works. The volatility or instability of the 
rate of growth of income reflects ex post macro economic instability which depends 
on exogenous shocks and structural factors of exposure, but also on policy factors, 
either as a reaction to shocks or as autonomous policy shocks. There is clear 
empirical evidence of the influence of policy factors on growth volatility (Easterly 
et al., 2001; Combes et al., 2000),23 and thus growth rate volatility cannot be 
considered a good synthetic indicator of structural vulnerability. Moreover if costly 
insurance or compensatory mechanisms are at work, the negative impact of shocks 
on growth does not necessarily involve growth instability. Nevertheless, growth 
volatility, even though showing some decline in the 1990s, is high in the developing 
countries. And it has been higher in the SIDS as well as in the LDCs compared to 
other developing countries. It seems however higher in the LDCs than in the SIDS 
(Section V below).24 
Shocks Faced by the LDCs and the SIDS: Permanently High 
Natural shocks. Climatic and other natural shocks are a mam source of 
vulnerability in many developing countries and these cover a large variety of 
disasters: earthquakes, typhoons or hurricanes, floods, droughts, insect invasions, 
etc. An indicator of the risk of natural catastrophes might be the frequency of such 
events, measured over a long period of time. But as evidenced by the recent Asian 
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Table 1. EVI and its component indices compared, for LDCs and SIDS, from LDCs list (2006 review) 
Share of 
Exposure Shock Population agriculture, Export Agricultural Instability 
EVI index index smallness of Remoteness in GDP concentration Homeless instability of exports 
Average (0.5) (0.5) (0.25) (0.125) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.125) (0.125) (0.25) 
Developing 45.2 48.6 41.8 43.3 70.3 34.1 40.5 55.0 30.7 40.7 
countries ( 122) 
Least Developed 53.4 55.0 51.8 46.5 74.1 53.4 52.6 62.9 35.5 54.4 
Countries (50) 
Non Least 39.4 44.1 34.8 41.1 67.7 20.6 32.1 49.5 27.4 31.2 
Developed 
Countries (72) 
SIDS (31) 56.6 67.6 45.6 80.9 73.2 27.2 43.9 55.9 36.3 45.2 
Non SIDS (91) 41.3 42.l 40.4 30.5 69.4 36.4 39.4 54.7 28.8 39.1 
LDCS not SIDS (38) 49.7 49.4 50.0 35.1 73.7 56.9 50.6 62.3 34.9 51.4 
SIDS not LDCs (19) 51.3 64.3 38.3 79.8 71.7 17.5 34.4 50.2 35.8 33.5 
SIDS LDCs (12) 65.0 72.8 57.3 82.5 75.5 42.5 58.9 64.8 37.l 63.6 
Wilcoxon-z/pvalue-z 
LDCs/N on LDCs 5.7 3.5 5.7 1.1 1.1 7.0 4.6 2.1 1.9 4.6 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.262 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.059 0.000 
SIDS/Non SIDS 5.3 6.8 1.5 7.4 0.9 -2.0 I. I 0.6 2.0 1.0 
0.000 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.354 0.040 0.263 0.580 0.047 0.299 
SIDS not LDCs/ 0.6 4.0 -2.7 5.2 0.0 -5.l -2.5 -0.8 0.7 -2.4 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.565 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.973 0.000 0.013 0.397 0.488 0.015 
SIDS LDCs/ 3.5 4.5 1.1 4.7 0.7 -1.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.1 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.001 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.510 0.073 0.481 0.510 0.982 0.280 
SIDS LDCs/ 3.6 2.0 2.9 -0.2 0.8 3.0 2.2 1.3 -0.4 2.2 
SIDS not LDCs 
0.000 0.043 0.004 0.837 0.405 0.003 0.029 0.208 0.685 0.026 
Note: Component weights between brackets, under the name of the component. 
Table 2. Vulnerability composite indices, from a restrospective dataset 
Ex-post EVI Shock index Exposure index 
1970-79 1980-89 1990---99 2000-04 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 1970-79 1980-~89 1990---99 2000-04 
Average 
Developing 46.8 44.2 43_5 41.2 40.3 40.6 52.4 48.1 46.3 45.0 
countries ( 122) 
Least Developed 52.8 51.6 51.3 46.2 47.8 49.0 59.4 55_5 53.6 51.9 
Countries (50) 
Non Least 42.7 39.0 38.0 37.8 35.0 34.8 47.6 43.1 41.3 40.2 
Developed 
Countries (72) 
SIDS (31) 59.4 55_7 53.9 50.2 46.8 44.2 68.6 64.7 63.6 63.9 
Non SIDS (91) 42.5 40.3 39.9 38.2 38.0 39.4 46.9 42.5 40.4 38.6 
LDCs not SIDS (38) 48.5 47.7 48.l 42.2 44.7 47.3 54.8 50.8 48.8 46.5 
SIDS not LDCs (19) 54.9 50.5 49.0 44.6 40.0 37.6 65.3 61. l 60.5 60.5 
SIDS LDCs (12) 66.5 64.0 61.6 59.0 57.6 54.6 74.0 70.3 68.6 69.1 
Wilcoxon-z/pvalue-z 
LDCs/Non LDCs 3.6 4.5 5.6 2.4 3.7 5.2 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIDS/Non SIDS 5.4 4.9 5.2 3.1 2.3 1.5 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.020 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIDS not LDCs/ 1.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 -0.8 -2.2 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 
LDCs not SI OS 
0.060 0.397 0.648 0.520 0.436 0.025 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
SIDS LDCs/ 3.6 3.2 3.5 2.7 1.9 1.2 4.0 4.1 4.3 4_5 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.063 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIDS LDCs/ 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 
SIDS not LDCs 
0.013 0.008 0.002 0.032 0.026 0.013 0.023 0.015 0.032 0.043 
Table 3. Shock component indices, from a retrospective dataset 
Homeless Agricultural instability Instability of exports 
1970-79 1980 -89 1990-99 2000··-04 1970--79 1980--89 1990-99 2000- -04 1970--79 1980-89 1990--99 2000-04 
Average 
Developing 41.5 41.5 42.9 29.9 30.9 46.l 45.5 46.7 44.3 36.7 33.8 
countries (I 22) 
Least Developed 47.9 51.l 50.l 28.5 32.4 48.4 46.l 54.2 53.9 48.8 45.4 
Countries (50) 
Non Least Developed 37.1 34.9 37.9 30.8 29.8 44.5 45.2 41.5 37.7 28.4 25.7 
Countries (72) 
SIDS (31) 57.0 56.0 50.8 35.7 37.7 47.8 45.5 54.0 46.7 39.0 34.8 
Non SIDS (91) 36.3 36.6 40.2 27.9 28.5 45.5 45.5 44.3 43.5 36.0 33.5 
LDCs not SIDS (38) 41. l 44.6 46.0 28.3 30.8 49.l 47.6 49.7 51.7 47.0 43.5 
SIDS not LDCs (19) 49.2 46.0 43.0 39.7 38.0 48.7 48.3 44.7 37.9 29.3 24.3 
SIDS LDCs (12) 69.3 71.8 63.3 29.2 37.3 46.4 41.I 68.7 60.7 54.3 51.3 
Wilcoxon-z/pvalue-z 
LDCs/Non LDCs 2.0 3.0 2.3 -0.2 0.4 0.8 0.0 2.9 3.3 4.4 4.1 
0.043 0.002 0.021 0.841 0.723 0.447 1.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 
SIDS/Non SIDS 3.7 3.0 1.9 2.3 2.2 0.3 -0.1 2.1 0.8 0.2 -0.1 
0.000 0.003 0.060 0.023 0.026 0.775 0.881 0.036 0.402 0.830 0.955 
SIDS not LDCs/ 1.7 0.3 -0.1 2.1 1.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.7 -1.7 -2.7 -2.7 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.084 0.773 0.906 0.037 0.101 0.839 0.986 0.514 0.087 0.006 0.008 
SIDS LDCs/ 3.2 2.8 2.1 0.7 0.7 -0.3 -0.8 2.4 1.0 0.6 0.8 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.002 0.005 0.036 0.510 0.453 0.750 0.440 0.015 0.340 0.525 0.413 
SIDS LDCs/ 1.7 2.2 1.9 -0.8 -0.l -0.3 -0.5 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.4 
SIDS not LDCs 
0.081 0.030 0.056 0.417 0.935 0.792 0.626 0.009 0.032 0.035 0.015 
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tsunami, the most severe and exceptional disaster does not comply with any 
measurable probability. The potential negative impact of these very different 
catastrophes differs, even within same type of disaster. Measuring the resulting 
economic losses in all the developing countries concerned seems impossible. A better 
approach is to take the number of people affected, if known, but even then people 
may be affected with varying severity. Indicators of the average proportion of the 
population affected can be used specifying the way the population is affected (for 
example, killed, displaced). 25 The percentage of population displaced due to natural 
disasters (homeless index) has thus been retained as a component of EVI since 2003 
when comparable data became available. 
Due to this data problem and to the fact that not all natural shocks (as for 
instance recurrent droughts in Sahelian countries) are registered as 'disasters', 
another proxy was needed. The answer was the instability of agricultural production 
measured with regard to its trend value. The trend of agricultural production can be 
assumed to depend mainly on a country's economic policy and other permanent 
factors. However, fluctuations around the trend can be hypothesised to be a 
reflection of the occurrence and severity of natural shocks, because these are likely to 
affect agricultural production. 26 This is why this indicator was retained as a 
component of the EVI. 
Both in the LDCs and SIDS, the homeless index has been significantly higher than 
in the other developing countries (for all periods). It has not been significantly higher 
in the SIDS than in the LDCs in the last two decades, albeit higher over the first one 
(see Table 3). 27 The agricultural instability index has also been significantly higher in 
the SIDS than in the LDCs (and all other developing countries as well) only during 
the first two decades. This implies that the difference between the two country groups 
with regard to these two indices has decreased, and disappeared during the 1990s. 
These previous two measures of natural shocks, which are not correlated, are only 
complementary proxies of the size of the natural shocks likely to affect growth 
prospects (likely to be aggregated in a single average level of natural economic 
shocks). They give a picture of the average size of past shocks which is only a proxy 
of the risk of similar future shocks. The risk of more severe or exceptional natural 
shocks, such as the December 2004 Asian tsunami, cannot be captured ex ante by 
any shock-probability index. It can only be reflected ex post in the measures here 
presented, and is more in the nature of a permanent damage, that is a structural 
handicap, than a risk. This difficulty suggests that more attention should be given to 
exposure indices. 
Another caveat is needed. Instability indices are related to a trend or an average 
level. This one, even if predictable to some extent, can also reflect a structural 
handicap (for example, lower rainfall levels in Sub-Saharan Africa), but is not 
retained here as a component of vulnerability. 
External shocks. An indicator of trade shocks is given by the instability in real 
export proceeds surrounding the trend. It has to be applied to total exports of goods 
and services because shocks affect both types of exports, and often service exports in 
small (developing) countries account for a large part of total receipts. Some private 
transfers, such as migrant remittances, can also be included. It is assumed that for 
small countries this instability is structural, resulting from exogenous events such as 
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fluctuations in world prices, in external demand and in domestic events that are not 
related to policy (for example, climatic shocks). Of course, some fluctuations in the 
real export values may be a reflection of the instability of policy itself, but it can be 
assumed that policy has greater influence on the trend than on the fluctuations of 
exports.28 However, if we consider the terms of trade, their trend, to a large extent, 
seems to be beyond the control of the country. When the terms of trade deteriorate 
(as when the sea level rises), it may be a handicap, without being an (unexpected) 
shock. 
The export-instability indicator, although decreasing in both groups, appears to 
have been higher in the LDCs than in the SIDS (Table 3).29 Export instability has 
become increasingly significantly higher than in other developing countries over the 
decades in the LDCs (due to a slower decrease), and gradually less in SIDS (due to a 
faster decrease) so that levels no longer show a difference between the SIDS and 
other developing countries. According to the figures of the 2006 review of the list of 
LDCs, a large difference appears between the LDCs not SIDS (51.4) and the SIDS 
not LDCS (33.5), while the LDCs-SIDS exhibit the highest index (63.6). 
As an average result (Table 2), the shock index in the LDCs appears to have 
become significantly higher than in the SIDS in the 1990s, the opposite to the case in 
the 1970s, although unsignificantly. For both groups it is respectively higher than in 
other developing countries, although the difference with them is weakly significant 
for SIDS in the 1990s. 
Exposure to Shocks: SIDS and LDCs Highly Exposed 
Four indicators are used to measure the exposure to shocks: 
(1) Population size (in logs), based on the assumption that small size is a handicap 
due to vulnerability and other reasons listed above: it is clear that the SIDS, by 
their very definition, have a small average size, which is also the case with the 
LDCs, but to a lesser extent: as a result the SIDS not LDCs are significantly 
smaller than the LDCs not SIDS. 
(2) Both in the SIDS and LDCs, the export concentration coefficient (as calculated 
by UNCTAD) is also higher than in other developing countries, but it has 
progressively become greater in the LDCs than in the SIDS, while the opposite 
was true in the 1970s, due to a strong decrease in SIDS, not in LDCs: in 2006 
(Table I) the difference is significant (index value of 52.6 versus 43.9, or, 
excluding LDCs-SIDS in both groups, 50.6 versus 34.4) . 
(3) The share of agriculture, forestry, fisheries is quite higher in LDCs than in other 
developing countries, higher also in SIDS, but significantly lower in SIDS than 
in LDCs (due to a larger share of services) (index values of 53.4 versus 27.2 in 
2006). 
( 4) The index of remoteness from world markets (adjusted for landlockedness) has 
been designed and calculated at CERDI and is used by the CDP for the 
measurement of EVI. ·According to Table 4, it has been significantly higher for 
the LDCs than for other developing countries, but curiously not so for the SIDS 
as a whole, then higher for the LDCs not SIDS than for the SIDS not LDCs 
(albeit unsignificantly in 2000-04). This is due not only to the landlockedness 
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Table 4. Exposure component indices, from a retrospective dataset 
Population (smallness of) Remoteness Share of agriculture etc GDP Export concentration 
1970- 1980-- 1990- 2000- 1970 1980- 1990- 2000- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000-- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000 
79 89 99 04 79 89 99 04 79 89 99 04 79 89 99 04 
Average 
Developing 52.6 49.2 46.1 44.1 58.3 54.7 54.3 54.9 45.0 40.7 38.2 34.5 47.5 38.2 39.4 39.4 
countries ( 122) 
Least Developed 57.4 53.8 50.2 47.6 65.8 61.8 60.9 60.4 63.2 59.8 57.5 54.2 50.7 45.0 48.5 49.9 
Countries (50) 
Non Least Developed 49.2 46.0 43.2 41.6 53.2 49.8 49.7 51.1 32.4 27.4 24.9 20.8 45.3 33.5 33.1 32.J 
Countries (72) 
SIDS(31) 85.5 84.l 82.5 81.4 56.1 52.3 52.4 56. l 38.3 33.9 31.3 27.4 56.3 42.6 42.9 45.9 
Non SIDS (91) 41.3 37.3 33.7 31.4 59.1 55.5 54.9 54.5 47.3 43.0 40.6 36.9 44.5 36.7 38.2 37.2 
LDCs not SIDS (38) 47.2 43.l 39.2 36.3 66.5 63.2 62.4 61.0 66.2 63.4 61.0 57.8 50.2 44.l 48.4 46.8 
SIDS not LDCs (19) 82.9 81.8 80.8 80. l 51.5 48.8 49.9 54.6 28.7 24.5 21.7 17.7 59.0 39.4 39.1 37.2 
SIDS LDCs (12) 89.7 87.7 85.2 83.4 63.5 57.7 56.4 58.4 53.6 48.7 46.5 42.8 52.2 47.6 48.9 59.7 
W i lcoxon-z/ pval ue-z 
LDCs/Non LDCs 1.5 l.5 1.4 1.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 2.5 6.2 6.9 7.0 7.0 l.3 3.2 4.0 4.1 
0.132 0.130 0.158 0.217 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.183 0.001 0.000 0.000 
SIDS/Non SIDS 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 - l.O -1.3 -0.9 0.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.0 2.8 l.7 l.5 2.1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.294 0.203 0.360 0.551 0.116 0.109 0.083 0.051 0.004 0.094 0.131 0.034 
SIDS not LDCs/ 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.1 -3.4 -3.6 -3.3 - I.I -4.7 -5.0 -5.0 -5.l 2.0 -0.9 - l.6 -1.3 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.388 0.101 0.210 
SIDS LDCs/ 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 0.1 -1.7 -2.0 -1.8 -1.9 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.6 
LDCs not SIDS 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.785 0.481 0.440 0.946 0.097 0.043 0.069 0.062 0.820 0.467 0.964 0.102 
SIDS LDCs/ 0.7 0.4 O.l 00 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.3 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 -1.3 I.! l.6 2.8 
SIDS not LDCs 
0.464 0.707 0.934 0.984 0.022 0.040 0.037 0.187 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.209 0.256 0.114 0.005 
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adjustment in the index of several LDCs, but also mainly because, while some 
SIDS are remote (as in the Pacific), many others are not (in the Caribbean). 
Moreover using a slightly different method of calculation of remoteness, as for 
2006 review, cancels any difference between the two groups. 30 
As an average result (Table 2), the exposure index has remained significantly 
higher in the SIDS than in the LDCs, while it has stayed significantly higher in both 
groups than in other developing countries. 
Comparing Synthetic Indices 
We compare the synthetic indices from two datasets: the official dataset of the 2006 
review of the CDP list of LDCs (Table 1), and the tentative dataset of the 
'retrospective EVI' mentioned above (Table 2). The results between the two datasets 
do not differ significantly and this allows us to draw a few observations: 
• EVI is significantly higher both in the LDCs and in the SIDS compared to the 
other developing countries; 
• the gap between LDCs and not-LDCs is increasing, while the gap between SIDS 
and not-SIDS is not; 
• EVI, which was significantly higher in the SIDS (not LDCs) than in the LDCs 
(not SIDS) in the 1970s, is no longer so; 
• while the exposure index is permanently and significantly higher in the SIDS than 
in the LDCs, the shock index is increasingly, and now significantly, higher in the 
LDCs; 
• the diminishing gap between the LDCs and the SIDS is due to the shock index, 
as the gap between the average exposure indices has not changed; 
• the SIDS-LDCs evidence a significantly higher EVI than that of the other SIDS 
and of the other LDCs, due both to shock and exposure indices with regard to 
other SIDS, essentially and very significantly due to exposure with regard to 
other LDCs· 31 
' 
• as and when LDCs-SIDS with very high EVI will be graduated, the level of EVI 
may reappear higher in the SIDS (not LDCs) than in the LDCs (not SIDS). 
EV! and Overall Vulnerability: Resilience of the SIDS 
The previous indicators have been related to structural vulnerability, reflecting the 
size of the shocks and exposure to them. Overall vulnerability may also differ as a 
result of resilience. While we observe a slight (and insignificant) higher structural 
vulnerability (EVI) in the SIDS than in the LCDs, we do not observe a lower 
growth instability32 (a debatable index, as seen above 4.1), but we do find a 
higher average growth, which have promoted higher levels of GNI per capita in 
the small island developing states. This higher resilience of the SIDS, as argued in 
Section III, may result from higher human capital, which constitutes the major 
difference between the two country groups. The higher resilience can, of course, 
also be due to better policy reactions, but this fact may still reflect the level of 
human capital. 
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V. Some Policy Implications of the Vulnerability Assessment 
Here we consider two main policy implications of the availability of the EVI. The 
more direct implication is related to the identification of the LDCs, the purpose for 
which the index has been created, and specifically the issue of SIDS exiting the LDCs 
list. The second issue, more indirect and general, is related to the use of EVI as an 
instrument in the design of aid policies. 
The LDCs Graduation Issue: SIDS, Although Vulnerable, Primarily Concerned 
As noted in the introduction, EVI is one of the three criteria used by the Committee 
for Development Planning for the identification of the LDCs: GNI per capita and 
the human assets index (HAI), a composite index of health and education indicators, 
are the two other criteria. For inclusion in the list, a country must be characterised 
by three complementary criteria: being a low-income country, with a low level of 
human capital, and high vulnerability. The complementarity between the three 
criteria is based on the assumption of a combined effect of vulnerability and human 
capital on growth. 
Exit or graduation from the list, and related rules, were introduced only in 1991. 
These rules have been carefully designed to avoid premature departure from the list, 
such as countries, after exit, becoming again eligible for inclusion. Margins were 
imposed between the inclusion and graduation thresholds of the criteria. Exit 
eligibility is to be confirmed at two successive triennial reviews and, more important, 
to be eligible for graduation a LDC must show improvement not only in one, but in 
two of the benchmarks considered for inclusion. 
Since the creation of the list in 1991 to 2007, only one country - Botswana - has 
graduated (1994). The graduation of Cape Verde and Maldives was ratified by the 
UN General Assembly in December 2004 for implementation three years later, in 
December 2007. This occurred for Cape Verde but was postponed for another three 
years for Maldives due to the tsunami. The graduation of Samoa, recommended in 
2006 by the CDP, has also been decided by the General Assembly in December 2007 
for an application three years later. Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, as well as 
Equatorial Guinea, were given the first-round eligibility clearance by CDP in 2006, 
but this needed to be reconfirmed at the 2009 review before any recommendation is 
made. 33 
It has to be noted that all the LDCs mentioned above as possible graduates are 
SIDS. They have resisted the recommendation, and resistance by the Maldives, then 
by Samoa, was particularly strong, based on the argument that these countries are 
highly vulnerable, as is evidenced by their EVI levels. Following this argument, some 
potential graduate countries have requested that an LDC could not be made to exit 
the list until it is no longer (highly) vulnerable, implying that (low) EVI would 
become a 'compulsory' criterion. 
If this happens the asymmetry between the inclusion and exit criteria becomes 
even deeper. Inclusion is governed by poor ratings in the three benchmarks, and 
graduation could then be proposed only when there is improvement in all three 
criteria, instead of just one criterion (which symmetry would involve) or when two 
criteria no longer apply (present asymmetry). Such a solution would make 
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graduation very unlikely, even for SIDS rated as upper middle-income countries, 
and this would lead to inequitable treatment of the developing countries. 
If certain developing countries have been able to sustainably achieve a significant 
rate of growth, as well as high levels of human capital, they are not likely to be 
locked in a poverty trap, as LDCs are assumed to be. Even though they may be 
vulnerable, their high level of human capital is probably the cause. The vulnerability 
of these countries, however, is an issue of concern. This is why a smooth transition 
strategy for graduating countries has been proposed by the CDP and officially 
adopted by the UN General Assembly. Anyway economic vulnerability should also 
be considered, through EVI, as a relevant parameter of aid policies. 
Dampening Vulnerability by Aid: a Policy for SIDS as well as LDCs 
Back to analytical basis. Although a negative factor of growth, structural 
vulnerability - sometimes captured only by (exogenous) export instability - has 
been found to increase the marginal effectiveness of aid (its marginal contribution to 
growth). The effect is more significant than that of the quality of institutions and 
policy, so strongly put forward by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the World Bank 
(1998). In other words, aid dampens the negative effects of vulnerability on growth 
(Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2007, 2009). These 
growth regression results are supported by the micro-macro analysis of the 
determinants of the rate of success of World Bank projects (Guillaumont and 
Laajaj, 2006). It follows that aid is potentially more effective in vulnerable countries 
such as the SIDS and the LDCs than in other developing countries. 
The current concern about high aid instability (see, for instance Bulir and Javier 
Hamann, 2003, 2005) is not contradictory with the above findings. First, it is not 
clear that aid is more often pro-cyclical than contra-cyclical with regard to the main 
exogenous flows (exports). As already suggested by Lensink and Morrissey (2001), 
economic vulnerability may be the source of aid instability. Second, either pro-
cyclical or contra-cyclical aid may have a stabilising impact, still with regard to 
exports, which can be captured by the difference between the export instability and 
the aid plus export instability. This stabilising character is a significant factor of 
growth, confirming the previous results (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2009). 
Moreover, aid, through its stabilising impact, has a twin effect on poverty 
reduction. First, it enhances growth, which is a major factor in poverty reduction, 
and second, it also makes growth more pro-poor by making it more stable 
(Guillaumont, 2006). 
These briefly reviewed findings have three implications for aid policies. 
Structural vulnerability ( EVI) among the criteria for aid allocation. The first and 
easiest way to take economic vulnerability into account in the design of aid policies is 
to consider it as a relevant criterion of aid selectivity. The standard criteria for aid 
selectivity are the level of poverty (income per capita) and the quality of governance. 
But these do not include vulnerability, which can be easily added for at least two 
reasons, and which could lead to significant changes in aid allocation (Amprou et al. 
2007). Both the LDCs and SIDS would benefit from the inclusion of a vulnerability 
measure (Guillaumont, 2008). 34 
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First, as we have seen, aid effectiveness is increased by structural vulnerability; if 
aid is allocated according to vulnerability (among other criteria), its effectiveness will 
be increased. This argument is also empirically (seemingly better) grounded than the 
similar argument used to support retaining governance as a major criterion. 
The second reason is equity. If we acknowledge that the goal of aid is to 
compensate for handicaps in order to promote equal opportunities/chances, then it is 
also legitimate to retain structural vulnerability - the handicap to growth - as a 
criterion for aid allocation. 
Finally, a practical matter has to be kept in mind. Retaining vulnerability, possibly 
EVI, as an ex ante aid allocation criterion would lead to the immediate dampening of 
unforeseen shocks. This may not be as easy with the other modalities now briefly 
considered. 
Aid modalities to use aid as insurance. As these views have been extensively 
examined in other papers (Guillaumont, 2006; Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
Jeanneney, 2003), we focus here only on the core arguments (see also Collier et al., 
1999; Sarris, 2003; Gilbert and Tabova, 2005). The challenge is to compensate 
negative shocks quickly and to simultaneously promote good governance, avoiding 
moral hazard. The solution is to offer automatic compensation once the rules of 
management (particularly in the case of positive shocks) have been agreed and 
implemented ex ante. This would combine the delivery of needed resources and the 
strengthening of ownership, and could be achieved through debt service regulation 
(increasing or decreasing) in accordance with the development of the terms of trade, 
or through a special fund for small indebted countries. Links between micro and 
macro variables need to be checked, to make the insurance scheme effective not only 
at the macro level, but also for the groups more severely affected by shocks, such as 
small farmers. 
Support to operations aimed at lowering instability and its impact. This is a longer-
term issue, as it involves structural transformation. Should its relative importance 
with respect to the SIDS be re-examined? Certainly not: we have seen, for instance, 
that the export concentration index has significantly decreased in the SIDS, more 
than in the LDCs. Any diversification policy has to balance costs and benefits. 
International support to promote regional integration will lower exposure and 
increase resilience in the LDCs as well as in the SIDS. It can thus be a major factor in 
reducing vulnerability and making growth more sustainable. 
VI. Conclusion 
Structural economic vulnerability is a matter of concern, particularly for the SIDS 
and the LDCs, albeit in a different way for each group. Vulnerability can 
conveniently be captured through the economic vulnerability index (EVI) designed 
at the UN by the Committee for Development Policy, and its shock and exposure 
components. This index is a suitable instrument to guide international development 
policies in two fields. 
The first is the identification of LDCs, which are the low-income countries most 
severely affected by structural handicaps to growth. Economic vulnerability is a 
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major disadvantage that needs to be considered in tandem with a low level of human 
capital. In order to be considered for inclusion into the LDCs list, in addition to 
meeting the vulnerability criterion, a country needs to comply with the stipulations 
of having a low income per capita and a low level of human capital. The graduation 
rule is not symmetrical. For a country to be eligible to graduation, it should no 
longer meet not only one but two criteria. Once the income level of a country exceeds 
the low-income threshold and the country has a relatively high level of human 
capital, it is then likely to be graduated from the list even though it may still be 
vulnerable. 
The second field where the use of EVI is needed is the geographical allocation of 
aid. For reasons of effectiveness and equity, structural vulnerability can constitute 
one of the relevant criteria of aid allocation; its application would favour vulnerable 
countries, LDCs as well as SIDS, even if the latter do not or do no longer comply 
with the LDCs qualifications. 
In the two country groups, structural vulnerability should seriously be taken into 
account, but not exclusively. The identification of LDCs cannot rely solely on 
vulnerability, so that vulnerability cannot be a compulsory criterion for exiting the 
list of LDCs. Similarly, aid allocation cannot rely on vulnerability only. 
Notes 
I. According to several decisions of the UN General Assembly, Cape Verde, the Maldives, and Samoa 
were to be graduated from the list, respectively at end of 2007, as achieved for Cape Verde, and 
January 2011 or end of 2010 for the two others (see details in Guillaumont, 2008), 
2, The concept of resilience is largely used in studies more specifically oriented towards the 
environmental or natural sources of vulnerability (Kaly et al., 1999). A distinction close to 
environmental vulnerability is given in Rodrik (1999) who, in looking at the risk of social conflict in 
countries facing external shocks, separately considers the severity of the shocks, the depth of latent 
social conflict (likely to increase the impact of the shocks), and the quality of conflict management 
institutions. 
3. Consider, for instance, a small country that is a primary commodity exporter, Its vulnerability to trade 
shocks results, first, from the world price fluctuations, reflected by the instability of its terms of trade; 
second, from the exposure to shocks expressed by the ratio of (commodities) export to GDP; and 
finally, from the capacity of the country to efficiently manage such shocks. The size of the shocks for a 
small price-taker country (its export price instability) is clearly an exogenous factor of instability. 
Resilience, or the capacity to manage instability, depends on the policy pursued. Exposure to shocks is 
more ambiguous: it is mainly a structural factor, but is also dependent, to some extent, on policy and 
this is all the more evident the longer the period considered. 
4. The same ambiguity is evident in the concept of sustainable development which covers both 
sustainability of economic growth and sustainability of environment since the depletion of natural 
resources may threaten growth as well as the environment. 
5. At first glance vulnerability (with regard to growth) may appear simply as the opposite of the 
sustainability of growth, a concept used even more extensively: the more vulnerable a country, the less 
sustainable its growth, ceteris paribus. But the sustainability of growth depends not only (negatively) 
on the vulnerability to shocks, but also results from other permanent factors, such as the rate of 
human and physical capital accumulation, and the preservation of natural resources. 
6. Without attempting to distinguish between vulnerability resulting from structural factors or from 
policy sources, Rodrik (1999) also tests a negative influence on the change in the rate of growth 
between two 15-year periods of a multiplicative index of 'conflict', which multiplies an index of 
'shocks' by an index of 'latent social conflict' (the ethnolinguistic fragmentation index or a Gini 
coefficient of income inequality), then by an index of the quality of conflict management institutions 
(namely, the lack of democracy or the quality of governmental institutions, as measured by Knack and 
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Keefer, 1995). Introduced alternatively, each of these appears highly significant. Rodrik also tests the 
respective effects of trade 'shocks' and of either an exposure index or an index of the capacity to cope. 
7. They check the exogeneity of growth volatility through instrumental, mainly policy, variables. 
8. See the review of the literature by Araujo Bonjean et al. (1999) and by Guillaumont (2006, 2009). 
9. Actually the aim of their paper is to test the impact of negative growth shocks on the likelihood of civil 
conflict, and rainfall variations are used as an instrumental variable for economic growth. 
10. Growth regressions on instability or vulnerability indicators either include or exclude the rate of 
investment in addition to other control variables. When the rate of investment (investment to GDP 
ratio) is included, the coefficients of the instability or vulnerability indices express only their impact on 
the growth residual, whereas when it is excluded, the coefficient is assumed to assess their total effect, 
both through the rate of investment and the growth of factor productivity. 
I I. The instability of foreign direct investment may be considered as a primary instability as well as an 
intermediate one. 
12. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981); see also UN (2001) for a review of studies on the impact of risk on 
agricultural productivity. 
13. See Guillaumont and Combes (1996), Boussard and Gerard (1996), and Subervie (2007) for the effects 
of real border price instability. 
14. For instance, from 1990 to 1999, the median value of real effective exchange rate instability has been 
10.5 for LDCs (6.5 for other developing countries) and 5.1 for SIDS (9.4 for other developing 
countries) (CERDI calculations). Comparative data on primary instabilities can be found in 
Guillaumont (2009, chapter 6). 
15. See recent work by Alesina and Spolaore (2004), Winters and Martins (2004). 
16. With regard to natural shocks or disasters, insofar as they generally concern specific groups of the 
population, the larger the population, the smaller the aggregate exposure: in a large country, climatic 
shocks are likely to affect only a small part of the population. 
17. The relevance of remoteness for vulnerability has been underlined by Encontre (1999). 
18. See Adams (2004) for a recent illustration. 
19. Guillaumont Jeanneney and Kpodar (2005), however, examine the effects of financial instability on 
poverty. 
20. Consistent with the idea that instability increases inequality, as found by Breen and Garcia-Penalosa 
(2005). 
21. There were several attempts earlier to propose a vulnerability index (in particular Briguglio, 1995; 
Atkins et al., 1998; Crowards, 1999), but these were not appropriate for the purpose of LDCs 
identification, as noted by the CDP (UN 1999). An overview can be found in Briguglio and Kisanga 
(2004). For a general discussion of the topic, see Guillaumont (2008). 
22. Accordingly, weights given to each component are the following: smallness of population size (0.25), 
remoteness (0.125), export concentration (0.0625), share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries (0.0625), 
instability of exports of goods and services (0.25), instability of agricultural production (0.125), 
homeless (due to natural disaster) index (0.125). 
23. For instance, Easterly et al. (2001) stress the negative effect (up to a point) of financial depth and the 
positive effect of openness on volatility. More specifically, with regard to the effects of openness, 
Combes et al. (2000) find that structural vulnerability (depending on structural factors, including 
population size) makes growth more unstable, whereas outward-looking policy has the opposite effect. 
Bleaney and Fielding (2002) examine the impact of the exchange rate regime on output volatility in 
addition to the impact of exogenous factors such as instability in the terms of trade. 
24. The relative position of the SIDS and the LDCs has changed over the decades (volatility higher in the 
SIDS during the 1980s, but the situation reversing in the 1990s). 
25. The main source of the data is the Emergency Events Database, compiled by the Center for 
Research on Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) at the School of Public Health, Universite 
Catholique de Louvain, data also given and supplemented in the IRC annual World Disasters 
Report. Based on these data sources, a picture of natural disasters in each of the LDCs can be 
found in UNDP (2001). A previous use of these data for the measurement of vulnerability is in 
Atkins et al. (1998). 
26. We use this indicator in several earlier studies (see Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 1988; Guillaumont 
et al., 1999). 
27. And it is higher in the SIDS-LDCs than in SIDS not LDCs and LDCs not SIDS. 
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28. The use of instability indices as components of a vulnerability indicator raises measurement problems. 
Instability is always relative to a reference or trend value. It is measured, for instance, by the average 
absolute deviation from the reference or trend value, or more commonly, by the variance of this 
deviation. A critical issue is then the choice of this reference value, in particular the estimation of the 
trend. A deterministic trend has long been adopted, for instance, in the export-instability literature. 
This was often inappropriate due to the possible non-stationarity of the series. On the other hand, the 
series may not be purely stochastic, and the reference value can be conveniently estimated from a 
'mixed' function, combining a deterministic element and a stochastic element: this is how instabilities 
of exports and of agricultural production have been estimated in the EVI and which we retain in the 
next simulations. Several other measures are used in the empirical literature on issues that concern us. 
For instance, measurements of growth volatility generally use the standard deviation of the rate of 
growth (which may not be appropriate when the rate of growth is not stationary). Other works on 
volatility (in particular, aid volatility considered in the next section) use empirical filters such as the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, in which a series is divided into 'cycle' and 'trend' components. In most cases 
these measures, intended to be internationally comparable, re:flect only ex post instabilities, that is, the 
deviations from a trend observed in the past, but not the risk variable perceived by economic agents, 
which would involve the specification of a model of anticipations, which could possibly differ among 
countries. 
29. Although not significantly different between LDCs not SIDS and SIDS not LDCs during the first 
decade. 
30. The difference in the methods used to calculate remoteness is essentially the following: for the 
retrospective EVI remoteness relies on the minimum average distance to reach one third of the world 
market, while the 2006 review retained one half of the world market. With one half threshold, Pacific 
Islands appear relatively more remote than with only one third. 
31. The slightly higher level of EVI in the low-income countries compared to middle-income ones is due to 
a somewhat higher shock index, while exposure index is lower (data not reported in the tables). 
32. According to data in Guillaumont (2009, chapter 6). 
33. At the 2009 triennial review CDP only recommended the graduation of Equatorial Guinea, 
postponing its decision for Tuvalu and Vanuatu at the next review, and finding Kiribati no longer 
eligible. 
34. Arguments are developed and simulations presented in this paper. Formulae are used that include EVI 
as an allocation criterion, and at the time take population with a 0.5 exponent and result in giving a 
higher share both to LDCs and SIDS than with actual allocation or with a formula relying only on the 
quality of governance and secondarily the level of income per capita, as with the so called 
'performance based allocation'. 
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Terms of Trade Shocks and the Current 
Account in Small Island Developing 
States 
AMELIA U. SANTOS-PAULINO 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, Finland 
ABSTRACT The paper investigates the dynamic relationship between external and internal 
shocks and the current account in selected small islands developing states. External shocks, 
defined as terms of trade fluctuations, explain a significant proportion of the variation in the 
current account balances. The external shocks have a temporary negative impact on the current 
account balances with a subsequent improvement, generating a I-curve type reaction. In contrast, 
real output shocks have a positive and significant effect on the current account. 
I. Introduction 
Small island developing states (SIDS) face a greater risk of marginalisation from 
global economic activities than other developing countries. The problem results from 
their small size, remoteness from large markets, and vulnerability to economic and 
environmental shocks. Although SIDS are characterised by significant openness to 
international trade, they face low diversification in production and exports, which 
further increases the vulnerability to adverse fluctuations and shocks in world 
markets, and constrains their export earnings potential. This is evident in the 
historically unstable terms of trade and the highly volatile economic performance of 
these countries (see Briguglio, 1995; Armstrong and Read, 1998). 
Understanding terms of trade patterns is a topic of interest in the development 
literature. The seminal work of Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) - the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis - suggests that the relative prices of primary commodities have a 
tendency to decline. Therefore, the impact of terms of trade deterioration, that is, 
import prices rising faster than export prices, other things being the same, is to 
worsen the balance of payments at a given growth rate (Thirlwall, 2003). The impact 
of terms of trade shocks on a country's current account balance is also a key issue in 
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international economics. Various theoretical frameworks predict that an adverse 
shock to the terms of trade will worsen the current account (for example, Harberger, 
1950; Laursen and Metzler, 1950). However, other studies hold that the impact 
depends on the duration of the shock (for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
The paper investigates the effects of terms of trade shocks on the current account 
in a selection of SIDS from Africa, the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific. In spite 
of the advances on the theoretical front, existing empirical evidence for developing 
countries is limited. The paper contributes to our understanding of the topic by 
reviewing the specialisation patterns in small islands by sector, industry and 
technology content, as well as the dynamics of terms of trade volatility and external 
shocks. The study applies the panel vector autoregression (VAR) approach in 
modelling the relationship between terms of trade shocks and the current account. 
The analysis reveals that external shocks, defined as terms of trade fluctuations, 
explain a significant proportion of the variation in the current account balances. 
External shocks have a negative impact on the current account balances, although 
on a temporary basis, reflecting a J-curve type reaction. Real output shocks, 
conversely, have a positive and significant effect on the current account. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the evolution of the 
terms of trade and the current account shocks in selected SIDS. Section III examines the 
relevant theory and empirical evidence. Section IV describes the empirical methodo-
logy, estimates the econometric models and discusses the results. Section V concludes. 
II. Terms of Trade and the Current Account in SIDS 
The secular deterioration of developing countries' commodity or net barter terms of 
trade has significant consequences for developing countries' prospects, as underlined 
by Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1950) and the subsequent literature. Small island 
developing states are beset by commodity price fluctuations due to their highly 
specialised production and export activities, which affect their terms of trade and, in 
turn, other economic outcomes. In general, world commodity prices are highly volatile, 
and this translates into large terms of trade fluctuations for primary commodity-
exporting countries such as SIDS. This has two important connotations. On the one 
hand, there are the implications for primary commodities relative to manufactures, and 
on the other, for the terms of trade of developing countries relative to developed ones. 1 
Although different, there is considerable overlap between the two phenomena. 
Terms of trade volatility in small islands could be explained by two dynamics. First, 
the share of trade in GDP (that is, openness) is especially large in small states, and this 
may contribute to magnifying the impacts of terms of trade shocks. Second, SIDS 
exports are prone to be more specialised than those oflarge states, both in terms of the 
products exported and their export markets (Kuznets, 1960; Armstrong and Read, 
1998). In this regard, Figure 1 depicts the high concentration of exports on primary 
products and resource-based manufactures, particularly in small islands from the 
Pacific and Africa regions. Consequently, the average prices of their exports and 
imports might be more volatile than in countries with more diversified trade patterns.2 
High population growth rates, migration, and a lack of diversification in 
production further exacerbate the terms of trade shocks impact on the variability 
of national incomes (Cashin and Loayza, 1995). For instance, Browne and Scott 
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Figure 1. Mean export composition in small island developing states by main sectors, 1980-
2005. Note: *Arithmetic mean. Data availability varies by region. Series may not add to 100% 
due to averages. The export baskets are classified using Lall's (2000) industry taxonomy, which 
ranks exports according to their technology content, and helps to identify the sectors which 
promote dynamic comparative advantages. The sample includes the SIDS de.fined in Table A 1, 
and South East Asia refers to Singapore. Detailed mean export composition by country is 
presented in Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix. Source: Author's own calculations using 
UNCTAD's COMTRADE (3-digits SITC Rev2). 
(1989) explain the high variability in the Pacific islands' national income mostly as a 
result of limited agricultural production, emigration to New Zealand and Australia, 
and low diversification in production. Thirlwall ( 1991) examines the exports and 
balance of payments performance of the Pacific island economies in relation to the 
movements in commodity prices and the extent to which changes in export earnings 
have been dominated by terms of trade volatilities. The study confirms that Pacific 
island economies are extensively dependent on the production and export of primary 
commodities. Hence, the instability of primary product prices has had detrimental 
consequences on the balance of payments and on the economic performance of such 
countries. 
Serven (2000) shows that Latin American and Caribbean countries have suffered 
significant terms of trade disturbances - similar to developing economies in South 
Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. A key factor explaining the large terms 
of trade variability is the high share of a few primary commodities, minerals and 
resource-based manufactures in the total exports of many of the region's economies. 
Terms of trade volatility was high during the 1970s (largely reflecting the first oil 
crises), and abated somewhat in the 1980s and more so in the 1990s, both in small 
island developing states and other world regions. Table 1 reveals the high variability 
and dispersion in the terms of trade experienced by SIDS, especially in Western 
Africa (such as Cape Verde, Comoros and Guinea-Bissau). This phenomenon could 
be explained by the low levels of diversification in such countries, where production 
and exports are concentrated in a limited range of commodities, as already discussed. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables in the VAR models, 1980-2005 
Caribbean (N = 4, 
All (N = 13, Obs. = 362) Africa (N = 7, Obs.= 181) Obs.= 103) Pacific (N = 3, Obs. = 78) 
Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean SD CV 
TOT 142.5 146.9 103.4 148.3 184.5 124.5 149.1 102.5 68.7 99.9 55.9 55.9 
Current -5.4 12.4 -228.1 -11.5 13.1 -114.1 -2.9 4.9 -163.7 -2.3 10.6 -464.3 
Account GDP growth 2.9 4.8 165.9 3.2 4.4 138.8 1.9 4.3 228.1 1.9 4.7 236.0 
Notes: i) The sample period (that is data availability) varies across countries. ii) 'SD' is the standard deviation, and CV the coefficient of variation, 
formulated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. iii) All ratios are reported as percentages. 
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Changes in terms of .trade are also affected by reductions in the prices of 
manufactured goods, higher raw material prices, and exchange rate fluctuations, 
amongst other factors. 3 According to Baxter and Kouparitsas (2000), terms of trade 
fluctuations are twice as large in developing countries as in developed countries. The 
authors attribute this pattern to developing countries' reliance on commodity 
exports, the prices of which are more volatile than those of manufactured goods. 
Furthermore, small developing countries, notably SIDS, are exceptionally exposed 
to terms of trade fluctuations because they have little, if any, influence over their 
export prices (Broda, 2004). 
High terms of trade volatility concurs with variable changes in their current 
account balances and real output, as can be noted in Figures 2 and 3.4 On average, 
the terms of trade show a negative historical trend, in line with significant 
fluctuations in the current account as a share of GDP. This tendency is observed in 
most of the countries, particularly those highly susceptible to negative shocks 
resulting from primary commodities and resource-based manufactures volatilities 
(for example, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean; Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea in the Pacific; and, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe in the Indian 
Ocean and Africa). Real GDP growth rates are, as well, more volatile in small states, 
owing to their high exposure to international trade (predominantly imports) and 
fluctuations in their terms of trade. However, there is a significant variability 
amongst countries, and between and within regions regarding fluctuations of the 
variables under scrutiny, as noted in Table 1. 
The evolution of the current account in SIDS has been determined by both 
domestic and international market environments. In the late 1970s global market 
conditions were adverse for most developing countries, chiefly to net commodity 
importers - of which SIDS are a notable subset. As in the case of terms of trade 
volatility, large current account deficits (mostly double-digit) reflected the second 
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Figure 2. Terms of trade and current account evolution in SIDS (1978-2006). Note: Terms of 
trade (TOT 2000 = 100, left scale); Current Account as share of nominal GDP (US$; right 
scale). Author's elaboration based on the sample defined in Table Al. 
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Figure 3. Terms of trade and real GDP growth in SIDS (1978- 2006). Note: Terms of trade 
(TOT 2000= 100, left scale); real GDP growth (2000= 100; right scale). Author's elaboration 
based on the sample defined in Table Al. 
oil-debt crises in the late 1970s. Subsequent gradual improvements in the current 
account and balance of payments relate to progress in domestic policies and 
favourable conditions in international markets. 
The end of the 1980s and early 1990s were also marked by turbulent 
macroeconomic conditions in the global economy, affecting the developing world 
mostly through exchange rates and balance of payments crises. These conditions 
aligned significant reform efforts, backed by international financial institutions, 
development agencies and donors' efforts, and entailed a change in production and 
trading patterns, mostly in larger SIDS. Structural reforms and trade liberalisation 
helped to increase foreign capital inflows - predominantly foreign direct 
investment, representing an important additional source of investment and a 
potentially critical contributor to growth and the sustainability of balance of 
payments in SIDS. 
The next phase of gradual improvements, which started in the mid-1990s, 
coincided with structural changes in the global trade architecture, notably selected 
phasing out of trade preferences for agricultural products, and the modification of 
guaranteed prices for apparels (that is, the phasing out of the multi-fibre agreement), 
as well as competition from other developing countries in the production of 
manufactures (notably China). But, to a limited extent this has occurred within the 
WTO and due to the EU preferences (for example, the Everything but Arms, EBA 
scheme), but is not a feature of EPAs - if anything they preserve ACP preferences. 
These have significant implications for SIDS that specialise in manufactures exports, 
such as the Dominican Republic and Mauritius. During the period, terms of trade 
movements are also highly correlated with current account developments, and 
particularly until the mid 1990s. 
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With this background, the paper proceeds to discuss the theoretical framework 
relating external and internal shocks to the current account and estimating how 
terms of trade fluctuations and real income changes impact the current account in 
the short term using panel vector auto-regression (VAR). 
III. Terms of Trade Shocks and the Current Account 
Theory and Evidence 
The impact of terms of trade shocks on a country's current account balance is one of 
the most debated subjects in international economics. A major contribution is the 
Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (Harberger, 1950; Laursen and Metzler, 1950) theory, 
which predicts that an adverse shock to the terms of trade will worsen the current 
account balance (known as the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect). The original 
work envisaged that a terms of trade deterioration should lead to a fall in savings 
and a current account deficit: Harberger discussed the effect on the trade balance of a 
devaluation, and Laursen and Metzler examined the transmission of disturbances in 
a two-country world with endogenous terms of trade and balanced trade, looking at 
the effects on spending of a terms of trade change. 
However, other theoretical frameworks and empirical studies state that the 
relationship between terms of trade and current account is ambiguous. In models 
that hold the current account balance as the outcome of forward-looking dynamic 
savings and investment decisions, the impact depends on the duration of the shock 
(examples of these models include the inter-temporal approach to the current 
account, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
On empirical grounds, the effect of a terms-of-trade shock on the current 
account depends, to a certain extent, on the duration (transitory or permanent) 
and agents' expectations about the shock, that is, if the shock was anticipated or 
unanticipated by agents. There are other determinants that affect the direction of 
the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect such as the type and significance of the 
transmission channel. 
These models, which have been extended in different fashions, try to explain the 
various channels through which the terms of trade affect the current account (that is, 
savings, investment, and consumption). 5 For instance, Edwards (1989) analyses how 
temporary terms of trade shocks influence the current account, allowing for 
differences between disturbances to the internal terms of trade generated by tariff 
changes, and instability to the external terms of trade. The author shows that 
changes in the (equilibrium) real exchange rate - or relative price of non-tradables -
are a crucial channel through which a change in the terms of trade affects the current 
account. 
Cashin and McDermott (2002) study several features of the terms of trade patterns 
of five commodity-exporting OECD countries and the relationship between terms of 
trade shocks and the current account balance. The paper shows that median shocks 
to the terms of trade are highly persistent, albeit with a large transitory component, 
and that they account for a small proportion of the variability of the current account 
balances in Canada, the UK and the USA, in contrast to the relatively large share of 
the variability of the external balances in Australia and New Zealand. 
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Considering the existing literature, the impact of the terms of trade on the current 
account is regarded as theoretically ambiguous. Specifically, an unfavourable shock 
in the terms of trade will have three effects: first, the consumption smoothing effect (or 
Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect) which results from the reduction in national 
income relative to future national income; second, the consumption tilting effect that 
results from the increase in the current price of imports relative to the future price of 
imports; and, third, the real exchange rate effect, consisting of the increase in the 
price of imported goods relative to the price of non-tradables. In response to an 
adverse transitory shock in the terms of trade, private savings will fall if the 
consumption-smoothing effect dominates the saving enhancing implications of 
the consumption-tilting and real exchange rate effects. Otherwise, savings will rise if 
the consumption smoothing is weaker than the other two effects. 
Identification of the Shock to the Current Account 
Our aim is to identify the impact of external and domestic shocks to the current 
account through changes in the terms of trade and output (real GDP). The paper 
follows Ahmed and Park (1994) and Cashin and McDermott (2002), which extend 
the open economy framework proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to an open 
economy setting, using vector auto-regression models to identifying the major 
sources of economic shocks. 
SIDS are small open economies, which produce and trade goods and services with 
the rest of the world at exogenously given external terms of trade, and other 
international prices. The determinants of the balance of trade (and the current 
account), are explained based on the behaviour of domestic absorption, defined as 
the sum of consumption, investment and government spending, as predicted by the 
Harberger-Laursen-Meltzer theory. Following Ahmed and Park (1994), the growth 
of domestic absorption is defined as: 
( 1) 
where Ydt is domestic absorption,~ is the first difference operator, Lis a finite order 
polynomial in the lag operator, µ is a white noise disturbance representing real 
shocks originating in the rest of the world, £ is the domestic supply shock, v is the 
domestic absorption shock, and u represents the domestic price level shock. To the 
extent that supply and demand shocks (both domestic and international) have 
persistent effects on output, they increase permanent income, and hence domestic 
absorption. In this framework, the trade balance (B), defined as the difference 
between domestic output (y) and domestic absorption (ydt), can be expressed as: 
(2) 
where polynomials are functions of the lag-operator polynomials in equation (1). 
The main concern of this study is the response of the current account, that is, the 
sum of the trade balance (B), net factor income, and net transfer payments to 
external and domestic shocks. That is, what is the impact of terms of trade 
movements and real GDP changes on the current account? Therefore, following 
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equations (1) and (2) and substituting the terms of trade and real GDP for (µt) and 
(et) respectively, the external and domestic shocks to the current account of the 
balance of payments (ca) can be characterised as follows: 
(3) 
IV. Empirical analysis 
Panel Data Vector Autoregression 
This empirical exercise aims at examining how terms of trade disturbances affect the 
current account balances in the economies under study. Due to data constraints, 
which make it difficult to employ time series analysis for individual countries, such as 
a structural VAR, the paper applies the panel data vector autoregression (VAR) 
approach. Panel data VAR represents an interesting challenge due to the likely 
presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity. This methodology links the traditional 
VAR technique, which captures the evolution and the interdependencies between a 
set of 'n' time series (or endogenous variables) measured over the same sample period 
(t = 1, ... , I) as a linear function of their past evolution (t-1), with panel-data 
methodology, which allows for individual (country) heterogeneity. The asymptotic 
properties and advantages of estimating VARs with panel data are discussed by 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). 
Orthogonalised impulse response functions are used, which help to illustrate the 
response of one variable of interest (that is, the current account normalised by 
nominal GDP) to a shock in another variable of interest (terms of trade and real 
GDP changes). Also, impulse-response functions allow identifying one shock at a 
time while holding other innovations constant.6 
A first-order panel VAR model can be specified as: 
cait = lli + Yt + zitb + eit (4) 
where ca represents the current account to GDP ratio; :t,i and y 1 are the country and 
time specific effects in panel data; zit is a vector of lagged endogenous variables {ca, 
tot, ry}, that is, tot represents the net barter terms of trade, ry (real GDP), and eu is 
the idiosyncratic error term. The model also considers country-specific time dummies 
to explain aggregate shocks that may affect all countries equally. 
Impulse Responses Estimations 
Sample and data. In this paper, small islands developing states (SIDS) follows the 
United Nation's classification, which includes coastal countries that share similar 
sustainable development drawbacks. A sample of 13 SIDS from Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific were selected mainly due to data availability, which is a 
major constraint particulady in less developed SIDS. A list of countries covered is 
presented in the Appendix, Table Al. These small states hold unique vulnerabilities, 
which tend to augment the volatility of the current account compared to larger 
states. As far as the empirical analysis of shocks to the current accounts is concerned, 
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the paper focuses on terms of trade and real income shocks, as explained in the 
previous section. The definition of the variables and data sources is also detailed in 
the Appendix. 
Results. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of the panel VAR system 
presented in Equation 4.7 These coefficients are the result of the estimated impulse 
response functions. In this regard, two different types of shocks are identified in this 
paper, in the spirit of the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler theory: (i) an external shock, 
quantified by innovations to the terms of trade; and (ii) a temporary 'demand shock', 
identified by the response of the current account ratio to changes in real GDP. The 
main underlying assumptions in identifying these shocks are that the terms of trade 
shocks are exogenously given, and that demand disturbances have no long-run 
impact (that is, the demand shock is transitory). 8 
As far as the external shock is concerned, the results imply that the response of the 
current account to innovations in the terms of trade is negative, as shown by the 
estimated coefficients from the panel VAR. However, this shock on the current account 
is temporary, and this is also graphically represented in Figure 4 (panel a). The impulse 
response analysis shows an initial negative shock of the terms of trade to the current 
account persisting for up to two years. This is a I-curve type response, as the short term 
movements in the terms of trade can worsen the current account (and the overall 
balance of payments), due in part to inelastic demand for exports and imports.9 
Moving on to the domestic shock, output (GDP) changes have a positive 
(temporary) and significant effect on the current account fluctuations, as indicated by 
the positive coefficient. However, the initial shock disappears after two years as 
portrayed in panel (b) in Figure 4. 
We also consider the impact of terms of trade and current account shocks on real 
output. The results suggest that, in all cases, real output reacts negatively to external 
shocks. This relates to Easterly and Kraay (2000), who find that small states present 
greater volatility of annual growth rates which is, in part, explained by these 
countries' sensitivity to terms of trade shocks. 10 The terms of trade based volatility 
is, in turn, due to small states' exposure to (and dependence on) international trade 
as discussed earlier, mainly export volatility. 11 
Table 2. Main results of VAR impulse response estimates 
T~o Of r~ ----------- ca (t-1) y (t-1) 
Ca 
y 
tot 
Number of observations 
Number of countries 
0.065 (0. 70) 
0.063 (1.47)* 
0.009 (2.03)** 
339 
13 
0.132 (2.63)** 
0.514 (8.99)* 
0.0002 (0.05) 
tot (t-1) 
-1.951 (2.17)** 
-1.210 (l.61)** 
-0.356 (2.99)** 
Notes: aThe reported coefficients are the median unbiased estimations from the vector 
autogression (VAR) estimations. That is, a one unit shock to the residuals of a VAR equation 
produces a deviation of a given variable from its mean value which amounts to the size of the 
impulse response. b(t-1) refer to one year lag operator. cNumbers in brackets (.) are t-statistics. 
The estimations include SIDS presented in Table Al, excluding Singapore. 
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Figure 4. Dynamic responses to a current account shock: (a) Terms of Trade and (b) Real 
GDP. Note: The smooth lines -- are 95 per cent point-wise probability bands generated by 
Monte Carlo interactions. Mean values for sample in Table 2. 
For countries that benefit from compensatory mechanisms or insurance, which 
tend to be costly, the negative impact of shocks on growth does not necessarily 
involve growth instability. Nevertheless, growth volatility, even though showing 
some decline in the 1990s, is high in the developing countries, and has been higher in 
SIDS and Least Developed Countries (LDC) compared to other developing 
countries. 
The non-permanent feature of the shocks identified in this study could be explained 
by the significant role of policy factors on reducing volatility (Combes and 
Guillaumont, 2002; Easterly et al., 2001). Improvements in economic policy 
implementation and institutions, alongside foreign aid, have played a part in reducing 
the negative consequences terms of trade deterioration and other exogenous shocks, 
and these are not necessarily captured by the short run a theoretical VAR. For 
example, Funke et al. (2008) emphasise the role of 'policies' in achieving fast recovery 
after persistent negative terms of trade shocks for a sample of 159 countries over three 
decades. The authors confirm that fast recovery is associated, pari passu, with 
improvements in the government's stability and institutional environment. Impor-
tantly, timely donor support is conducive to absorbing the shock. 
In relation to the role of foreign resources, Santos-Paulino (2007) assesses the 
marginal relationship between capital flows (that is, aid flows) and import growth 
and the balance of payments in Least Developed Countries (LDC). For LDCs, 
official development assistance remains the most important source of foreign capital, 
amounting to more than 20 per cent of imports and over 10 per cent of GDP. The 
study empirically confirms the links between the liberalisation commitments and 
financial resource inflows. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the influences of terms of trade shocks on the current account in 
selected small island developing states. The findings suggest that the terms of trade 
innovations have a negative impact on the current account balances. However, this 
effect is transitory, as the current account balances reflect a ]-curve type reaction to 
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terms of trade variations. Real output also reacts negatively to changes in the terms 
of trade. SIDS sources of vulnerability mostly relate to their intrinsic economic and 
geographic characteristics, as well as to external factors, which in turn affect balance 
of payments positions, such as high variability of supply and demand, low price 
elasticities for their exports, excessive specialisation of production and trade (mostly 
in one or two commodities), and high concentration of exports in particular markets. 
The findings bring our attention to the optimal policy response to confront the 
repercussions of external adverse shocks, in particular terms of trade volatility, for 
small islands and least developed countries, the majority of which are categorised as 
fragile or vulnerable. Under these circumstances, risk management policies to deal 
with aggregate volatility (that is, terms of trade, financial system, international 
capital flows, fiscal policy, and monetary and exchange rate system policy) become 
imperative. Several guidelines have been put forward, aimed at addressing terms of 
trade volatilities (see for example, Serven, 2000). These include: international 
portfolio diversification; self-insurance, based on stabilisation funds; and self 
protection, consisting mostly of trade diversification and the appropriate trade 
policy package, that is, trade taxes and subsidies. Some policies address more than 
one source of instability, or combine two or more of the insurance aspects. 
In terms of financing, traditionally, small islands have benefited from income or 
buffer stock compensation schemes such as IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility 
(CFF), the Stabex Scheme under Lorne (and Cotonou) conventions, or the European 
Development Fund. Whether these schemes should be further promoted and 
enhanced, or new efforts should be put forward remains an important research and 
policy agenda issue. 
The effectiveness of such insurance schemes has been widely discussed (see, for 
instance, Collier et al. 1999; and Guillaumont in this issue). The literature and policy 
experiences show that the challenge is to compensate negative shocks in an effective and 
timely manner, at the same time promoting good governance to improve absorptive 
capacity, mitigating moral hazard. Alternative proposals include combining the 
transfer of resources, by means of debt service regulation linked to the evolution of the 
terms of trade, or through a special fund for countries with low levels of indebtedness. 
The proposal, contrary to the CFF and Stabex schemes, will contribute to 
strengthening countries' and agents' ownership of the resources and outcomes. 
Finally, as part of a long term development strategy, it is imperative for the small 
island developing states (and low and middle income economies in general) to 
diversify their output and export structures in favour of commodities and economic 
activities with more advantageous production and demand characteristics. In 
practice, however, this is difficult to achieve as it is the restricted endowments and 
capabilities that determine the narrow production and export structures. 
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Notes 
1. A related discussion is whether globalisation ameliorates the extensively reported decline in the terms 
of trade of primary commodities. For instance, Blattman et al. (2003) argue that exogenous relative 
price shocks associated with the external terms of trade, especially during periods of globalisation (or 
disintegration) when commodity prices converge (or diverge), induce large terms of trade changes and 
economy-wide responses. However, evidence for the USA, an advanced economy highly integrated 
with the rest of the world, demonstrates that the decline in commodity terms of trade is not directly 
related with the process of globalisation. This indicates that, in the case of the USA, neither more 
integration nor protectionist measures would affect this trend (Mallick et al., 2008). 
2. Table Al presents the export diversification and concentration indexes for our sample of countries. 
The high concentration of exports in SIDS is also confirmed by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index 
where African SIDS, such as Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe in particular are 
close to maximum specialisation (that is, the index is nearly 1). 
3. Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino (2005) show that the greater the technological content, the smaller the 
percentage (or the lower the prevalence) of products registering price falls. 
4. Figures Al and A2 in the Appendix show the terms of trade, the current account balances to GDP 
ratios, and real GDP growth by country. 
5. Important references to such models include Sachs (1981), Obstfeld (1982), Dornbusch (1983), 
Svensson and Razin (1983), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
6. The estimations are done using the STAT A programme developed by Love and Zicchino (2004). Impulse 
response functions and their confidence intervals are constructed from the estimated VAR coefficients, 
where the standard errors of the impulse response functions are computed using Monte Carlo simulations. 
The panel VAR approach allows for individual heterogeneity by introducing fixed effects. Fixed effects are 
removed by the Helmert procedure or forward mean differences, whereas time dummies are eliminated by 
subtracting the means of each variable calculated for each country-year. This transformation preserves the 
orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors; therefore, lagged regressors can be 
used as instruments (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Zicchino, 2004). 
7. This paper focuses on low and middle income small island states. Further estimations were undertaken 
including Singapore, a high income SIDS that specialises in manufactures and high-technology 
exports in contrast to other countries in the sample. Although Singapore is also vulnerable to external 
business cycles and other natural hazards inherent to small islands, it is less exposed to fluctuations in 
the terms of trade as far as the price of primary commodities is concerned. The inclusion of Singapore 
did not alter the results significantly. 
8. This restriction follows Blanchard and Quah (1989). They show that fluctuations in output (GNP) and 
unemployment are affected by supply disturbances, which have a permanent effect on output, and 
demand shocks, which are transitory. Cashin and McDermott (2002) also identify a permanent 
'supply shock', measured by changes in the growth of real output (GDP) for OECD countries. 
9. Providing that the elasticities of demand for imports and exports are greater than one in the longer 
term, the trade balance will improve over time, as stipulated by the 'Marshall-Lerner' condition. See, 
for example, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) for further elaboration on this issue. 
10. Although terms of trade fluctuations are not the only determinant of economic performance in small 
island states, the authors show that even after controlling for terms of trade volatility, growth rates in 
small states are significantly more volatile than in non-small states. 
11. Easterly et al. (1993) show that terms of trade shocks explains part of the variance in growth across 
countries. See also Broda (2004). 
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Appendix 
Sources and Description of the Data 
Annual data for the three-variable vector auto-regression (VAR) panel are taken 
from the International Monetary Funds' International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
and the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank, 2006), 
generally for the period 1980-2005. However, the data ranges and availability vary 
between countries. The terms of trade (TOT) data are from the IFS, and 
UNCTAD's Handbook of Statistics, and is defined as the ratio of the export value 
index to import value index (2000 = 100, in percentage). The data for the current 
account and the real gross domestic product (GDP) are from the WDI, where real 
GDP (y) values are in constant 2000US$; the current account (ca) is defined as the 
ratio of the current account balance to nominal GDP, in percentage. Data on 
disaggregate exports is from UNCTAD's COMTRADE (3-digits Standard Industry 
Classification Revision 2). 
Table Al. The sample of small island developing countries 
Africa and Indian Ocean 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Guinea Bissau 
Mauritius 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Seychelles 
Caribbean 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Trinidad and Tobago 
56 
Asia and Pacific 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
Singapore 
Table A2. Export diversification and concentration in small island states 
1993 2003 
No. of No. of 
commodities Diversification Concen tra ti on commodities Concentration 
exported a indexh indexc exported a Diversification index0 indexc 
Caribbean 
Dominican Republic 100 0.50 0.17 114 0.62 0.21 
Haiti 28 0.44 0.26 49 0.49 0.47 
Jamaica 101 0.62 0.49 101 0.66 0.63 
Trinidad and Tobago 132 0.65 0.37 144 0.72 0.36 
Pacific 
Fiji 92 0.59 0.32 96 0.51 0.27 
Papua New Guinea 71 0.64 0.41 80 0.65 0.37 
Samoa 7 0.48 0.83 24 0.48 0.68 
Southern Africa 
Comoros 5 0.48 0.81 5 0.49 0.87 
Mauritius 108 0.65 0.33 157 0.70 0.28 
Seychelles 14 0.44 0.57 18 0.53 0.72 
Western Africa 
Cape Verde 12 0.47 0.46 12 0.47 0.48 
Guinea-Bissau 16 0.45 0.49 15 0.51 0.76 
Sao Tome and Principe 16 0.44 0.62 8 0.51 0.93 
(continued) 
South East Asia 
Singapore 
Developing countries 
No. of 
commodities 
exported a 
226 
200 
Table A2. (Continued) 
1993 
Diversification 
indexb 
0.46 
0.53 
Concentration 
indexc 
0.19 
0.24 
No. of 
commodities 
exported a 
222 
211 
2003 
Diversification indexb 
0.47 
0.51 
Concentration 
indexc 
0.25 
0.24 
Notes: aNumber of commodities (at SITC, Rev. 2, 3 digits group level) exported by a country. This includes only those products whose figures are 
greater than US$100,000 or more than the 0.3 per cent of the country's total exports. 
b The diversification indicator predicts structural changes in a country's exports. Also, it evaluates if a change in the behaviour of exports is oriented 
towards more dynamic products demanded by the rest of the world, or by the main trade partners of a country. The diversification index ranges 
from 0 to l, and reveals the degree of differences between the structure of the country's trade and the world average. An index value closer to 1 
indicates a bigger difference from the world average. 
That is, Aj - ~~Ii~ - ~1 where k is the product andj is the country, and X total exports. 
cExport concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann market concentration index. It ranges from 0 to 1, where I represents maximum 
concentration. (UNCT AD, 2005). It is computed as: 
XHERFj c.cc 2;: [i,J2 
l 
Source: Author's own elaboration. 
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Comoros 
Cape Verde 
150 
100 
50 
l 980 1990 2000 
Africa 
Southern Africa 
I 980 1990 2000 
Western Africa 
1980 l 990 2000 
Caribbean 
--··-TOT-GDP Growth 
1980 l 990 2000 
l 980 1990 2000 
Dominican Republic Haiti 
t 
200 
500 
150 
250 100 
50 
10 
O· 
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Trinidad and Tobago 
125 lO 
5 
100 
0 
75 
-5 
-IO 
1980 1990 2000 
Pacific 
125 PNG ro 10 
10 
125 
0 0 
100 
~~~~~~~·10 
I 980 J 990 2000 1980 ! 990 2000 1980 I 990 2000 
Southeast Asia (Singapore} 
15 
10 
0 
1980 1990 2000 
JO 
Figure A2. Terms of trade and real GDP growth, 1980-2005. Terms of trade (2000 = 100) left 
scale, GDP growth right scale. Source: Author's elaboration (see data appendix for sources 
and description). Notes: in Figures Al and A2, Fiji's TOT data is available until 1990. 
Table A3. Mean export composition (%) by main sectors, l 980-94a 
Primary Resource-based Low- Medium-
Primary products- Resource-based manufactures- technology technology High 
products minerals manufactures mineralsb manufactures manufactures Engineering technology 
Caribbean 9.40 9.08 10.96 24.70 32.34 3.49 4.35 3.49 
Dominican Rep. 10.10 0.14 11.98 0.35 47.12 8.72 14.35 5.18 
Haiti 19.20 0.01 4.74 1.46 65.98 0.27 0.88 5.76 
Jamaica 7-31 0.36 15.21 60.44 10.92 1.61 l.09 2.27 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.00 35.82 11.92 36.57 5.34 3.36 1.10 0.77 
Pacific 28.66 0.96 33.90 19.07 4.57 0.89 1.28 1.92 
Fiji 4.46 0.09 54.55 13.48 11.69 1.41 1.16 3.09 
Papua New Guinea 21.25 2.63 14.04 43.20 0.24 0.27 1.29 1.52 
Samoa 60.28 0.17 33.11 0.52 1.80 0.98 1.41 1.14 
Southern Africa I 1.17 0.04 28.43 27.82 23.92 0.40 2.27 3.82 
Comoros 
Mauritius 1.97 0.02 41.13 2.27 47.23 0.48 3.26 0.60 
Seychelles 20.36 0.06 15.73 53.37 0.60 0.32 1.28 7.04 
Western Africa 33.45 5.12 11.36 0.29 l.54 l.09 0.22 0.10 
Cape Verde 33.45 5.12 11.36 0.29 1.54 1.09 0.22 0.10 
Guinea-Bissau 
Sao Tome and Principe 
South East Asia 6.04 1.76 7.25 20.86 8.08 4.74 15.48 28.38 
Singapore 6.04 1.76 7.25 20.86 8.08 4.74 15.48 28.38 
Notes: a Arithmetic mean. Data availability vary by country; bMineral refers to precious metals, minerals, and sub-products (including oil). 
Source: Author's own elaboration based on Lall (2000). 
Table A4. Mean export composition (%) by main sectors, 1995-2005a 
Primary Resource- Resource-based Medium-
Primary products- based manufactures- Low-technology technology High 
products minerals manufactures mineralsb manufactures manufactures Engineering technology 
Caribbean 11.37 8.79 13.73 28.69 28.18 3.93 1.47 1.54 
Dominican Rep. 
Haiti 23.75 0.01 8.60 0.04 63.31 0.08 0.24 2.56 
Jamaica 9.06 0.33 15.96 55.62 13.09 2.57 0.88 1.30 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.29 26.03 16.64 30.40 8.14 9.13 3.27 0.77 
Paci tic 14.21 8.03 18.23 15.66 12.83 0.53 23.17 1.13 
Fiji 13.77 0.26 34.73 6.88 32.23 1.02 0.70 1.21 
Papua New Guinea 10.85 23.77 12.93 39.65 0.3 I 0.16 1.24 1.69 
Samoa 18.01 0.05 7.03 0.45 5.93 0.41 67.58 0.48 
Southern Africa 27.42 0.14 32.52 10.63 21.1 I 1.09 1.82 3.82 
Comoros 73.59 0.30 18.59 0.00 0.38 1.92 1.92 0.60 
Mauritius 2.20 0.05 24.58 2.62 62.44 0.93 2.83 2.78 
Seychelles 6.47 0.05 54.40 29.26 0.50 0.43 0.70 8.08 
Western Africa 62.08 0.04 2.03 10.73 16.06 6.34 4.01 1.46 
Cape Verde 4.84 0.06 2.10 27.62 47.26 15.28 6.87 4.16 
Guinea-Bissau 86.38 0.05 1.83 4.56 0.50 2.72 3.88 0.07 
Sao Tome and Principe 95.01 0.00 2. 15 0.00 0.41 1.02 1.28 0.16 
South East Asia 1.21 1.03 5.16 8.79 6.25 5.24 11.99 54.77 
Singapore 1.21 1.03 5.16 8.79 6.25 5.24 11.99 54.77 
Notes: aArithmetic mean. Data availability vary by country; bMineral refers to precious metals, minerals, and sub products (including oil). 
Source: Author's own elaboration based on Lall (2000). 
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ABSTRACT This paper investigates the short-run macroeconomic impact of aid in small 
developing countries (SD Cs) by using a vector auto regression (VAR) model to study the impact 
of aid on net import (absorption) and domestic demand (spending). We focus on average country 
effects within two country sub-groups, and find substantial differences between 'aid-dependent' 
SDCs and other SDCs that are more dependent on natural resources, tourism or financial 
services. In aid-dependent SDCs, aid absorption more or less equals spending, although only half 
of the aid flow is absorbed and spent. In the non-aid-dependent group, aid does not seem to be 
absorbed or spent in any systematic fashion. 
I. Introduction 
Although many aspects of small developing countries (SDCs) have been widely 
researched in the development literature, especially their structural differences 
compared to larger developing countries, 1 relatively little is known about the 
effectiveness of aid in SDCs. 2 This is surprising given that one of the most distinctive 
features of SDCs is their high degree of dependence on foreign aid. On average, small 
states tend to receive two to three times as much aid (relative to GDP) as large states, 
raising real concerns about the implications for both long-run institutional 
development and short-run macroeconomic management. A key objective of the 
present study is to expand our knowledge of this second area of concern, namely the 
impact of aid to SDCs on short-run macroeconomic management. 
Aid can be highly fungible, and donors wish to know that their money is really 
being spent. However, donors and recipients alike also want to be sure that large aid 
inflows do not indirectly cause macroeconomic problems that could limit the overall 
impact of foreign aid on growth and development. Of special concern in small open 
economies (that is, those that depend heavily on the ability of strong export sectors 
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to generate enough exchange to satisfy import demand) is the possibility that aid 
flows denominated in foreign currencies may raise either nominal exchange rates or 
the prices of other critical resources that are in limited domestic supply (for example, 
skilled workers or coastal land). These effects, known as Dutch Disease, are often 
considered one of the main reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of aid. 3 The 
textbook method for avoiding Dutch Disease is to 'absorb' aid inflows through 
increased imports. An alternative solution (although one that may be less attractive 
to donors) is for aid recipients to delay absorption and aid spending by bolstering 
their foreign exchange reserves. 
With our focus on the short-run macroeconomic impacts of aid, the present study 
is related to several recent studies evaluating foreign aid through a variety of 
empirical approaches and techniques. For example, the fiscal response literature uses 
theoretically-motivated models to simulate the effect of aid on government 
expenditure, tax revenue and other policies, given the utility preferences of 
policymakers (see, for example, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004). Other studies 
examine the volatility of aid flows, and consider implications for the appropriate 
utilisation of aid by recipients (Pallage and Robe, 2001; Bulif and Hamann, 2003, 
2008). Other recent reports use overtly historical analyses that combine narrative and 
empirical elements from small sets of countries to examine the absorption and 
spending decisions of aid recipients, where absorption is defined as increases in the 
current account deficit (net of aid), and spending as increases in the government 
fiscal deficit net of aid (IMF, 2005; Aiyar et al., 2006; Foster and Killick, 2006; Berg 
et al., 2007; Killick and Foster, 2007).4 Although this research is still in its infancy, it 
offers some interesting insights into how recipients might respond to a significant 
scaling up of aid, as mandated by the Gleneagles summit of 2004. To the best of our 
knowledge, only one study, that of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008), provides an 
econometric analysis of absorption and spending in a cross-section of countries. The 
findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah generally support the case studies in Berg et al. (2007) 
and Foster and Killick (2006), in that these authors consistently find quite low 
spending ratios and even smaller absorption ratios. 
Our approach is methodologically similar to recent studies using more atheoretical 
or agnostic approaches to gauge the effects of aid on the macroeconomy. These 
studies use vector autoregressive (VAR) models to estimate the impact of aid receipt 
on fiscal policy in individual countries (for example, Osei et al., 2005, on Ghana). 
While related to all these branches of the macroeconomic literature, our study is 
methodologically distinct in that we also use the agnostic VAR approach, but we 
focus our attention on a range of countries rather than a single country. 
Furthermore, although we examine the macroeconomic utilisation of aid in the 
short run, as is done in the more narrative reports by Berg et al. (2007) and Foster 
and Killick (2006), we expand on the prior studies by examining both spending and 
absorption responses using more systematic econometric techniques. 
Generally speaking, it could be problematic to use a VAR approach to gauge short-
run aid impacts across a wide range of countries, given the variety of legitimate uses to 
which aid can be put in the short run. This variety is amply demonstrated in even the 
small number of countries analysed in the studies of Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and 
Killick (2006). Moreover, heterogeneity in the quality of domestic policy could also 
confound our analysis, given that poor policy environments can add an additional 
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spanner into the workings of aid in the macroeconomy. However, we focus on 20 small 
developing countries, using a strategy that has two advantages with regard to the above 
concerns. First, we are effectively studying the short-run effects of aid in economies that 
are, in many cases, 'supra-open' in terms of trade policies and trade to GDP ratios. 
Second, small economies (especially small island economies) are typically thought to 
have somewhat better policies and institutions compared to other developing 
countries. 5 Thus, our focus on SDCs allows us to investigate the extent to which aid 
is absorbed and spent in a group of highly aid-dependent economies that satisfy the 
implicit assumptions of a textbook prescription for how aid ought to be used, in that 
they have relatively good policies and institutions, and are characterised by very high 
degrees of openness. So although we do not wish to over-emphasise the relevance of our 
results to issues such as the impacts of doubling aid to African countries, our results are 
indirectly relevant in the sense that if aid-dependent SDCs do not absorb and spend aid 
in a textbook fashion, we would tend to doubt that textbook absorption and spending 
would be seen in larger and less open economies. 
In summary, this study has three major objectives. The first objective is to improve 
our knowledge of aid usage in a group of countries that are highly aid-dependent and 
where there are strong concerns about the indirect impacts of aid on the 
macroeconomy. A second objective is to develop and test a new econometric tool for 
testing macroeconomic questions that have previously relied in large part on case study 
analysis, often of a narrative nature. The third and final objective is to examine whether 
countries that possess broadly textbook characteristics do, indeed, absorb and spend 
aid inflows in a manner that does not disturb the short-run macroeconomic balances. 
Accordingly, the paper is organised as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical 
underpinnings of aid's short-run effects on the macroeconomy in terms of absorption 
and spending, and discusses the diverse responses observed in the Berg et al. and 
Foster and Killick studies. Section III describes our econometric modeling 
techniques in detail. Section IV presents our data set. Section V discusses our 
empirical results. Section VI provides some brief concluding remarks and directions 
for future research. 
II. A Simple Accounting Framework for Aid Flows 
In this section, we discuss possible scenarios for the macroeconomic use of aid flows. 
In line with Berg et al. (2007), we do not formulate a fully-fledged theoretical model, 
but rather adopt an accounting approach by using balance-of-payments and the 
national accounts system as an organising framework. The main purpose of this 
discussion is to identify channels by which increases in aid inflows could affect 
macroeconomic aggregates. In contrast to the analyses in Berg et al. (2007), we 
herein focus on economy-wide aggregates rather than on government decisions and 
the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Aid Flows in the Balance-of-Payments Accounts 
Most foreign aid is transferred to an economy in the form of a grant or loan to the 
recipient country government. 6 In the balance-of-payments system, aid grants are 
recorded as current transfers on the current account, while loans are recorded as 
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changes in the net financial position of the capital account (vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world). Hence, we can specify the following balance-of-payments identities: 
CAi = (Xt - Mt)+ Wr - (irLt-1 + rrDr-1) + Af, 
KAr = 11Lr +(A~ - A;). 
(1) 
(2) 
In Equation (1), the current account (CA) is defined as the net export of goods and 
services (export, X, less import, M) plus net private transfers (W, mainly remittances 
and worker compensation) less net interest payments to foreigners (iL + rD), with 
interest payments on market loans (iL) separated from interest payments on 
concessional aid loans (rD). The final term in the capital accounts definition (1) is 
that of aid grants (Ag). In Equation (2), the capital account (KA) is specified simply 
as the net change in market loans (11L), which has both private and public elements, 
plus the change in concessional aid loans, defined as the foreign aid loan given within 
the year (At), less repayments of principal on the aid loans (amortisations).7 
Using the fact that the difference between the current account and the capital 
account equals the change in foreign reserves (11R), we have the following 
decomposition of the overall balance-of-payments: 
From this identity it is clear that from a purely accounting perspective an increase in 
the net aid inflow (through either a grant or loan) can 'enter the economy' in (a 
combination of) five ways. The inflow may: 
( 1) Increase foreign reserves. 
(2) Increase net imports of goods and services. 
(3) Finance interest payments on foreign debt (both aid and non-aid debt). 
( 4) Finance a decrease in private transfers. 
(5) Decrease net external debt (or increase capital flight). 
Put simply, aid inflows may be thought of as initially increasing foreign reserves, 
because many large donations are transferred to dollar accounts in the central banks 
of recipient countries. Thereafter, it is up to the recipient country government and 
central bank to channel the aid resource into the economy. 
As we will discuss below, there is unlikely to be any optimal way of 'distributing' 
the aid inflow across the balance of payments (BoP) components, as aid increases are 
often granted and disbursed under a variety of different circumstances (for example, 
macroeconomic crises). We wish to analyse the impact of aid inflows under 'normal' 
circumstances, so we focus on the most common intended use of aid inflows: to fund 
an increase in net imports. Therefore, we define the rate of absorption of an increase 
in aid as the increase in net imports relative to the increase in aid. Letting /1 denote 
change over time, absorption of aid in a given period can be specified as: 
(4) 
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Thus, absorption can be seen as a measure of the direct, real resource transfer 
associated with an increase in the aid infiow.8 As discussed in Berg et al. (2007), 
absorption is largely controlled by the central bank through its decisions on reserve 
accumulation and interest rate policy, to the extent that interest rates influence the 
demand for private sector imports via aggregate demand. Some important exceptions 
to the central bank control of aid flows are seen in aid-in-kind, aid given directly to the 
government for purchase of imported goods and services, aid given directly to NGOs, 
and grants for debt forgiveness. Aid is fully absorbed in the first three cases, while 
there is no absorption in the case of debt forgiveness. In most countries, these 
exceptions are quite small in magnitude, leaving the central bank controlling most of 
the decisions surrounding the absorbance of an increase in aid flow. 
Aid Flows in the National Accounts System 
In terms of national account identities, aid loans do not appear directly, while aid 
grants are part of disposable gross national income (disp. GN[): 
disp. GNir = Yr+ Wt - (i1Lt-1 + r1Dt-1) + Af 
=(Ct+ 11 + G1) - (Mi - Xr) +Wt - (i1L1-1 + r1Dr-1) + Af. (5) 
The notation in Equation (5) follows standard nomenclature: Y is GDP, C is 
household consumption expenditure, I is investment, and G is government 
consumption. In the second line of Equation (5), GDP is specified as domestic 
demand (C +I+ G) less net imports (M - X). 
It can be discerned from the above equations that GDP less net interest payments 
on foreign debt plus workers' compensation from abroad defines GNI, while adding 
remittances and aid grants yields disposable GNI. Hence, foreign aid has no direct 
impact on the main macroeconomic aggregates constituting GDP and GNI. An aid 
grant that is not used to finance net imports will increase national financial savings, 
but may not alter GDP and/or GNI (in the short run) if the grant is used to either 
increase reserves or decrease foreign debt. 9 Aid only affects the components of GDP 
when the recipient government spends the infiow. 10 Berg et al. (2007), in their 
definition of aid spending, look at changes in government fiscal deficit (net of aid) 
relative to changes in aid inflow. While this definition clearly relates the spending 
decision to government policies, we prefer the notion of spending aid to have a 
definition more closely linked to the macroeconomy. We therefore use a broader 
definition of spending, by looking at the change in total domestic demand relative to 
the change in aid: 
. i1 (Cr + ft + Gt) 
Spendzng = i1(Af +A~_ A;). (6) 
Under this definition, a government decision not to widen the fiscal deficit could still 
result in increased spending if the private sector increases consumption or investment. 
Absorption, spending and production. The main reason for the above definitions of 
absorption and spending is that they work directly on the national accounts identity 
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by linking spending and absorption decisions to changes in GDP relative to the 
increase in aid inflows: 
. L1Yr 
Productwn = Li(Af +A~_ A;) 
= Spending - Absorption. (7) 
Based on this identity, we can discuss different short-run responses as combinations 
of the spending and absorption of increased aid inflows. 
With regard to spending, an increased aid transfer to the government can be utilised 
in four ways. The response generally preferred by bilateral donors is what Berg et al. 
(2007) term the 'textbook case,' that is, full absorption and spending that leaves GDP 
unaffected (in the short run) because the increased domestic demand is exactly offset 
by increased net imports. In the long run, it is hoped that the inflow results in 
increased productive capacity via investments in physical and human capital, and 
possibly even in improved institutions (financed by government consumption or 
investment in the short run). But although this is the textbook response to aid inflow, a 
variety of circumstances could warrant different utilisation of aid inflows. 
For example, a second response would be to let the inflow be absorbed but not 
spent. This may occur when the foreign exchange generated by aid flow is used to 
sterilise the monetary impact of a fiscal deficit, leading to increases in the exchange 
rate and net imports (absorption). If government consumption and investment 
decreases, then spending will be less than absorption, and a visible real resource 
transfer will have a negative short-run impact on growth. Thus, the decision not to 
spend the inflow may be reasonable in times of fiscal stress, but it is not a sustainable 
development strategy. 
A third response would be to spend but not absorb the inflow. Such an expansion 
would be similar to an increase in domestic demand without any increase in aid 
inflow, and would result in a considerable short-run pressure on GDP, which also 
may not be sustainable. Both Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006) discuss 
the spending/no absorption combination in detail, generally noting that this is a 
highly unattractive policy option because it is analogous to deficit financing of public 
expenditure. 
Finally, a fourth option is to neither absorb nor spend the inflow. One way this 
could be done is via principal payment on external debt. In some situations, aid has 
been disbursed to avoid countries' defaulting on their external debt obligations (so-
called defensive lending); under such circumstances, the increased inflow is obviously 
meant to finance interest payments (and possibly principal repayment) on external 
debt. 11 In recent years, grants for debt forgiveness (which are clearly intended to 
decrease the net external debt) have been very popular among a number of bilateral 
donors, and this strategy has been an integral part of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative. 
A second and very important rationale for neither absorbing nor spending aid is to 
bolster foreign exchange reserves, as often advocated by the IMF in times of 
balance-of-payment crises (see IMF, 2004). In small countries that are highly 
dependent on volatile and unpredictable export revenues and aid flows, smoothing 
out the inflow of foreign reserves and ensuring a relatively large stock of reserves 
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may be a sound practice at any time (indeed, a common measure of reserve status is 
'months of imports,' implying that highly import-dependent SDCs ought to 
maintain larger-than-average reserves). Conversely, this means that full absorption 
and spending of aid within any given year may be a bad choice when fiscal and 
macroeconomic stability is an issue. Hence, when aid flows are volatile and have 
unpredictable elements, full absorption and spending should only be achieved over 
time, not within a single year. 
This idea of dynamic absorption and spending is implicit in the country studies in 
Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), since aid absorption and spending is 
measured over two- to four-year periods. However, while full absorption and 
spending is the best short-run response, it is not the desired medium-term result if 
one expects well managed aid flows to increase national income over the medium and 
long run through investment in physical capital, human capital, and institutional 
capacity building. If aid has a medium-term impact on productivity, then spending 
should be greater than one and should ultimately exceed absorption, which should 
be less than one, reflecting an increase in exports. This may be one reason why the 
country studies in Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006) often find that 
spending exceeds absorption. 
III. A Simple Econometric Model of Absorption, Spending and Production 
The above discussion illustrates the need for dynamic models for the econometric 
analysis of absorption and spending, because the optimal time horizon for measuring 
absorption and spending cannot be given a priori. The econometric model of 
absorption, spending and production developed herein accommodates the complica-
tions arising in such a dynamic context. 
The Econometric Mode! 
We formulate and apply a simple dynamic econometric model that seeks to account 
for a country's absorption, spending and changes to GDP following a sudden 
increase in foreign aid. 12 We use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model because it 
does not impose too much a priori structure. Our starting point for the econometric 
model is the national income accounts identity, measured in constant local currency 
units and given as annual changes: 
~ J}i = L'1 CJt + L'.'11.Jr + Ll G11 - ( ~MJt - lLl}t) 
= L'!DJt - ilN M11 (8) 
where J}1 is GDP in country j at time t, c11 is household consumption, IJt is gross 
capital formation (investment), G1t is government consumption, );)i is exports of 
goods and services, and M;r is imports of goods and services. As in Section II, we can 
specify the changes in GDP (lJr) as the change in domestic demand (D11) less the 
change in net imports (NM;r), thereby directly linking our definitions of absorption 
and spending. 
In order to obtain 'standardised' measures across countries, we divide the changes 
in GDP and its components by GDP in the initial year. Hence, we look at the change 
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in real GDP from year t-1 to year t, relative to the initial level and the contributions 
from the terms on the right-hand side of the identity: 
Yit = d11 - (mJt - XJt) (9) 
where each of the series have been transformed by: 
( 10) 
For foreign aid, we look at the net inflows of aid (grants plus loans minus principal 
repayments) less emergency aid and technical cooperation. The aid inflow is 
measured analogously to the national income accounts variables in equation (9); that 
is, we model the change in aid inflows (A) in country j from t-1 to t relative to GDP 
in the initial year: 
( 11) 
The national income accounts variables in (9) and the aid variable in (11) are used to 
specify a VAR model. However, because equation (9) is an identity, the covariance 
matrix of disturbances is singular. As shown in Barten (1969), the parameters of the 
model can be consistently estimated by omitting one of the variables from the 
system. In the present model, it doesn't matter which variable is omitted. 13 We omit 
imports from the model, meaning that the VAR is specified to include scaled changes 
in aid, real GDP, domestic demand, and exports. In addition to these four 
endogenous variables, we control for the impact of natural disasters, F;r, as measured 
by the number of people per 100 who are affected by natural disasters each year. 14 
We mainly control for natural disasters because aid flows to a disaster-struck 
country may respond within-year to such exogenous events. 
The resulting VAR model can be formulated as: 
p q 
Zjt = µj + L rj!cZjt-k + L lf!11FJ·i-l + Ujt (12) 
k=I l=O 
Where zjt = (ajr,yjt,d·Jt•Xjt)', µj is a vector of country-specific intercept terms, rjk, 
k = 1, ... ,p, and l.Jl11, l = 0, ... , q are country-specific coefficient matrices, and u1, is a 
zero-mean innovation process with E(u1ru}r) =Qi and E(u1ru}s) = 0 for t ":I s. 
Identification of Aid Shocks 
The errors in the VAR model (u1i) are reduced form innovations; in order to estimate 
responses to aid shocks, we must identify such aid shocks by transforming the 
reduced form innovations to structural shocks. As the model is based on an 
accounting identity, there is little guidance from economic theory when it comes to 
specifying the identifying restrictions. Here, we impose a simple identifying structure 
by assuming a causal ordering of the variables. Given the lack of economic theory, 
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we can only give the following heuristic argument, using the variable names to 
indicate the innovations in the respective equations: 
(13) 
We assume innovations in aid changes are predetermined, such that the innovations 
in the aid equation are 'structural' aid shocks. 15 In light of the importance of the 
endogeneity and instrumentation of aid in cross-country growth regressions, one 
might ask whether this is a reasonable assumption. To this end, it is important to 
note that we do not assume the exogeneity of aid flows as such. Rather, we assume 
that they are endogenous, but further assume that annual changes in country-specific 
aid flows - conditional on lagged changes in aid flows, GDP, domestic demand, 
exports and imports - are exogenous and unpredictable given our information set. In 
light of the results of the country studies in Berg et al. (2007), we believe that this 
assumption is not unreasonable. 
The ordering within the national accounts identity is mainly governed by the fact 
that the countries in our sample are small open economies. Hence, we assume that 
shocks to the changes in exports (again, conditional on the past) are mainly external 
events driven by changes in world market prices. As most of the countries in the 
sample have fixed exchange rates, this makes export shocks independent of shocks to 
changes in domestic demand and GDP. The innovation in the change in domestic 
demand is the third variable in the chain, because this variable includes government 
consumption and investment, and discretionary fiscal policy can be considered as 
consumption or investment shocks within the model. Finally, the change in GDP is 
fourth in the ordering; however, as it precedes changes in imports, the goods market 
is assumed to be cleared by changes in imports, not by changes in GDP. 16 
The VAR model is mainly formulated to analyse the short- and medium-run 
impact of aid flows. Therefore, our specific choice of structural ordering should not 
be interpreted as an attempt to provide a strict identification of structural shocks. 
Instead, the key assumption is that aid flows are predetermined, meaning that the 
innovations in the aid equation can be interpreted as aid shocks to the economies in 
question. 
Estimation of Absorption, Spending and Production 
The VAR model in equation (12) is specified with country-specific parameters. Thus, 
in a cross-country setting, we must impose some kind of structure on the parameters 
in order to obtain representative (or average) parameter estimates. The simplest and 
most restrictive structure is to assume that the parameters are identical across 
countries. Under this assumption, the cross-country data can simply be pooled and 
the parameters of the VAR are estimated using ordinary least squares. A slightly less 
restrictive structure allows the intercepts (µ;)to vary across countries, while the slope 
parameters (r1k, \f/11,) are assumed to be equal. This assumption gives us a dynamic 
panel data model with country-specific fixed effects, yielding a structure that is 
currently popular in cross-country analyses. However, in the present setting, where 
the model is formulated for annual changes of all variables, it may be overly 
restrictive to assume equal slope parameters. Thus, we consider the least restrictive 
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structure, in which we allow both the intercepts and the slope parameters to vary 
across countries. Under this assumption, the VAR model in equation (12) is a 
version of the random coefficient dynamic panel data models in, for example, 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Hsiao et aL (1999). 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the parameters of the random coefficient 
dynamic panel data model can be consistently estimated using the mean group 
estimator (MGE), which is computed by estimating the parameters for each country 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) and then taking the arithmetic average of the 
country-specific parameters. For the present analysis, we then use the MGE for the 
autoregressive parameters to estimate the mean group impulse response function 
parameters for aid, GDP, domestic demand and exports. Although imports are 
omitted, based on the adding-up constraint we know that the responses for imports 
equal the responses in domestic demand plus the responses in exports less the responses 
in GDP. Based on these response parameters, we can estimate responses and 
accumulated responses for all variables of interest. We focus on four functions of the 
impulse-response parameters, namely the estimates of cumulated changes in the aid 
flows, absorption, spending and changes in production following an unexpected 
increase in the aid flow. 
Specifically, if we let Rh(z,a) denote the response in variable z in period t + h 
following an aid shock in period t, then the resulting cumulative change in the aid 
flows over time can be estimated from the accumulated response as: 
. ~s ( !\ At+s - At-1 Aid flow(s) = L-i-o Rh a, a) = A , 
1
- t - At-1 
s=O,l, ... ,oo. ( 14) 
Furthermore, absorption up to a given year (s) following the aid shock is the 
accumulated response in net imports relative to the accumulated response in the aid 
flow: 
s = 0, 1, ... l 00. 
(15) 
Spending over time can be estimated analogously as the accumulated response in 
domestic demand relative to the accumulated response in the aid flow following an 
aid shock: 
s = 0, 1, ... '00. ( 16) 
Finally, the impact on production (GDP) can be estimated as the difference between 
absorption and spending up to a given year, s: 
d . ( ) L~-0 Rh(y, a) !\ Yt+s - Yt-1 . ( ) . ( ) Pro uct10n s = °"s - R ( ) = A = Spendmg s - Absorpt10n s . 
0h=O h a, a At+s - t-1 
(17) 
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The four dynamic response functions in equations (14)-(17) are useful as 
'descriptive' measures, and may also be used to test hypotheses about each of the 
processes. Some examples of specific testable hypotheses are: 
(i) H0: Sudden changes in aid are permanent. 
(ii) Ha: Absorption of additional aid flows is zero at any given horizon following 
the initial change. 
(iii) Ha: Spending of additional aid flows is zero at any given horizon following the 
initial change. 
(iv) Ha: Absorption equals spending, such that the impact of an additional aid flow 
on GDP is zero at any given horizon following the initial change. 
Despite the mainly descriptive appearance of the VAR approach, these hypotheses 
are implicitly tested in the following section. 
IV. The Data 
As noted in the introduction, we focus on the short-run impact of aid in small 
developing countries (SDCs). Among the many definitions of SDCs in the literature, 
most appear to be based on somewhat arbitrary criteria, and the definition of the 
'smallness' of countries appears to have decreased over time. Here, we mainly focus on 
countries with 1980 populations ofless than one million, and 1980 per capita incomes of 
less than US$5000 in 1990-adjusted dollars (although the sample does include some 
higher-income SDCs). This definition broadly matches the World Bank's (IDA) 
criteria for small countries that require special assistance due to their size, as well as the 
commonly-used criteria from the cross-country growth regression literature, which 
typically focuses on 'large' countries with populations above one million. 
Using the above-described guidelines and selecting countries for which we can 
gather a reasonable amount of acceptable-quality data, we construct a sample of 20 
countries with annual data for the period from 1972 to 2003. 17 The sample countries 
are given in Table 1, while some summary statistics for the countries and sub-groups 
are given in Table 2. 
The countries in our sample are generally quite poor, having an overall average 
per capita GDP just below constant US$2500 (Table 2). Another interesting (yet 
unsurprising) fact is that these countries rely heavily on international trade, with an 
average trade-to-GDP ratio just above 100 per cent and an average net import-to-
GDP ratio of about 20 per cent. The aid data in Table 2 conform to our own 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Fiji* 
Table 1. The sample of small developing countries 
French Polynesia 
Gabon* 
The Gambia 
Grenada* 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mauritius* 
St. Lucia* 
St. Kitts & Nevis* 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Seychelles 
Suriname* 
Togo 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Note: Countries marked with * comprise the subsample of non-aid-dependent countries. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the sample of small developing countries, 1972-2003 
Non-aid-
Aid-dependent dependent 
All (N =20, (N = 13, (N=7, 
Obs.= 577) Obs.= 374) Obs. =203) 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
GDP per capita (Constant USD) 2467 3274 2225 3786 2914 1945 
Dom. Dem./GDP 120.6 19.8 127.0 19. l 108.8 15.3 
Net Imports/GDP 20.6 19.8 27.0 19.1 8.8 15.3 
Exports/GDP 41.5 21.8 34.8 22.8 53.7 12.8 
Imports/GDP 62.1 24.8 61.8 27.8 62.5 18.1 
Aid/GDP 10.9 13.6 15.0 15.2 3.2 3.2 
Aid/Trade 13.6 19.3 19.4 21.7 2.8 3.0 
Notes: All ratios are reported as percentages. Trade is the sum of imports and exports. N is the 
number of countries. Obs. is the total number of observations in the sample. 
definition by including grants and loans minus loan repayments, but excluding 
emergency aid and technical cooperation. Under this definition, we see that the 
annual aid inflow could finance, on average, half of the annual net imports, 
indicating that most of these small economies largely finance net imports through 
external resources other than aid. 
We use the average aid flow in each country to identify highly aid-dependent 
economies; in contrast to most other studies, however, we look at aid relative to trade 
(imports plus exports) instead of relative to GDP, both because international trade is 
so important in small developing countries, and because aid and trade are alternative 
means of earning foreign exchange. Somewhat arbitrarily, we define countries as aid-
dependent if they have an average aid-to-trade ratio above 5 per cent. Under this 
definition, 13 of the 20 countries are aid-dependent. The non-aid-dependent countries 
are indicated by asterisks in Table 1, and the summary statistics in Table 2 clearly 
show that these seven countries have low aid-to-trade ratios because they export 
relatively more than the 13 aid-dependent countries. In fact, while the import shares 
are almost equal in the two country groups, the average export share is significantly 
lower for the aid-dependent countries (35%) compared to the non-aid-dependent 
countries (54%). The aid-dependent country group is also poorer on average, it has a 
much higher net import share, and the average aid-to-GDP share is significantly 
higher compared to that of the non-aid-dependent country group. 18 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the data that we use in the VAR model. As 
in Table 2, statistics are shown for all 20 countries, as well as for the aid-dependent 
and non-aid-dependent country groups. The summary statistics indicate a slight 
increase over time for aid flows to the 20 countries; the average change in aid relative 
to the country-specific level of GDP in 1973 is 0.23 per cent. This increase is at least 
10-fold less than the increases in real GDP and the demand components. We also 
find that changes in domestic demand outpace GDP, as net imports increase by more 
than the average increase in aid flows over the sample period. The by-group division 
shows that the seven non-aid-dependent countries experience an overall decrease in 
aid flows over time. 19 Moreover, changes in both GDP and exports are larger for 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations for the variables in the VAR models, 1972-2003 
Aid-dependent 
All (N =20, (N = 13, Non-aid-dependent 
Obs.= 577) Obs.= 374) (N = 7, Obs.= 203) 
Scaled changes in Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Aid 0.23 12.90 0.45 15.76 ~0.16 4.01 
Exports 2.23 16.51 2.19 17.06 2.29 15.49 
Domestic demand 6.31 18.32 6.68 20.37 5.62 13.77 
GDP 5.49 9.81 5.68 10.15 5.13 9.17 
Net imports 0.82 16.04 0.99 17.92 0.49 11.85 
Notes: All ratios are reported as percentage changes. N is the number of countries. Obs. is the 
total number of observations in the sample. 
non-aid-dependent countries, while the average changes in domestic demand (and 
thus in net imports) are smaller than those in the aid-dependent country group. 
Finally, the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for 
the different measures clearly shows substantial variation in the data across both 
time and countries, particularly for aid flows. 20 
Clearly, the dynamic properties of the data cannot be inferred from the tables 
above. Therefore, before turning to our formal econometric results in Section V, we 
intuitively examine the properties of the time series by graphically examining 
the time series patterns for key variables. Specifically, in Figures 1 and 2 we look at 
the time patterns of aid, net-imports and spending for each country in the sample. 
Figure 1 gives plots for the 13 aid-depyndent countries, while Figure 2 shows plots 
for the seven non-aid-dependent countries. 
Although we find marked heterogeneity even within the aid-dependent SDCs, the 
two figures highlight some interesting patterns. The first such pattern is seen in the size 
of aid changes. In most of the aid-dependent countries, the changes in aid (scaled by 
GDP in 1973) are on the same order of magnitude as the changes in net imports and 
domestic demand, whereas the aid flows are much less volatile in the non-aid-
dependent country group. Second, net imports and spending are likewise more volatile 
in the aid-dependent countries. Third, the closeness with which changes in aid track 
changes in imports or spending clearly varies across countries, with the clearest signals 
seen in the aid-dependent countries. In countries such as Dominica, Togo, and 
Vanuatu, aid appears to closely track imports and spending. In the other countries, 
however, the patterns are more mixed. In some years, large aid changes seem to 
coincide with commensurate changes in imports or spending, but in many cases they do 
not. In Gambia, for example, we see large changes in imports and spending that are not 
associated with significant changes in aid. In Guinea-Bissau, large aid changes in the 
late 1980s and 1990s often exceed changes in imports and spending, suggesting that it is 
either very difficult or undesirable (or both) to absorb and spend massive shocks. 
V. Empirical Results 
While the graphical results are interesting, and allow us to look at country-specific 
results, they do not provide a rigorous tool for examining and formally testing more 
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• _Djj,ouli 
Figure 1. Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand (% GDP in 1973) in 13 aid-
dependent SDCs. Note: Extreme observations (±40 per cent) are omitted from the plots. 
Abbreviations: a= aid; d =demand; m-x =net imports. All measures are relative to initial 
GDP. 
Fiji I Gab Oil Gnm.dli 
40 
1- a ----ell 
·-·u·-·- m-x 
1975 1923 1995 2005 
Figure 2. Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand(% GDP in 1973) in seven non-
aid-dependent SDCs. Note: Extreme observations (±40 per cent) are omitted from the plots. 
Abbreviations: a= aid; d =demand; m-x =net imports. All measures are relative to initial 
GDP. 
complex dynamic patterns in the data. The more formal econometric model we 
propose in Section III seeks to fill this gap. As we explain in Section III, the 
autoregressive parameters of the VAR model are reduced form parameters with no 
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direct interpretation; this is why we do not present or discuss the autoregressive 
parameter estimates. Instead, we focus on the dynamic responses, represented by the 
estimations of aid flow, absorption, spending and production changes following an 
exogenous aid shock. 
Table 4 shows the estimated average responses for the aid-dependent country 
group following a shock in year zero. 21 Notably, the table shows that shocks to aid 
are followed by significantly decreased aid flows in succeeding years. This confirms 
the high volatility of aid flows, and is consistent with previous findings, suggesting 
that policymakers in aid-receiving countries should not regard sudden increases in 
aid flows as permanent (Heller and Gupta, 2002; Foster and Killick, 2006; Berg 
et al., 2007). More specifically, the information in Table 4 indicates that about half of 
the initial change is transitory. As discussed in Section II, a reasonable response to 
this reversion tendency in aid flows would be to delay and smooth the absorption 
and spending of sudden changes in aid. 
A certain delay or smoothing of the response is clear from Table 4, as we see only 
small, non-significant changes in both absorption and spending in the initial year of 
the shock, and also in the first year thereafter. Spending increases rather smoothly 
from a low level in the initial year to a peak three years after the shock. The point 
estimate of the peak level of spending is 48 per cent, indicating that about half of the 
change in aid is spent. While we cannot reject the possibility of higher levels of 
spending, full spending of the additional aid flow is highly unlikely, as it is clearly 
outside the two-standard-error band. The absorption ratios are smaller than the 
spending ratios, but only by a small margin, and the time patterns are fairly similar. 
The peak level of absorption is also seen in year three following the shock, although 
the point estimate of the peak is only 40 per cent, yielding a relatively small effect on 
GDP. 
Table 4 paints a clear picture of aid shock smoothing and somewhat low 
absorption and spending ratios compared to the ideal absorption and spending 
prescription. However, absorption and spending rates just below 50 per cent are 
higher than the findings for most of the countries examined in Berg et al. (2007) and 
Foster and Killick (2006). Furthermore, the time pattern of absorption and spending 
Table 4. Dynamic responses to an aid shock: average aid fl.ow, absorption, spending, and 
production for the 13 aid-dependent countries 
Year 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Aid fl.ow 
100.00 -
56.80 ( 4.00) 
47.00 ( 4.50) 
60.30 (4.40) 
51.90 (3.20) 
56.90 (2.90) 
54.50 (3.20) 
57.30 (2.80) 
55.80 (3.00) 
Absorption 
1.10 (5.50) 
14.20 (11.60) 
7.50 (14.60) 
39.40 (11.10) 
16.90 (10.50) 
12.10 (9.30) 
19.40 (10.80) 
14.90 (10.40) 
19.00 (10.90) 
Spending 
4.70 (6.00) 
11.80 (13.20) 
28.20 (16.20) 
48.10 (11.60) 
31.70 (JO.JO) 
30.90 (8.90) 
23.60 (10.40) 
25.00 (10.00) 
35.60 (10.20) 
Production 
3.70 (2.70) 
-2.30 (6.00) 
20.70 (8.20) 
8. 70 (7.70) 
14.80 (9.50) 
18.80 (8.90) 
4.30 (9.60) 
10.20 (9.10) 
16.60 (9.60) 
Note: The response parameters and their standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
estimated using Monte Carlo Integration based on 10,000 Monte Carlo draws (see Sims and 
Zha, 1999). Coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level or better are bolded and italicised. 
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Table 5. Dynamic responses to an aid shock: average aid fiow, absorption, spending, and 
production for the seven non-aid-dependent countries 
Year 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Aid flow 
100.00 ~ 
56.90 (9.60) 
39.60 (11.10) 
57.30 (JO.SO) 
41.40 (7.80) 
55.90 ( 6.90) 
51.80 (8.10) 
43.10 (7.40) 
53.20 (6.90) 
Absorption 
15.80 (22.90) 
-95.60 (67.40) 
35.30 (157.30) 
-38.50 (84.00) 
-92.80 (103.60) 
-45. 70 (66.90) 
- 70.90 (74. 70) 
-51.80 (89.40) 
-40.00 (70.20) 
Spending 
21.00 (24.20) 
72.10 (74.00) 
91.30 (206.90) 
49.90 (103.70) 
98.10 (123.80) 
30.40 (80.70) 
58.60 (84.20) 
81.40 (101.10) 
46.60 (81.50) 
Production 
5.20 (15.50) 
167. 70 (55.50) 
56.00 (227.20) 
88.40 (67.50) 
190.90 (79.40) 
76.10 (48.60) 
129.50 (56.90) 
133.20 (68.40) 
86.50 (55.30) 
Note: The response parameters and their standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
estimated using Monte Carlo Integration based on 10,000 Monte Carlo draws (see Sims and 
Zha, 1999). Coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level or better are bolded and italicised. 
indicates reasonably consistent monetary and fiscal policies in the aid-dependent 
countries, thereby avoiding severe macroeconomic imbalances that could be caused 
by the increased aid inflow. 
Table 5 shows the same breakdown for the seven non-aid-dependent countries. 
Comparison of Tables 4 and 5 clearly reveals that while the aid-dependent 
countries absorb and spend half of a sudden increase in aid, the non-aid-dependent 
countries do not absorb the change at all. However, although we consistently find 
positive spending and (mainly) negative absorption in non-aid-dependent countries, 
yielding a huge impact on production (the aid-production ratio is just below 200 per 
cent at its peak in year four after the shock), the precision in the estimates is 
extremely low for this group of countries. Given the very small sample size, the 
results in Table 5 should be interpreted with more than the usual caution. The main 
conclusion we can draw from our analysis of the seven non-aid-dependent countries 
is that responses to sudden changes in aid do not appear to be very systematic, either 
within or across these countries. 
VI. Conclusion 
We develop a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) model to describe the short-run 
macroeconomic responses to sudden aid shocks in SDCs. Using the notions of 
absorption and spending introduced to the aid literature by the IMF (2005; later 
published in a revised version as Berg et al., 2007) we describe how this idea of 
absorbing and spending aid can be extended to macroeconomic variables, where it 
describes changes in net imports and domestic demand relative to changes in aid 
flow. We believe that this conceptual expansion is particularly interesting because 
absorption and spending are then naturally related to the national income accounts 
identity and, hence, to GDP. 
We stress the importance of allowing for a flexible dynamic structure when 
modelling absorption and spending, because the observed volatility of aid flows 
necessitates a certain degree of prudence in the absorption and spending decisions in 
78 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
recipient countries. This leads us to consider a VAR model as the least restrictive 
empirical framework. In addition, when we estimate average absorption and 
spending rates across a group of SDCs, we use the mean group estimator (Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995) to allow for country-specific heterogeneity in the VAR model 
parameters. We consider such a flexible parametric approach to be necessary when 
looking at short-run changes in macroeconomic variables across countries. 
While the novelty of the present econometric analysis - as well as justified 
concerns over data quality - warrants considerable caution in interpretation and 
warns against drawing overly strong inferences, our results suggest some reasonably 
clear conclusions. Specifically, for aid-dependent countries, we can reject several of 
the proposed hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that sudden changes in aid are 
permanent. On the contrary, we find that aid flows to SDCs are mean reverting and, 
in addition, highly volatile. This re-emphasises the importance of 'aid smoothing' in 
aid-dependent countries, and allows us to be somewhat encouraged when we see that 
the aid-dependent countries typically appear to do this. Our second and third 
hypotheses were that aid flows are neither absorbed nor spent. Again, we are inclined 
to reject these hypotheses, because we find a reasonably strong co-movement in 
absorption and spending for the group of aid-dependent SDCs, which in turn implies 
that there is little short-run (demand-driven) impact of aid shocks on GDP (as 
expected). This is in contrast to the findings from the country studies reported in 
Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), and also counters the findings of the 
only other econometric study of this kind that we know of (Aiyar and Ruthbah, 
2008). Aiyer and Ruthbah find that spending significantly exceeds absorption in both 
the short and long run in a large cross-section of countries. It is unclear what can be 
inferred from these differences, as both the data and empirical methods differ 
between this prior study and the present work. However, we note that our results for 
the non-aid-dependent sample are much weaker than those for the aid-dependent 
sample, so much so that the non-aid-dependent results are more in line with the 
findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008). 
While we do not think these results are entirely surprising given the large aid 
inflows in aid-dependent SDCs, the results do provide encouraging information to 
donors. For example, when aid flows to an economy are an important source of 
resources, there does appear to be sufficient focus on absorbing the resource flow. In 
contrast, when other resource flows are more important than aid (for example, 
exports of natural resources or financial services), then aid flows may be primarily 
used to augment foreign exchange reserves. This in turn can lead to a possible 
mismatch between absorption and spending, whereby large increases in aid may lead 
to short-run problems and macroeconomic imbalances. 
Since our approach is methodologically novel, it behoves us to consider the 
implications of our work for future research. Such analyses could include further 
experiments with the econometric modeling of short-run responses. Although the 
VAR approach is largely atheoretical or 'agnostic,' we are required to impose 
restrictions on the causal ordering of the variables in the VAR-model without formal 
theoretical guidance. Arguably, the key assumption of this ordering is that changes 
in aid, conditional on the past, are predetermined with respect to the other variables. 
This assumption can be challenged. For example, in very small economies that are 
highly dependent on imports, donors may react to any factor that threatens the 
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import capacity of the country (for example, export shocks or terms of trade shocks, 
such as the recent surge in international food prices). There are also different ways in 
which one might define subsamples or average across them, and future investigations 
in this area would do well to identify the robustness of alternative means of grouping 
responses. Nevertheless, the use of VAR-type models in the context of aid flows 
seems as though it will be a useful avenue for improving our understanding of both 
how aid is actually utilised in the short run, and how its utilization might be 
improved. 
Notes 
1. A number of recent papers have systematically tested for differences between small and large states. 
See, among others, Streeten (1993), Bertram (1993), Milner and Westaway (1993), Briguglio (1995), 
Armstrong et al. (1998), Easterly and Kraay (2000), Armstrong and Read (2002), and Kase and 
Prasad (2002). 
2. In particular, there are very few cross-country studies, especially of the econometric kind, on aid 
effectiveness in SDCs. See Feeny (2007) for a recent example. However, country studies have been 
reported in numbers too large to allow them to be adequately referenced herein. 
3. See Adam (2006) for a survey and discussion of Dutch Disease effects of aid flows. 
4. The studies by IMF (2005), Aiyar et al. (2006) and Berg et al. (2007) are closely related and (more or 
less) written by the same group of authors. Although IMF (2005) was the first, we refer to Berg et al. 
(2007) as it is the most comprehensive study. 
5. The reasons for the relatively good socioeconomic performance of SDCs are typically thought to be 
two-fold. First, SOCs have an apparent disadvantage that could work to their advantage in the long 
run, namely an extreme dependence upon the world economy, which is thought to impose the 
discipline of competition on domestic markets, and to pressure policymakers into adopting 
internationally acceptable policies and institutional structures. Second, their lack of political and 
economic importance on the international stage could mean that larger countries do not view them as 
economically threatening, and may even see 'rewarding' SDC support as a cost-effective means of 
acquiring support in UN voting decisions (Bertram, 1993). Thus, powerful countries may be inclined 
to offer SOCs more favorable conditions on trade, offshore finance laws, migration, and foreign aid, 
relative to other LDCs. 
6. Both grants and loans may be 'in kind' but this does not influence the following discussion. 
7. The sum of the aid grant and the aid loan less the repayment corresponds to the definition of net 
official development aid (ODA) by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC): net 
ODA= Ag +A1 -A'. 
8. Our definition of absorption differs from the definition in Berg et al. (2007), as we include only net 
imports of goods and services, while they also include net interest payments and private transfers (the 
non-aid current account). As will be apparent later, we consider the former a more natural choice in 
our setting. 
9. Naturally, over time, there may be second-order effects from an increased reserve position or decreases 
in interest and principal payments on debt. 
10. When aid is given to an NGO, the spending decision is recorded as an increase in household 
consumption and private investment, because NGOs are included in the private sector in the national 
accounts system. 
11. Needless to say, 'defensive lending' is never stated explicitly as an aid program. However, fairly strong 
evidence suggests the occurrence of defensive lending to highly indebted poor African countries 
(Birdsall et al., 2003). 
12. By 'sudden increase,' we mean an unanticipated exogenous change in aid, or at least a change in aid 
that is not predictable given our model set-up. 
13. See also Greene (2003, Chapter 14) for examples. 
14. The term 'natural disasters' covers droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, famines, 
floods, insect infestations, landslides, volcano eruptions, wave surges, wild fires, and wind storms. 
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These data are from the International Disaster Database (http://www.em-dat.net) maintained by the 
Universite Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 
15. This assumption is the main reason for subtracting emergency aid from the net aid flows, because this 
kind of aid may respond to within-year changes in the macroeconomic variables. 
16. Clearly, this assumption is questionable if lack of foreign exchange reserves is a binding constraint in a 
country. However, we consider the assumption to be reasonable under 'normal' circumstances. 
17. Data quality is a significant limiting factor, as we require reliable annual observations for all 
expenditure components in the national accounts identity. A frequent problem in the national 
accounts data is that the real growth rate in one or more of the expenditure components is identical to 
the growth rate in real GDP, that is, the data are constructed so as to maintain a fixed expenditure-to-
GDP ratio over time in real terms. The most extreme example of this is seen in Kiribati, where all 
national income account components have identical growth rates from 1971 to 2003. Needless to say, 
such data do not allow analysis using our approach. 
18. The seven countries with low aid-to-trade shares have special characteristics affecting their 
international trade volumes. For example, four of the countries have significant financial centers 
(Grenada, Mauritius, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis); Fiji and Suriname are mineral-rich; and 
Gabon is an oil/petroleum exporter. 
19. This is on average, and it does not hold for all seven countries. Fiji and Grenada see increasing aid 
flows over time, while the other countries experience decreasing aid flows from 1974 to 2003. Several 
countries in the aid-dependent group also experience decreasing aid flows over time. 
20. This variation is mainly over time; the cross-country variation is less than 10 per cent of the total 
variation in the aid variable. 
21. When reporting results for the impulse response parameters, we follow the suggestions of Sims and 
Zha (1999) and report parameter estimates and standard errors based on a Bayesian model 
formulation in which we condition on the initial observations and use a flat prior. The posterior 
probability distribution is estimated using Monte Carlo Integration based on 10,000 Monte Carlo 
draws. 
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ABSTRACT Aid flows to small island developing states (SIDS) are enormous by international 
standards when compared to the size of their economies. Yet these countries face many severe 
economic challenges and many have experienced declines in the living standards of their citizens. 
This paper looks at the impact of aid on what is treated as a necessary precondition for 
improvements in living standards, typically defined. Specifically, it examines the impact of foreign 
aid on real per capita income growth in SIDS by econometrically analysing cross-country data 
for the period 1980 to 2004. A variety of econometric techniques and measures of aid are used. 
Results suggest that foreign aid is effective at spurring economic growth but with diminishing 
returns. 
I. Introduction 
Achieving higher living standards in small island developing states (SIDS) is 
particularly challenging. This group of countries is characterised by small domestic 
markets, high export concentrations, often extreme vulnerability to environmental 
and economic shocks and high costs of transport to international markets. Social 
disharmony and tensions are high in some SIDS and some have even experienced 
civil war. Those located in the Pacific are faring particularly poorly, with living 
standards having fallen appreciably in many of these countries in recent years. While 
these factors might provide a case for providing greater international assistance to 
SIDS, these countries currently receive some of the highest levels of aid in the world 
relative to the size of their economies and populations. This raises important 
questions over the effectiveness of foreign aid to SIDS in promoting higher living 
standards. An evaluation of aid effectiveness in SIDS is therefore timely and 
pertinent. 
Examining the impact of aid on living standards outcomes in recipient countries is 
no easy task. It is especially difficult for SIDS due to a severe paucity of requisite 
data. Information on factors such the number of people living in income poverty, 
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health and education achievements and access to water and sanitation is such that 
any rigorous empirical analysis of the impact of aid on living standards in SIDS is 
simply not feasible. What is more feasible, however, is a cross-country analysis of the 
impact of aid on real per capita income (economic) growth in these countries. It is 
well known that economic growth is a necessary (although clearly not sufficient) 
precondition for improved living standards as described. It can create income-
earning opportunities for the poor and lead to larger tax revenues and subsequently 
higher government expenditures in the social sectors such as health, education and 
water and sanitation. Many studies point to these relationships (see, for example, 
Bell and Rich, 1994; Ravallion and Datt, 1994; Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Dollar 
and Kraay, 2000). An analysis of the link between aid and income growth will at 
least tell us, therefore, whether aid is effective in spurring a precondition for the 
improvement in living standards. 
Figure 1 below shows that foreign aid flows to SIDS are large and volatile. 
Foreign aid flows trended up from accounting for an average of 10 per cent of SIDS' 
GDP in 1980 to over 20 per cent in 1988. Aid flows then followed a downtrend to 
account for around an average of 13 per cent of GDP in 2004. Aid flows accounted 
for a particularly high ratio of GDP in SIDS for the years 1994 and 1995. This is 
largely explained by very high levels of aid provided to Sao Tome and Principe in 
these years due to civil unrest and a coup (101 % and 185% respectively), and Palau 
following its independence (242% and 149% respectively). 
The average per capita income growth rate of SIDS has followed similar trends 
although average growth was negative for the years 1982 and 2001. This is largely 
explained by severe economic contractions in 1982 in St Lucia (due to political 
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instability) and Guyana (due to a sharp contraction in the mining sector) and due to 
civil unrest in the Solomon Islands in 200 I. 
This paper provides an econometric analysis of the impact of aid on SIDS real 
income growth per capita using data for the period 1980 to 2004. While income 
growth data are far more widely available than living standards data in SIDS, data 
availability still imposes particular constraints. Econometric models must be 
relatively parsimonious so that sample sizes are sufficiently large. Econometric 
analysis of the type conducted for most aid recipients cannot consequently be 
applied to SIDS. A variety of estimation techniques and measures of aid are 
employed, therefore, to test for the robustness of the results. Results from the 
analysis undertaken by this paper suggest that foreign aid is effective at spurring 
economic growth but with diminishing returns. The finding of diminishing returns, 
combined with the often very large levels of aid relative to the size of SIDS 
economies, leads the paper to question whether the aid received by some of these 
countries is appropriate from an economic growth perspective. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief 
summary of the recent literature which has examined aid effectiveness. It identifies 
four key findings, which are used to justify or inform the econometric analysis 
conducted later in the paper. Section III provides an overview of the data and 
methods used in this paper. Section IV presents the results from the empirical 
analysis and further analysis is undertaken in Section V. Finally, Section VI 
concludes with the policy implications arising from the research of this paper. 
II. Aid Effectiveness Literature 
The vast majority of the aid effectiveness literature has evaluated foreign aid by 
examining its impact on economic growth and on poverty reduction by association. 
There are four main findings from this literature. Firstly, on average, aid works. 
That is, there is now an extensive body of recent international research that suggests 
that foreign aid is effective at spurring economic growth in recipient countries (see 
McGillivray et al., 2006 for a recent review of numerous studies). The implication is 
that economic growth would be lower in the absence of foreign aid. The finding that 
aid spurs growth in recipient countries is confirmed by the few existing studies 
examining foreign aid effectiveness in selected Pacific countries implying that the 
poor growth records of many of these countries cannot be attributed to foreign aid 
(see Gounder, 2001, for the case of Fiji; Gounder, 2002 for the case of the Solomon 
Islands; Feeny, 2006, for Melanesian countries; Sugden and Pavlov, 2005, for a 
sample of seven Pacific countries). 1 To the knowledge of the authors of this paper, no 
study has specifically examined empirically the impact of aid on growth in SIDS. 
Secondly, foreign aid works better in some countries or environments than in others 
with its impact being contingent upon certain factors. Put differently, the impact of an 
additional dollar varies among countries. This is hardly surprising. These contingencies 
are empirically captured through the use of multiplicative interactive variables, in 
which aid interacts with one of more of these factors. There are ongoing debates, 
however, about precisely the contingency or contingencies that actually matter. Some 
researchers find it works best in recipients with good economic policies (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000, 2004; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Collier and Hoeffier, 2004). Others find 
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aid works best in countries experiencing adverse trade shocks (Collier and Dehn, 2001), 
in structurally vulnerable and politically stable countries (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 
2001), in more democratic countries (Svensson, 1999; Islam, 2003) or in countries 
located outside the tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004). 
Thirdly, the type of foreign aid is likely to be important for the impact on 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Foreign aid comes in many different forms 
and recent empirical studies have attempted to account for this. Gomanee et al. 
(2005) examine the mechanisms via which aid should affect growth. Food aid, 
emergency relief and technical assistance are subtracted from their aid variable, 
arguing that these forms of assistance will not impact on growth (at least in the short 
run). They find that aid has a positive impact on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
through its impact on investment. They also observe that the small marginal effect of 
aid on growth can largely be attributed to the low productivity of investment in the 
region. Clemens et al. (2004) disaggregate aid into 'short-impact' and 'long impact' 
aid variables. Short-impact aid relates to aid flows that can be expected to increase 
GDP per capita within approximately four years. Clemens et al. (2004) find that the 
positive impact of short impact aid on growth is found to be about two or three times 
larger than in studies using aggregate aid. Ram (2003, 2004) provides evidence to 
suggest that bilateral aid has a positive impact on economic growth while 
multilateral aid has a negative impact. Feeny (2006) finds that while aid grants 
have spurred economic growth in Melanesian countries, aid loans have not had any 
impact. Interestingly, Morrissey et al. (2007) find the same for Kenya. 
Fourthly, aid is found to be effective but with diminishing returns. Studies find 
that foreign aid is effective at spurring economic growth up to a certain threshold of 
aid. Past this threshold, its impact diminishes or becomes smaller (see for example, 
Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 200 I; Lensink and White, 
2001; Hudson and Mosley, 2001; Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004). 
Intuitively, this makes good sense since there are likely to be limits to the amounts of 
foreign aid inflows that an economy can efficiently absorb. Absorptive capacity 
constraints arise for a number of different reasons. High levels of aid place a huge 
administrative burden on recipients with public sector officials in recipient countries 
facing negotiation, management and reporting requirements. This is particularly true 
in the presence of a high level of donor proliferation. Aid volatility can also impact 
on absorptive capacity as can Dutch disease effects (whereby high levels of aid have 
an adverse impact on the export competitiveness of developing countries). 
Estimates of the level of aid at which its incremental impact on recipient country 
growth diminishes vary, but on average, this occurs at around 20 per cent of 
recipient GDP (Feeny and McGillivray, 2008). Very high levels of aid (exceeding 
twice this level) might not necessarily be effective. In scaling up foreign aid, donors 
will need to ensure that they provide aid at levels that recipients can effectively 
absorb from a growth perspective. Testing for diminishing returns assumes great 
importance given that donors are currently scaling up aid (OECD, 2006). 
III. Data and Methods 
Studies using cross-county data have been widely criticised. Results can be sensitive 
to the specification of the model, the time period used and the data employed. By 
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examining the impact of aid only in SIDS, this paper attempts to circumvent some of 
the criticisms of cross-country studies by building on the findings presented in 
Section II above.2 It adopts a variety of econometric techniques to examine the 
relationship between aid and growth to test the robustness of the results. 
Building on the most recent aid effectiveness literature, the following empirical 
model is specified: 
(1) 
where gi is a real growth in GDP per capita, ai is the ratio of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to GDP, <Di is a vector of multiplicative interactions between aid 
various other variables, and Zi is a vector of control variables. Subscript i represents 
the recipient country. The variables interacting with aid include binary regional 
location dummies, measures of policy, regional location and binary dummies whose 
values depend on whether country i is classified by the donor community as a fragile 
state. The vector of additional variables (Z1) contains measures of ethnic frac-
tionalisation, governance, macroeconomic policy and a dummy variable to capture 
major natural disasters impacting on the recipient country. The model includes an 
aid squared variable to capture possible diminishing returns to aid. The expected 
signs of /3 1 and /32 are positive and negative, respectively. Foreign aid is disaggregated 
into its various components in some specifications. The data include annual 
observations for 29 SIDS, covering the period 1980 to 2004. The number of countries 
included in the sample varies from year to year due to data availability. Many 
variants of model outlined in (1) are estimated, with each being relatively 
parsimonious in order to include as many SIDS in the sample as feasible. 
Data for SIDS, especially those located in the Pacific, are sparse and often of 
questionable reliability. This can make the identification of relationships between aid, 
growth and other variables difficult. Obtaining information on the control variables 
typically used in aid-growth analysis is a particular problem. Data sources used for 
the analysis in this paper include the World Bank (2006), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) (2006) and the OECD (2006). The governance variable used in this 
paper is a composite index of the World Bank's governance indicators. The 
governance indicators are available for the period 1996 to 2004. They include six 
dimensions of governance: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability and 
absence of violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of 
law; and (vi) control of corruption. The index is an equally weighted index of the six 
dimensions of governance. The value of the index for 1996 was used in years prior to 
1996. This is justified on the grounds that no other data are available and that the level 
of governance usually varies very little through time. Macroeconomic policy variables 
include the annual rate of inflation and the ratio of import and exports to GDP to 
represent trade. 3 A disaster impact dummy variable was included in recognition of the 
environmental shocks often faced by SIDS. It takes the value of one for natural 
disasters which impacted on at least 10 per cent of the recipient's population. This 
variable was created using the WHO Emergency and Disasters Database. Full details 
of the data and their sources are provided in Appendix Table Al. 
An important issue in any examination of aid effectiveness relates to the 
endogeneity of the foreign aid variable. This variable can be endogenous if donors 
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allocate aid among recipients on the basis of the economic growth rates of the latter. 
In short, aid determines and is determined by recipient growth rates. Studies have in 
response to this instrumented for aid to obtain more accurate parameter estimates. 
However, it is important to note that foreign aid flows are predetermined with 
respect to the current period. Donors do not have information on current growth 
rates and therefore allocate their aid based on growth rates at least one year prior to 
the current year. This means that current aid and current growth will almost 
certainly not be endogenously related and that, consequently, instrumenting for aid 
is not necessary if data for single years are used. 4 Second, it might well be the case 
that the impact of aid on growth is not contemporaneous. Thus, even if donors were 
able to base current aid on current growth, the aid variable in this scenario is not 
endogenous. 5 Third, a number of studies averaged data over a four- or five-year 
period. The reason for this is to lessen the empirical problems associated with large 
annual fluctuations in economic growth rates. Such a treatment will almost certainly 
make foreign aid become at least partially endogenous if donors do allocate aid in 
response (partial or otherwise) to recipient country growth rates and if information 
time lags do not exceed four or five years. 
In view of these responses the approach of this paper is to estimate variants of 
equation (1) using both annual data and data averaged over four years and in 
particular using lagged aid as the instrument. For the former, both the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) estimation methods are used, which are 
appropriate if all explanatory variable are exogenous. Alternative estimates are 
obtained using current and lagged aid data. The disaster impact variable outlined 
above will be relied on at control for the problem of yearly variations in growth 
rates. Recognising that this reliance might be excessive, (1) will also be estimated 
using the generalised method of moments (GMM) approach with four-year 
average data. GMM uses lagged values as instruments and is preferred over the 
standard instrumental variables (IV) method commonly used in the aid-growth 
literature. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) argue that the GMM approach should be preferred since 
any policy variables in period t are likely to be correlated with shocks in earlier 
periods, violating the assumption that all variables other than aid are exogenous and 
not therefore correlated with the error term. Such a correlation implies that an IV 
approach will yield inconsistent parameter estimates. Moreover the aid effectiveness 
literature has struggled to find appropriate instruments for foreign aid with the IV 
approach. Reddy and Minoiu (2006) argue that many studies have used donor 
interest variables as instruments for foreign aid. Since donor interest variables 
represent the part of foreign aid which is unlikely to be as effective as foreign aid 
provided for humanitarian concerns in the recipient, the coefficient on the aid 
variable in these IV regressions is likely to be biased downwards. 
The GMM approach is not subject to these criticisms and it provides estimates 
that are consistent in the presence of one or more endogenous regressors. It is 
therefore the preferred approach of this paper when analysing averaged data. The 
specific variant of GMM used is a two-step system GMM proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and extended by Roodman (2005), which is thought to be more efficient 
than a single-step approach. The Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction to the 
two-step covariance matrix is applied. 
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IV. Results 
Results from the estimation of the empirical model using aggregate aid and OLS are 
presented in Table A2 in the Appendix and are broadly consistent with those from 
the fixed effects specifications provided in columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Econometric results 
Constant 
ODA 
ODA Squared 
ODA Lagged 
1 Year 
ODA Squared 
Lagged 1 Year 
ODA Lagged 
2 Years 
ODA Squared 
Lagged 2 Years 
ODA-Pacific 
Interaction 
ODA-Fragility 
Interaction 
ODA-High 
Fragility 
Interaction 
Ethnic 
F ractionalisation 
(1) 
FE 
-2.511 
(1.03) 
0.098 
(1.18) 
-0.002 
(1.51) 
(2) (3) 
FE FE 
-3.025 -2.213 
(1.23) (0.87) 
-0.108 -0.139 
(1.12) (1.42) 
0.001 0.002 
(1.24) (1.43) 
0.241 0.223 
(2.43)** (2.26)** 
-0.003 -0.003 
(2.77)*** (2.66)*** 
Inflation -0.003 -0.008 
(0.28) (0.75) 
Trade 0.049 0.049 
(3.36)*** (3.40)*** 
Governance 0.398 0.244 
(0.25) (0.15) 
M2 -0.017 -0.013 
(0.87) (0.62) 
Disaster Impact - 1.866 -1.440 
Inflation 
Lagged l Year 
Trade 
Lagged 1 Year 
Observations 
R-squared 
(1.99)** (l.50) 
569 555 
0.665 
(0.42) 
-0.012 
(0.59) 
-1.473 
(1.54) 
0.005 
(0.49) 
0.033 
(2.27)** 
561 
(4) 
GMM 
-3.208 
(0.45) 
0.377 
(2.63)** 
-0.005 
(2.50)** 
-0.177 
(0.09) 
0.027 
( 1.15) 
0.055 
(1.80)* 
8.499 
(2.04)* 
-0.077 
(0.92) 
-1.152 
(0.31) 
124 
(5) (6) (7) 
GMM GMM GMM 
-3.620 2.107 5.586 
(0.64) (0.36) (0.99) 
0.447 0.344 0.502 
(1.89)* (2.32)** (2.15)** 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
(2.21)** (2.51)** (1.96)* 
0.007 
(0.04) 
-0.027 
(0.48) 
-0.476 
(3.26)*** 
1.071 -1.146 -0.386 
(0.45) (0.98) (0.17) 
0.011 0.802 0.237 
(0.34) (1.16) (0.31) 
0.050 0.031 0.031 
(1. 76)* (1.29) (1.59) 
7.774 6.513 5.143 
(1.35) (1.37) (1.41) 
-0.068 -0.139 -0.172 
(1.02) ( 1. 76)* (1.94)* 
-3.220 -3.396 -2.375 
(0.82) (0.92) (0.71) 
124 124 124 
Note: (i) year dummies included in equations estimated using OLS and FE; (ii) robust 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses; and (iii) *, ** and *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
levels, respectively 
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Results from column (1) indicate that aid (in the current year) is not positively 
associated with economic growth. However, results from column (2) indicate that aid 
(when lagged two years) is effective at spurring growth but with diminishing returns.6 
The coefficient on the aid variable is positive and the coefficient on the aid squared 
variable is negative. This is consistent with much of the recent aid effectiveness 
literature. Results from column (3) confirm the relationship between aid and growth 
when inflation and trade are also lagged to control for their potential endogeneity. 
Results using data averaged over a four-year period are provided in columns (4) to 
(7). These results have been obtained using GMM. Results again indicate that 
foreign aid is effective, in that growth would be lower in its absence, but with 
diminishing returns. For reasons outlined in the recent aid effectiveness literature 
and discussed above, the results reported in columns ( 4) to (7) represent the preferred 
specifications of equation (1). These results are discussed below. 
The results shown in columns (I) to (4) have been obtained from an equation with 
no multiplicative interaction terms. Models estimated correspond to equation (I) but 
with vector /31 3 restricted to zero. Variants of (1) were estimated with alternative aid-
continuous variable interactions. Owing to high levels of multicollinearity variants 
were estimated with no more than one interaction. Particular attention was given to 
the well-known and highly controversial aid-policy interaction originally used in the 
infamous Burnside-Dollar (2000) study and many subsequent studies. The 
coefficients attached to each of these interactions were all insignificantly different 
from zero and for this reason are not reported in Table 1. 
Results obtained from a variant of (I) with a multiplicative aid-Pacific binary 
dummy variable are reported in Column (5) of Table 1. This dummy takes the value 
of one for Pacific SIDS and zero for all other SIDS. Results from this specification 
(and numerous others not reported here) cannot lead one to conclude that the 
behavioural relationship between aid and growth is different in Pacific countries than 
in other SIDS. 
Further models were estimated to examine whether the impact of aid differs in so-
called fragile states. There are widespread and valid concerns within the 
international donor community regarding aid effectiveness in fragile states. These 
states are thought to use aid for development purposes less effectively than other 
states. A country is classified by this community as a fragile state if it has a critically 
low World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score, so low 
that it falls into the bottom two quintiles of country CPIA scores. A number of SIDS 
fall into the fragile state category. The exact number varies from period to period. 
Comoros, Haiti, Sao Tome and Principe and the Solomon Islands belong to this 
category in the latest period of the sample. 
Given this, equation (1) was augmented with a number of other multiplicative 
variables. The first was obtained by interacting aid and a fragile state dummy. The 
latter takes the value of one if a SID fa1ls into the bottom two CPIA quintiles or zero 
if otherwise. Results are shown in Column (6) of Table I. Results are such that one 
cannot conclude aid is of differing growth effectiveness in fragile and non-fragile 
SIDS. The equation was subsequently augmented with a multiplicative interaction 
between aid and a highly fragile state dummy, which takes the value of one if a 
SID falls into the bottom CPIA quintile. Results are shown in Column (7). The 
parameter attached to the aid-highly fragile state interaction is negative and 
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significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that the impact of aid in highly fragile 
SIDS is lower than in all others. While this result should be seen as indicative only 
since it has been derived from a relatively small sub-sample of highly fragile states, 
there are clear policy implications. If donors want to increase the level of aid to these 
countries they need to work closely with them to improve the performance in the 
policy and institutional areas on which the CPIA scores are based. 
Finally, it is worth noting that results across all variants of Equation (1) indicate 
that trade and the level of governance are important for economic growth in SIDS 
and there is some evidence that natural disasters impacting on at least 10 per cent of 
the population have a negative impact on growth rates. 7 
V. Further Analysis 
The specification of equation (1) shown in Columns (1) to ( 4) of Table 1, is: 
(la) 
This essentially is (1 ), but with the vector /f 3 restricted to zero. The level of aid that 
maximises its contribution to growth according to (la) is: 
We term a\ as the growth efficient level of foreign aid. The corresponding total 
contribution of aid to growth is: 
The specification of (1) shown in Column (7) of Table 1, is: 
( 1 b) 
where Ji is the previously defined highly fragile SIDS binary dummy variable and 
f3 3 < 0. The main difference between (1) and (lb) is that the former contains a vector 
of interactions and the latter a single interaction only. It follows that in ( 1 b) /h is a 
single coefficient rather than a vector of coefficients as in (1 ). The growth efficient 
level of aid for highly fragile SIDS and growth due to aid in these countries 
according to 1 (a) are, respectively: 
Results from specifications in which the coefficients on the aid variables are 
statistically significant indicate that the growth efficient level of aid, for all SIDS, is 
where these inflows account for between 30 and 40 per cent of recipient GDP. Rather 
than rely on one possibly preferred model specification, we assume that the growth 
efficient level of aid is in between these upper and lower bounds, where it accounts 
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for 35 per cent of a recipients GDP. Then aj is obtained from the conditional mean 
which applies across the full sample of SIDS under consideration. As such it applies 
on average, but for some countries it will be an overestimate and for others an 
underestimate. This point notwithstanding, it is useful to consider what the total 
level of ODA to the sample of SIDS under consideration would be if each country 
received di. Table 2 provides this information. It shows that the sample of 
SIDS under consideration received US$ 1.833 billion in ODA during 2004 which 
accounted for an (unweighted) average of 11.2 per cent of GDP. Total ODA would 
have come to US$ 22.6 billion had each SIDS received the growth efficient amount of 
35 per cent of its GDP. 8 Providing this amount compared to what was actually 
provided would, on average, have led to a GDP per capita growth gain of 0.8 
percentage points. The significance of this information is that it suggests that there is 
substantial scope (from a growth efficiency perspective) in scaling up ODA to SIDS. 
Table 2 makes no distinction between highly fragile and other SIDS. This is 
because the results discussed above for the former group of countries are indicative 
only, for the reason stated above. With this caveat in mind, it should be noted in 
passing that the growth efficient level for highly fragile SIDS, corresponding to the 
results shown in column (10) of Table 1, is 9 per cent of GDP. This result 
approximates to the growth efficient level of aid for a larger sample of highly fragile 
states reported in McGillivray and Feeny (2008). 
The estimate of the level of growth efficient aid in SIDS is higher than those 
consistent with the results of a number of recent aid-growth studies (see Feeny and 
McGillivray, 2008). This is not surprising. Recent studies have derived their 
estimates using a sample of all developing countries for which data were available, a 
much larger sample than that used in the current study. Estimates of growth efficient 
aid will vary among samples and this highlights the importance of examining the 
issue using subsets of countries and, if possible, individual case studies. There are 
three possible explanations for the growth efficient level of aid being higher in SIDS 
than for larger samples containing SIDS and other developing countries, 
remembering that the growth efficient level is an average obtained from the sample 
in question. Firstly, public sector officials in SIDS might face a relatively low 
administrative burden associated with aid since they are likely to have fewer donors 
providing them aid. Secondly, in some SIDS, particularly Pacific SIDS, a relatively 
large proportion of foreign aid bypasses the government budget and therefore 
further reduces the administrative burden on the recipient country. Thirdly, SIDS 
Table 2. Key findings from empirical models 
ODA (2004, US$ millions) 
Average ratio of ODA/GDP (%) 
Growth efficient aid (%) 
Lower Bound a7 
Upper Bound a7 
ODA if all recipients receive aj (VS$ millions) 
92 
1,833 
11.2 
35 
30 
40 
22,600 
Number of countries for 
which ai> at 
4 
4 
3 
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are likely to have larger government administrative capacity relative to their GDPs 
to absorb aid on the grounds that a given minimum scale is required to establish an 
administration and this is likely to be largely independe.nt of the level of GDP. 
Providing a growth efficient level of aid among SIDS that averages 35 per cent of 
these countries' GDPs does not, however, come without potential downsides over 
time. Arguably the most obvious downside relates to aid dependency due to 
potentially negative impacts on public sector fiscal behaviour. Providing up to 35 per 
cent of GDP in ODA will obviously translate into much larger ratios of ODA to 
public sector expenditure, often significantly so.9 Donors would need to very closely 
monitor the impacts of such ODA levels to ensure that they are not allocated by 
recipient governments to areas that have low development dividends or lead to 
declines in taxation effort. The latter outcome is arguably the most worrying. Lower 
taxation effort in recipient countries might be associated with benefits to the private 
sector and consumers through lower tax rates and trade-related taxes. But it can also 
lead to a long-term dependency on aid rather than taxation as a source of revenue 
and this is counter to some of the most basic principles of overseas development 
assistance. 10 The incidence of rent seeking and Dutch disease would also need to be 
monitored very closely. 
Country 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Belize 
Barbados 
Comoros 
Cape Verde 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
Micronesia, Fed. States 
Guinea-Bissau 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kiribati 
Maldives 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Samoa 
Seychelles 
Solomon Islands 
Suriname 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Table 3. Foreign aid to SIDS 
ODA US$m 2004 
1.63 
7.72 
28.81 
25.48 
143.24 
29.21 
84.54 
63.92 
86.31 
77.04 
15.36 
134.01 
259.64 
83.14 
16.71 
27.24 
51.09 
32.42 
19.55 
268.34 
10.45 
33.41 
30.76 
10.33 
121.32 
23.89 
19.26 
37.74 
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ODA to GDP (2004, % ) 
0.2 
0.7 
1.0 
6.7 
14.8 
10.8 
0.5 
2.4 
38.1 
27.2 
3.5 
18.4 
6.9 
0.8 
27.0 
3.7 
47.2 
0.6 
15.4 
6.8 
2.6 
53.6 
8.5 
1.5 
50.6 
2.2 
9.1 
11.9 
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Table 2 also indicates that four SIDS received more aid than the growth efficient 
amount of 35 per cent of GDP. This result is unaffected by using the lower bound 
threshold and falls to three countries if the upper bound threshold is used. Table 3 
elaborates. It shows that in 2004 the Federated States of Micronesia received slightly 
more aid relative to its GDP than the middle-bound amount, but just under the upper-
bound amount, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands and Sao Tome and Principe 
received well in excess of all estimates of the growth efficient amount in 2004. This 
observation does not necessarily indicate that aid in 2004 was harmful to the countries 
that received more than the growth efficient amount. Nor does it necessarily provide a 
sufficient case for reducing future aid levels. There may be important non-growth 
considerations which justify the high levels of aid provided to these countries. There 
might well be very valid developmental reasons other than growth promotion for the 
scale of 2004 aid allocations to these countries. The observation that a number of SIDS 
receive far more than the growth efficient benchmark does, however, suggest that the 
international donor community should closely examine the levels of aid to these 
countries, seeking to justify whether such levels can be justified. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper sought to examine the impact of foreign aid on the economic growth rates 
of SIDS using data for the period 1980 to 2004. Such an analysis is important given a 
number of constraints to development faced by these countries and the high levels of 
aid they receive. The analysis used annual and averaged data and estimated models 
using a variety of econometric techniques. Various interactions are included in the 
empirical analysis to examine whether foreign aid is less effective in fragile and highly 
fragile SIDS. 
Results suggest that foreign aid is effective at spurring economic growth but with 
diminishing returns. The level of foreign aid at which diminishing returns sets in is 
estimated to be where it accounts for about 35 per cent of a recipient's GDP. Further 
results suggest that foreign aid is less effective in SIDS which are classified as highly 
fragile and that these countries face more severely binding absorptive capacity 
constraints. Overall, results indicate that there is scope to scale up foreign aid to 
SIDS. However, it must also be recognised that given their small size, any increases 
in aid can lead to a large increase in the level of aid relative to GDP. This implies that 
relatively minor increases in aid flows can lead to levels of aid which exceed that at 
which recipients can utilise aid effectively from a growth perspective. 
The paper indentified four SIDS which may be receiving excess aid: Micronesia, 
the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, and Sao Tome and Principe. From a 
purely growth perspective these countries are receiving a very high level of support. 
International donors providing aid to these countries should examine very carefully 
these levels of aid to ensure there are other developmentally valid criteria for this 
level of assistance. To a large extent, the high levels of aid provided to Micronesia 
and the Marshall Islands are explained by the remoteness of these countries and 
the severe lack of income-earning opportunities. The high levels of assistance to the 
Solomon Islands, and Sao Tome and Principe are better explained by the 
international community responding to political instability and civil unrest in these 
countries. 
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Further, there are other countries in which the level of assistance they receive 
requires scrutiny given they have been classified as being 'highly fragile' in recent 
years. The Comoros suffers from high population density, high levels of 
unemployment and undiversified exports, while instability in Guinea-Bissau and 
Haiti ensure that recent growth rates in these highly fragile countries have been very 
low and aid has been needed to boost their economies. 
A caveat is that many of the paper's findings relate to average relationships for 
SIDS (and fragile SIDS) and there is an obvious need for a greater number of single 
country case studies in order to try and identify country specific absorptive capacity 
levels. This responsibility lies primarily with the research community but will rely on 
improved data availability and reliability, particularly for Pacific countries. This is 
an area in which national governments, regional organisations and the international 
donor community should work together to improve. 
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Notes 
1. Feeny (2006) finds no evidence of foreign aid impacting on the rural sector in Melanesian countries, 
proxied by agricultural GDP growth. However, foreign aid is found to impact positively on overall 
economic growth. 
2. An alternative approach would have been to take the panel datasets used in recent well cited aid 
effectiveness studies and augment the empirical model with a SIDS dummy variable and a 
multiplicative aid~SIDS interaction variable. Problems relating to data availability prevented this 
exercise. Datasets include only a very small number of SIDS due a paucity of relevant data for these 
countries. 
3. Unlike many previous studies, a country's budget balance is not included since this variable is only 
available for a small number of SIDS. 
4. This argument relies on an absence of temporal persistence in the aid variable. The high degree of 
volatility of aid to SIDS shown in Figure l lends support to the argument. 
5. Strictly speaking it will be a lagged or non-contemporaneously endogenous variable, which equates to 
it being exogenous econometrically. However, it is noted that the aid variable could still be 
endogenous if there is an omitted variable that is correlated with both aid and growth. 
6. This suggests that examining the dynamics of the impact of foreign aid warrants further attention. The 
dynamics of foreign aid has been largely neglected by the existing aid effectiveness literature. 
7. The main results are robust to using disaggregated aid (see Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix). 
Foreign aid can be disaggregated into aid grants versus aid loans and bilateral versus multilateral aid. 
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Results using annual data are provided in Table A3 in the Appendix. Again various lags of the aid 
variables are used. Results indicate that grants and bilateral aid are the categories which spur 
economic growth in SIDS. These findings are confirmed by results using averaged data and GMM 
estimations provided in Table A4. 
8. Note that if all SIDS received a level of aid which accounted for 35 per cent of their GDP, there would 
be large absolute dollar increases to the larger SIDS. 
9. Government finance statistics are rarely available for SIDS. Analysis of the data that are available for 
just a few countries over the sample period suggest that aid accounts for an average of 20 per cent of 
government expenditures in SIDS. However, there is a great deal of variation across countries with aid 
accounting for just 2.4 per cent of government expenditures in Barbados and as high as 80 per cent of 
government expenditures in Vanuatu. 
10. Feeny (2007) finds that aid has led to lower tax revenues in Melanesian SIDS. Conversely, Clist and 
Morrissey (2010) find no evidence that aid is associated with lower tax/GDP ratios and indeed there is 
some evidence that aid encourages tax effort since the mid 1980s. 
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Variable 
GDP growth 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
ODA 
Pacific 
Fragility 
High fragility 
Inflation 
Trade 
Governance 
Disaster impact 
M2 
Table Al. Variable definitions and sources 
Definition 
GDP per capita growth measured in 
constant local currency units, 
expressed as a percentage. 
Probability that two individuals will 
belong to different ethnic groups. 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as percentage of GDP, 
both expressed in current prices. 
Dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the country is located 
in the Pacific or zero if otherwise. 
Dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the country is a fragile 
state, defined on the basis of it 
belonging to the bottom two 
Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) quintiles. 
Dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the country is a highly 
fragile state, belonging to the 
bottom Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
quintile. 
Annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
The sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Average value of the following 
governance indictors: (i) voice and 
accountability, (ii) political 
instability and violence, 
(iii) government effectiveness, (iv) 
regulatory burden, (v) rule 
of law, and (vi) control of 
corruption. 
Dummy variable taking the value of 
one for years in which a natural 
disaster affected more than 10 per 
cent of the population and zero if 
otherwise. 
Ratio of M2 money supply to GDP. 
Source 
World Bank (2006), 
Asian Development 
Bank (2006) 
Grimes (2000) 
OECD (2006) 
World Bank1 
World Bank1 
World Bank (2006), 
Asian Development 
Bank (2006) 
World Bank (2006), 
Asian Development 
Bank (2006) 
World Bank (2006) 
Emergencies and natural 
disasters database 
(EM-DAT, 2006) 
World Bank (2006), 
Asian Development 
Bank (2006), Sugden 
and Pavlov (2005) 
Notes: 1Data obtained directly from World Bank staff under a confidential research 
agreement. 
Table A2. Results from OLS estimation 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS 
Constant 3.064 (1.20) -1.134 (0.53) -1.339 (0.63) 
ODA 0.067 (1.70)* 
ODA squared -0.001 (l.98)** 
ODA lagged 1 year 0.031 (0. 74) - 0.139 (l.63) 
ODA squared lagged 1 year -0.000 (0.64) 0.002 (1.38) 
ODA lagged 2 years 0.205 (2.27)** 
ODA squared lagged 2 years -0.003 (l.83)* 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.549 (0.88) -0.546 (0.87) -0.465 (0.75) 
Inflation -0.007 (0. 75) -0.008 (0. 79) -0.008 (0.87) 
Trade 0.030 ( 4. 74)*** 0.030 (4.69)*** 0.030 ( 4.61 )** * 
Governance 1.945 (3.58)*** 1.872 (3.40)*** 1.851 (3.35)*** 
M2 -0.018 (1.37) -0.017 (1.31) -0.016 (l.20) 
Disaster impact - 1. 775 (l.65)* - 1.676 (1.56) -1.367 (1.23) 
Inflation lagged 1 year 
Trade lagged 1 year 
Observations 569 568 555 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Table A3. OLS results for disaggregated aid 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 3.066 -1.331 3.314 -1.112 2.939 -1.60 l 3.359 -1.117 
(l .20) (0.62) (l.34) (0.53) ( 1.15) (0.73) (l .32) (0.53) 
ODA grants 0.079 
(1.86)* 
ODA grants squared -0.002 
(2.67)*** 
ODA grants lagged 1 year -0.168 
(2.01 )** 
ODA grants squared lagged l year 0.002 
(l.34) 
ODA grants lagged 2 years 0.233 
(2.83)*** 
ODA grants squared lagged 2 years -0.003 
(2.23)** 
ODA loans 0.167 
( 1.31) 
ODA loans squared -0.001 
(0.25) 
ODA loans lagged l year 0.138 
( 1.26) 
ODA loans squared lagged 1 year -0.002 
(0.56) 
ODA loans lagged 2 years 0.067 
(0.44) 
ODA loans squared lagged 2 years -0.009 
(0.65) 
Bilateral ODA 0.094 
(1.86)* 
Bilateral ODA squared -0.002 
(2.46)** 
(continued) 
Table A3. (Continued) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bilateral ODA lagged 1 year 0.025 
(0.23) 
Bilateral ODA squared lagged I year -0.000 
(0.00) 
Bilateral ODA lagged 2 years 0.082 
(0.77) 
Bilateral ODA squared lagged 2 years -0.002 
(1.58) 
Multilateral ODA 0.051 
(0.41) 
Multilateral ODA squared -0.002 
(0.33) 
Multilateral ODA lagged 1 year 0.001 
(0.01) 
Multilateral ODA squared lagged 1 year -0.009 
(0.72) 
Multilateral ODA lagged 2 years 0.048 
(0.31) 
Multilateral ODA squared lagged 2 years 0.005 
(0.66) 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.674 -0.574 -0.539 -0.257 -0.671 -0.630 -0.504 -0.347 
(1.10) (0.94) (0.84) (0.42) (1.09) (1.01) (0.76) (0.55) 
Inflation -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 
(0.78) (0.94) (0.89) (0.74) (0.81) (0.87) (0.77) (0.70) 
Trade 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.030 
(4.67)*** (4.60)*** (4.44)*** (4.55)*** (4.76)*** (4.68)*** (4.66)*** (4.65)*** 
Governance 1.944 1.830 1.967 1.707 1.979 1.952 1.813 1.635 
(3.60)*** (3.36)*** (3.63)*** (3.26)*** (3.63)*** (3.50)*** (3.37)*** (3.04)*** 
(continued) 
Table A3. (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
M2 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 
(1.25) ( l. l 0) ( 1.17) (1.31) (1.30) ( 1.17) (1.29) (1.24) 
Disaster impact -1.799 -1.294 -1.621 -1.283 -1.767 -1.431 -1.676 -1.436 
(l.67)* (1.16) (1.51) ( 1.17) (1.64) (1.28) ( 1.56) ( 1.31) 
Observations 569 555 569 555 569 555 569 555 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Note: (i) year dummies included in all equations estimated; (ii) robust /-statistics are shown in parentheses; and (iii) *, ** and *** significant at the 
10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
Table A4. GMM results for disaggregated aid 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.351 -2.875 -3.871 -3.603 
(0.13) (0.98) ( 1.05) (0.91) 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.868 0.393 -1.023 -1.133 
(0.88) (0.26) (0.73) (0.57) 
Inflation 0.014 0.022 0.020 0.012 
(0.61) (1.34) (0.60) (0.71) 
Trade 0.049 0.031 0.053 0.053 
(1.89)* (1.25) (2.78)*** (1.88)* 
Governance 4.374 7.199 6.209 0.304 
(1.17) (1.95)* (1.51) (0.06) 
M2 -0.077 -0.034 -0.092 0.013 
(1. 77)* (1.08) (2.04)* (0.25) 
Disaster impact -1.111 1.691 -3.556 -0.742 
(0.28) (0.33) (1.49) (0.18) 
ODA grants 0.277 
(2.32)** 
ODA grants squared -0.004 
(3.27)*** 
ODA loans 0.818 
(2.26)** 
ODA loans squared -0.019 
(1.14) 
Bilateral ODA 0.659 
(2.49)** 
Bilateral ODA squared -0.011 
(2.56)** 
Multilateral 0 DA -0.301 
(0. 72) 
Multilateral ODA squared 0.021 
(1.29) 
Observations 124 124 124 124 
Note: (i) robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses; and (ii)*,** and*** significant at the 10, 
5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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ABSTRACT The impact of aid on the macro-economy is ambiguous. Aid that increases 
expenditure may cause real exchange rate appreciation. However, if the capital stock in the 
traded goods sector rises then output might not contract, and if investment in the non-traded 
goods sector is relatively productive then real exchange rate appreciation could be avoided. We 
examine aid inflows in JO Pacific island states, and find them to produce a variety of outcomes. 
Applying our model to other small island states around the world, we analyse the country-specific 
characteristics that determine the macroeconomic impact of aid, and draw policy conclusions. 
I. Introduction 
There is already a large literature examining the macroeconomic consequences of aid 
inflows in developing countries. Part of this literature deals with the impact of aid on 
relative prices and output. An increase in foreign exchange income, from any source, 
is likely to impact on domestic relative prices (Carden, 1984). Under fixed nominal 
exchange rates in a small open economy, the effect is straightforward. The price of 
internationally traded goods is fixed on world markets, and increased domestic 
expenditure will raise only the price of goods that are not internationally traded. This 
relative price change will lead to a change in the composition of output, with the 
traded goods sector contracting, and a change in the sectoral allocation of resources. 
These changes do not necessarily lead to a reduction in social welfare, but welfare 
concerns arise when there are changes in the income distribution - especially when 
the poor own factors of production specific to the traded goods sector - and when 
there are externalities that motivate traded sector subsidies ex ante. In this case, the 
relative price changes work in the opposite direction to the appropriate subsidy, 
reducing aggregate productivity, so aggregate output falls, justifying the description 
of the relative price effect as 'Dutch Disease'. 1 Examples of this idea include van 
104 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
Wijnbergen (1984), Salehi-Esfahani (1988), Sachs and Warner (1995), Gylafson et al. 
(1997), Elbadawi (1999) and Adam and O'Connell (2004). 
In fact, in the basic Dutch Disease model, the nature of the exchange rate regime 
makes little difference to the effects of an increase in foreign exchange income. 
Suppose for example that two goods (traded and non-traded) are produced by a 
single factor of production (labour). There will be two domestic market equilibrium 
conditions (for non-traded goods and for labour), and a Balance of Payments 
equilibrium condition, with only two endogenous relative prices: that of non-traded 
goods relative to traded goods and that of labour relative to traded goods. General 
equilibrium can only be attained through adjustment of real money balances, and in 
a basic model it does not matter whether this is achieved by nominal exchange rate 
adjustment or by an adjustment of foreign exchange reserves under a fixed nominal 
exchange rate. 
The most interesting extensions to this basic framework explore the dynamics of a 
model in which some of the increased expenditure is on capital goods, as in Adam 
and Bevan (2006). Now, increased productivity in the non-traded goods sector can 
offset the standard relative price effect, at least in the steady state, and investment in 
the traded goods sector can offset any remaining contractionary effect there. It 
remains an empirical question how long it takes to reach the steady state, how much 
real exchange rate appreciation there is before the steady state is attained, and how 
much of a productivity loss there is during the transition period. Moreover, with 
sticky domestic prices, the nature of the exchange rate regime is likely to matter to 
the transition process. A flexible exchange rate - either a floating rate or an 
adjustable peg - is likely to facilitate faster relative price adjustment and a shorter 
transition period. If there are productivity losses during transition, then a fixed 
exchange rate is likely to entail some overall welfare loss. 
In this paper we use time-series data to explore the evidence for Dutch Disease 
effects from increased aid inflows in I 0 small open economies in the South Pacific. 
These countries display a substantial degree of economic heterogeneity, and we see a 
corresponding level of heterogeneity in their response to aid inflows. With only 10 
countries, we do not have enough cross-section data to conduct a formal statistical 
analysis of the causes of this heterogeneity. However, we can also apply our time-
series model to data from other small island states around the world. This gives us a 
large enough sample to analyse the sources of the heterogeneity, and to explore 
whether the Pacific islands are significantly different from islands elsewhere. 
Although there is some significant difference, there are also a number of country-
specific institutional characteristics which explain a large part of the variation in the 
impact of aid inflows across the globe. Before describing our econometric model, we 
briefly review existing evidence from other parts of the world. 
II. Existing Evidence on Aid and Dutch Disease 
Work on Dutch Disease in developing countries is hampered by a lack of data. All 
researchers face a choice between an econometric model that eschews much of the 
detail of the existing theory, and a more detailed model with parameters that are 
'calibrated' rather than estimated. Time series and panel econometric studies mostly 
find a link between the real exchange rate and the volume of aid inflows. However, 
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the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to aid varies substantially from 
one study to another. Adenauer and Vagassky (1998) find substantial real exchange 
rate appreciation effects in the countries of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union. Similar results appear in the work of White and Wignaraja (1992) 
on Sri Lanka, and of Prati and Tressel (2006), who use a large cross-country panel. 
Here, estimates of the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to aid inflows 
range up to 30 per cent. Bourdet and Falck (2006) find that aid inflows in the Cape 
Verde Islands also cause some real exchange rate appreciation, although the effect is 
relatively small, with an elasticity of less than 10 per cent. In contrast, Nyoni (1998) 
and Sackey (2001) find that aid inflows lead to real exchange rate depreciation in 
Tanzania and Ghana, respectively. There is some depreciation even in the short run 
(that is, within one year of an increase in aid). This suggests that in some countries 
the offsetting productivity effects kick in very quickly indeed, or that the standard 
Dutch Disease model is in some way inappropriate. In this regard, Atingi-Ego (2005) 
suggests that there is excess capacity in the non-traded goods sector of some African 
countries, so increases in demand are not likely to cause any substantial price 
mcrease. 
Results from CGE models of the effect of aid inflows are similarly mixed. The 
work of Bandara (1995), Jemio and Jansen (1993), Jemio and Vos (1993) and Vos 
(1998) suggests that in some countries there is likely to be enough investment by 
firms in the traded goods sector to ensure that this sector expands as a result of an 
increase in aid inflows. Examples of this case include Mexico, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand. However, in other countries, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, there 
are more conventional Dutch Disease effects, with an appreciating real exchange rate 
and a contracting traded goods sector. The dynamic CGE model presented in Adam 
and Bevan (2004), which is calibrated to data from Uganda, indicates that the 
response of the real exchange rate and traded good production to an aid inflow is 
very sensitive to variations in the composition of aid expenditure. Nevertheless, 
substantial real exchange rate appreciation is much less likely in the steady state than 
it is in the short run. This result also appears in Laplagne et al. (200 I), one of very 
few papers to attempt to model the economies of the South Pacific. Calibrating a 
CGE model to data from the Cook Islands, where labour is internationally mobile, 
and Kiribati, where labour is mostly not internationally mobile, they find substantial 
real exchange rate appreciation in the short run, with aid elasticities of 25 per cent 
and 10 per cent respectively. However, steady state elasticities are very close to zero. 
The existing evidence on the macroeconomic effects of aid inflows gives the 
overwhelming impression that there are few, if any, generalisations to be made 
across different developing countries. We should not expect to see uniformity in the 
macroeconomic response of different South Pacific economies to an increase in aid. 
As we will see in the next section, these countries do exhibit a great deal of 
macroeconomic heterogeneity. In Section IV, we explore the causes of this 
heterogeneity. 
III. Modelling the Macroeconomic Impact of Aid in the South Pacific 
The developing economies of the South Pacific have received almost no attention in 
the macroeconomic literature. However, they account for a substantial fraction of 
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the foreign aid budgets of Australia and New Zealand. The different Pacific islands 
encompass a wide variety of economies, and we explore the effect of official 
development assistance (ODA) in these islands as a representative case study of the 
impact of aid in small open developing economies. 
Table 1 indicates some basic economic characteristics of the economies we will be 
looking at. Both Table 1 and our econometric analysis exclude those Pacific 
territories with a population of under 10,000, and also those, such as Papua New 
Guinea, with a population of over one million. The largest is Fiji, with a population 
of close to one million, and a current level of PPP-adjusted GDP of over US$5 
billion. The smallest is Tuvalu, with a population of 12,000 and a GDP of just over 
$15 million. The different economies listed in Table 1 represent a wide range of per 
capita income levels. The French territories (French Polynesia and New Caledonia) 
are in the high middle-income range, with annual per capita income levels well in 
excess of $10,000. At the other extreme, Tonga, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands 
have annual per capita income levels of only around $2000. There is even more 
variance in the levels of aid dependency. Over the past three decades, ODA to Fiji 
has amounted to only around 3 per cent of GDP, while aid to Tuvalu has amounted 
to over 80 per cent. 
Table 2 shows the variation in economic structure for those 10 territories for 
which adequate data are available from the UN National Accounts statistics 
database. The table includes figures for the share of GDP accounted for by value 
added in three broad aggregates of (potentially) traded goods: agriculture, forestry 
and fishing; mining and manufacturing; hotels, restaurants and retail trade. It can be 
seen that the relative sizes of these components, and of the residual (mostly publicly 
provided services) vary considerably from one island to another. The table also 
shows that the same is true of export performance. Four economies have a 
reasonably high level of export performance: in Fiji, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands 
Table 1. Pacific states and territories with populations of 10,000-1,000,000 
Population PPP Adjusted GDP ODA 1970-2003 
State or Territory (own currency) (thousands)* (billions of USD)* (%GDP)§ 
Cook Islands (no) 21 0.11 26.7 
Fiji (yes) 906 5.38 2.9 
French Polynesia (no) 276 4.58 11.3 
Kiribati (no) 105 0.79 39.7 
New Caledonia (no) 219 3.16 12. 7 
Samoa (yes) 177 1.00 15.6 
Solomon Islands (yes) 552 0.80 20.8 
Tonga (yes) 115 0.24 19.3 
Tuvalu (no) 12 0.02 81.9 
Vanuatu (yes) 209 0.58 21.8 
Without adequate data 
FS. Micronesia (no) 108 0.28 
Marshall Islands (no) 60 0.12 
Nauru (no) 13 0.06 
Source: *CIA World Factbook. soECD DAC. 
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Table 2. Main identifiable components of sector value added and exports as a percentage 
of GDP, 1970-2003 
Mining Trade Transport 
Agriculture manufacturing restaurants storage 
forestry fishing utilities hotels communication Exports 
Cook Islands 11.4 5.5 31.6 12.5 6.8 
Fiji 17.3 15.7 14.9 11. l 56.2 
French Polynesia 4.0 9.0 23.4 6.6 9.1 
Kiribati 24.6 2.8 15.4 13.9 58. l 
New Caledonia 2.0 19.1 23.0 5.5 22.2 
Samoa 17.3 21.2 16.8 10.9 26.2 
Solomon Islands 43.5 6.6 8.6 4.1 57.9 
Tonga 28.3 6.5 12.6 6.9 21.6 
Tuvalu 19.2 7.4 16.2 6.0 15.9 
Vanuatu 22.6 6.5 32.9 7.7 52.8 
and Vanuatu, the ratio of exports to GDP generally exceeds 50 per cent. However, 
there are also two - the Cook Islands and French Polynesia - in which the ratio is 
typically below l 0 per cent. 
Given this degree of macroeconomic heterogeneity, we should allow for 
substantial variation in the response of different territories to aid inflows. This 
suggests that cross-country panel data analysis is inappropriate in our case. 
However, macroeconomic data on these territories are very limited, with few 
economies in which many variables are recorded for a substantial length of time. For 
this reason, we will fit a very simple time-series model to the available data for our 10 
territories. This model is described in detail in Appendix 1. The model is used to 
estimate the impact of annual variations in aid as a share of GDP on the subsequent 
levels of real GDP and of the PPP real exchange rate (and in territories with a 
floating or adjustable nominal exchange rate, of the rate of inflation). The real 
exchange rate is defined so that a rise in the rate constitutes a relative rise in local 
prices. Different parameters are fitted for each territory, so we do not make any 
assumptions about how similar the response to aid is in different territories. 
In the results in Appendix 1, the impact of aid is significantly different from zero in 
only four out of the 10 cases: in the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Tonga and Vanuatu. This 
should not be taken to imply that aid has no effect in the other six, but rather that, 
with the limited data available, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that it is 
inconsequential in only the four cases. Moreover, when we find the impact of aid on 
the real exchange rate to be negative but insignificantly different from zero, as in the 
Solomon Islands, it can still be significantly different from the positive coefficient in 
other territories such as the Cook Islands. We make use of these differences in the 
cross-section analysis in the next section. 
In this section, we illustrate the cross-country heterogeneity in the response of the 
macro-economy to aid inflows by discussing the results from the four Pacific island 
territories where we find aid to have a significant impact. Table 3 reports the 
estimated aid elasticities and corresponding t ratios in these four territories. (It also 
includes the 5% critical values of the t ratios, which are slightly different from 
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Table 3. Aid elasticities for the Cook Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
5% crit. 
Response in the next year of: to: elasticity t ratio value 
Cook Islands GDP aid this year -0.030 -0.79 
aid last year -0.120 -3.26 -2.13 
Real Exchange Rate aid this year 0.168 5.17 2.06 
aid last year 0.207 4.18 2.07 
Tonga GDP aid this year 0.048 0.53 
aid last year 0.103 1.54 
Real Exchange Rate aid this year -0.304 -2.19 2.09 
aid last year 0.283 3.27 2.09 
Inflation aid this year -0.319 -1.53 
aid last year 0.223 2.10 
Tuvalu GDP aid this year -0.009 -0.90 
aid last year -0.010 -1.11 
aid 2 years ago -0.026 -2.37 -2.00 
Real Exchange Rate aid this year 0.033 2.02 2.00 
aid last yem· 0.026 2.17 2.00 
aid 2 years ago 0.029 2.29 1.99 
Vanuatu GDP aid this year -0.090 -1.14 
aid last year -0.365 -1.68 
Real Exchange Rate aid this year -0.129 -0.96 
aid last year 0.014 0.07 
Inflation aid this year 0.306 3.37 2.08 
aid last year 0.316 3.76 2.09 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate effects significant at the 5% level. 
normal for reasons discussed in Appendix 1.) Note that for Tonga and Vanuatu, the 
elasticities in Table 3 are derived by fitting a model of the impact of aid on GDP,2 the 
real exchange rate and inflation. For the Cook Islands and Tuvalu (which have no 
independent monetary authority), the elasticities are derived by fitting a model of 
the impact of aid on just GDP and the real exchange rate. In all four territories, the 
macro-economy responds not just to aid in the previous year, but also to aid in the 
year before that. In Tuvalu, aid from two years ago also has a significant effect. 
As Tables 1~2 show, the four territories appearing in Table 3 embody a substantial 
degree of macroeconomic heterogeneity. The size of average aid inflows relative to 
GDP is unusually high in one of them (Tuvalu), but not in the other three, at least in 
comparison with the six economies registering no significant aid effect (Table 1, 
column 3). 
In three of the four territories (the Cook Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), aid 
appears to be inflationary. Of these three territories, the two without a flexible 
nominal exchange rate regime (the Cook Islands and Tuvalu) register a significant 
real exchange rate appreciation, while the other (Vanuatu) registers significant 
domestic inflation without any significant change in the real exchange rate. One 
interpretation of these results is that in Vanuatu large aid inflows have been matched 
by a nominal exchange rate depreciation, which has prevented any real exchange rate 
appreciation. In the Cook Islands and Tuvalu, similar pressures cannot be released 
through nominal exchange rate adjustment: the Cook Islands use the New Zealand 
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dollar and Tuvalu the Australian dollar. If the nominal exchange rate regime makes 
a difference here, then we are outside the bounds of a basic Dutch Disease model, as 
explained in the introduction. The importance of the nominal exchange rate regime 
suggests that there is some nominal rigidity at work. Nominal wage inertia is one 
possible explanation, although we do not have the data to test this hypothesis 
directly. 
In Tonga, there is a significant but temporary real exchange rate depreciation in 
response to an aid inflow. As noted in the introduction, this is not the first country 
where such a result has been recorded; nevertheless, the reasons for the difference 
warrant further investigation. It is possible that aid in Tonga is spent more 
productively than aid elsewhere. 
The magnitude of the inflationary effects recorded in Table 3 is depicted in Figures 
1-4. The figures show the time path of real GDP and the real exchange rate (or, in 
Vanuatu, the rate of domestic inflation), following a hypothetical increase in aid 
equivalent to one year's GDP. This is a much larger change in aid inflows than is 
typical in any of our countries; it represents an extreme scenario in which there is a 
very large innovation in donor policy. But these figures are based on a linear model, 
so the patterns shown in the figures would be the same if the innovation were 
smaller; only the scaling would change. The hypothetical increase in aid is 
temporary, lasting for a single year. 3 
The figures for the Cook Islands and Tuvalu (Figures 1-2) look very similar, 
except for the scaling. The effects in Tuvalu are very much smaller than in the Cook 
Islands. However, average aid inflows in Tuvalu are very much larger as a fraction of 
% change 
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-10% 
Cook Islands GDP 
0 5 JO 15 years 
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Cook Islands Real Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15 years 
Figure 1. Responses to an increase in aid, Cook Islands. 
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Figure 2. Responses to an increase in aid, Tuvalu. 
GDP (Table 1, column 3), and a typical increase or decrease in aid there is much 
larger than in the Cook Islands. In both places, there is a substantial real exchange 
rate appreciation within the first two years following the innovation; the growth in 
the real exchange rate is around 30 per cent in the Cook Islands and 6 per cent in 
Tuvalu. Thereafter, the real exchange rate depreciates again, and by year 4 is close to 
its original level. The appreciation causes a dip in GDP (by around 15% in the Cook 
Islands and 3% in Tuvalu), although we can see from Table 3 that this effect is only 
marginally significant. There are a number of possible reasons for such a decline in 
GDP. Firstly, if some of the aid inflow translates into an increase in private sector 
non-factor income, people may substitute leisure for consumption at the margin; the 
fall in the labour supply will lead to a fall in factor income. Secondly, the change in 
relative prices may lead to a reallocation of resources that entails some short-run 
adjustment costs. Thirdly, as in the literature cited in the introduction, the change in 
relative prices may draw resources away from sectors in which there are positive 
production externalities. Only in the third case does the fall in GDP correspond to a 
reduction in economic efficiency. Without the data to fit a structural model of the 
economy, we cannot identify which of these explanations (if any) is the correct one. 
After the initial dip, GDP quickly adjusts to its original level. In the model we have 
fitted, the final level of GDP is slightly higher than the initial level. This is consistent 
with aid improving productivity in the long run (for example through an expansion 
of the capital stock); however, this long-run effect is not statistically significant. 
The response of GDP in Vanuatu (Figure 3) also looks quite similar, although 
adjustment back to the initial level of income is faster: GDP is very close to its initial 
level by year 3. This is consistent with the conjecture that nominal exchange rate 
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Figure 3. Responses to an increase in aid, Vanuatu. 
adjustment in Vanuatu mitigates the inflationary effects of an increase in aid inflows, 
when otherwise nominal wage inertia may result in falling output. There is a short, 
sharp inflationary period with a 30 per cent drop in GDP, but the economy soon 
returns to its initial state. 
Another way of looking at the macroeconomic impact of aid in these three 
territories is to ask what would happen to GDP and the real exchange rate if aid were 
cut from its present level to zero for a single year, and thereafter restored to its initial 
value. Recall from note 2 that aid as measured here is part of GNI but not of GDP. 
The reduction in aid will correspond to a large and immediate reduction in GNI. 
However, for the reasons discussed above, there is a negative association between aid 
and GDP in the short run, so we will see a rise in GDP following the cut in aid. Aid 
in the Cook Islands is currently about a quarter of GDP, and the effect of cutting this 
aid would be to increase GDP by about 4 per cent in the first three years following 
the cut, accompanied by a real exchange rate depreciation peaking at about 8 per 
cent. Aid in Tuvalu is currently about 80 per cent of GDP, and the effect of cutting 
this aid would be to increase GDP by about 2 per cent in the first three years 
following the cut, accompanied by a real exchange rate depreciation peaking at 
about 4 per cent. Aid in Vanuatu is currently about 20 per cent of GDP, and the 
effect of cutting this aid would be to increase GDP by about 6 per cent in the first 
three years following the cut, accompanied by a deflation of about 6 per cent. 
Nevertheless, these increases are too small to offset the direct negative impact of a 
fall in aid on GNI. Cutting aid will make Cook Islanders, Tuvaluans and Ni-
Vanuatu worse off overall. Moreover, the time paths in the figures show that there is 
no significant long-run change in GDP in any of these three territories. 
112 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
In Tonga (Figure 4 ), there is a short, sharp depreciation in the real exchange rate 
by about 30 per cent. This is alongside an increase in GDP of a little over 10 per cent. 
While the real exchange quickly returns to its initial level, the increase in GDP is 
persistent. With so little data, this permanent effect is on the edge of statistical 
significance. However, Tonga is the one country where there is at least some evidence 
that aid improves productivity in the long run. This means that any cut in aid in 
Tonga would lead to a reduction in GDP. Reducing aid from its current level (about 
20 per cent of GDP) to zero would cause a reduction in GDP of around 3 per cent, 
an effect that would persist for some years, even if the cut were temporary. 
IV. Modelling the Institutional Determinants of the Impact of Aid 
The Data 
With only 10 Pacific island territories in our sample, we do not have a large enough 
cross-section for an analysis of the determinants of the size of the macroeconomic 
impact of aid inflows. However, we can still explore the cross-section variation in the 
macroeconomic impact of aid by using an augmented sample of states, including 
both the Pacific island territories and other small island states worldwide. In this 
section, we present the results of cross-section regression analysis in which the 
dependent variable measures the size of the response of the real exchange rate in a 
particular state to an increase in aid equivalent to one year's GDP. The cross-section 
variation in the response is explained by a number of country-specific institutional 
characteristics. We will see that while there are some significant differences between 
% change 
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Figure 4. Responses to an increase in aid, Tonga. 
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the average response in Pacific islands and the average response elsewhere, many 
features of the response are common to different parts of the world. 
Tables 4-5 present the cross-section regression results. These results are based 
on a sample comprising the states listed in Appendix 2. The sample is made up of 
all the developing island states with populations below one million for which 
basic macroeconomic data exist. The time-series model in Appendix 1 is applied 
to each state in turn. We then measure the cumulative impact on the real 
exchange rate of a hypothetical increase in aid equivalent to one year's GDP. For 
the Cook Islands, for example, this is the area under the real exchange rate curve 
in Figure 1. In order to check the robustness of our results, we measure the 
cumulative impact at three years, four years and five years. The variation across 
states in the size of the impact is modelled as a function of the following state-
specific institutional characteristics. 
Average output per head. If initial aggregate productivity in an economy is 
relatively low because of a low capital-labour ratio, then the marginal return to any 
aid-funded capital investment is likely to be relatively large. Ceteris paribus, the 
productivity gains that offset Dutch Disease effects are likely to be larger. This 
implies that an economy with a higher level of output per head is more likely to see a 
large real exchange rate appreciation when aid rises. Output per head is measured as 
the mean value of the logarithm of real per capita GDP in US dollars over the period 
of the time-series sample. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
Average government expenditure. It is possible that the response of an economy to 
aid inflows varies systematically according to the size of the public sector. A large 
public sector might reflect a large bureaucracy and relatively low rate of 
productivity, in which case we would expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
Government expenditure is measured as the mean ratio of total public spending to 
GDP over the period of the time-series sample. 
Table 4. Cross-section sample statistics 
All states Pacific islands only 
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Cumulative % impact { after 3 years -54.7% 105.1% -60.5% 91.8% 
on the real exchange after 4 years -62.3% 122.8% -54.8% 81.7% 
rate of an increase in after 5 years -67.6% 135.6% -47.8% 74.3% 
aid equal to one 
year's GDP 
Average output per head 7.569 0.997 7.425 1.149 
Average govt. expenditure 24.7% 9.0% 30.7% 10.7% 
Average inflation 6.79% 2.80% 6.19% 1.95% 
Average openness 1.147 0.322 0.958 0.230 
Government effectiveness 0.171 0.864 -0.105 0.755 
Political stability 0.804 0.489 0.673 0.575 
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Table 5. Cross-section regression coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust t ratios 
Dependent variable: cumulative impact of unit increase in aid on ln(s) 
Impact at 3 years Impact at 4 years Impact at 5 years 
Coe ff. t ratio Coe ff. t ratio Coe ff. t ratio Coe ff. t ratio Coe ff. t ratio Coe ff. t ratio 
Intercept -5.916 -2.670 -5.012 -2.357 -7.543 -3.437 -6.617 -3.091 -7.995 -3.705 -7.104 -3.233 
Average output per head 0.854 3.057 0.827 2.943 1.147 4.027 1.120 3.912 1.254 4.443 1.228 4.341 
Average government -2.500 -1.170 -0.849 -0394 -2.672 -1.249 -0.980 -0.457 -2.423 -1.123 -0.795 -0.370 
expenditure 
Average inflation 0.020 0.453 -0.026 -0.591 0.035 0.697 -0.012 -0.232 0.034 0.615 -0.011 -0.187 
Average openness -1.544 -1.959 -1.960 -2.394 -2.363 -2.972 -2.789 -3.459 -2.816 -3.753 -3.226 -4.189 
Government effectiveness -1.522 -4.294 -1.591 -4.904 -1.844 -5.190 -1.915 -6.067 -1.993 -5.444 -2.062 -6.338 
Political stability 1.764 4.040 1.750 3.785 2.096 4.763 2.082 4.653 2.194 4.876 2.180 4.900 
Pacific islands dummy -0.785 -2.515 -0.804 -2.628 -0.774 -2.274 
Joint significance (p) 0.018 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(J 0.834 0.789 0.876 0.833 0.930 0.898 
R2 0.522 0.594 0.613 0.668 0.643 0.685 
J arque-Bera test (p) 0.705 0.430 0.556 0.229 0.553 0.307 
RESET test (p) 0.820 0.887 0.658 0.670 0.687 0.673 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate effects significant at the 5% level. 
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Average inflation. The mean annual percentage inflation rate over the period of the 
time-series sample is one measure of macroeconomic stability. It is possible that a 
more stable macroeconomic environment promotes efficient resource allocation and 
mitigates any Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows. The inflation rate we used is based 
on the GDP deflator. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
Average openness. With a relatively large tradeables sector, a relatively large 
proportion of output is likely to be sold at international prices, and real exchange 
rate elasticities are therefore likely to be lower. Moreover, a higher level of trade 
might lead to greater efficiency (Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994), mitigating any 
Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows. Overall, there should be a negative association 
between openness and the magnitude of real exchange rate appreciation following a 
rise in aid. Openness is measured as the mean ratio of imports plus exports to GDP 
over the period of the time-series sample. 
Government effectiveness. Kaufmann et al. (2008) present a number of indicators of 
institutional quality. Not all indicators are reported for all of the states in our 
sample, but one key indicator that is available for all states is an index of government 
effectiveness, 'measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies'. More effective government could raise 
productivity and mitigate any Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows, so we expect a 
negative coefficient on this variable.4 
Political stability. This variable from Kaufmann et al. (2008) captures a different 
dimension of governance, 'measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.' On the one hand, 
political stability may entail lower risk, less investment hysteresis and more efficient 
resource allocation, in which case its effects will be similar to those of the 
government effectiveness variable. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that 
political instability reduces the proportion of national income allocated to domestic 
investment expenditure (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), and increases the proportion 
invested abroad (Lensink et al., 2000; Le and Zak, 2006). A country with a high level 
of political instability might see a relatively low rate of private domestic investment 
following, for example, an aid-funded increase in the level of infrastructure or 
human capital. There is less chance of a boom in domestic investment demand, and 
so less chance of a rapid real exchange rate appreciation, ceteris paribus. In this case, 
there will be a positive coefficient on the political stability variable. (Of course, this is 
not to be interpreted as indicating that political instability raises productivity. In the 
long run, lower investment will entail lower growth.) 
In principle, it is also possible that the exchange regime makes a difference to the 
impact of aid inflows. This is suggested by the differences noted in the previous 
section between the Cook Islands and Tuvalu on the one hand and Vanuatu on the 
other. However, we did not find the exchange rate regime to have any significant 
effect on either the intercept or the slope coefficients in the cross-section regressions. 
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Possibly a significant difference would appear in a larger sample; this is a point for 
further study. We do however find a significant difference between the intercept for 
Pacific island territories and the intercept for other states, and a Pacific islands 
dummy variable appears in Table 5. The interpretation of this dummy is discussed 
below; we do not find any corresponding significant difference in slope coefficients. 
Table 4 reports sample statistics for all of the variables used in our cross-section 
regression. The data on which these statistics are based appear in Appendix 1. The 
mean values of the aid impact variables are all negative. That is, aid inflows lead to a 
real exchange rate depreciation, on average. However, this mean represents about 
half of one standard deviation, indicating that there are many states in which aid 
inflows lead to a real appreciation. The unconditional mean values for the Pacific 
islands are not significantly different from those for other states. The same is true of 
the individual explanatory variables also listed in Table 5. 
The Results 
Table 5 reports the regression results. The results are broadly consistent across the 
three alternative dependent variables using different time horizons to measure the 
response of the real exchange rate to an increase in aid. As the time horizon 
increases, the size of statistically significant coefficients and the regression R2 
statistics also increase slightly. Overall, the explanatory variables account for 
between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the cross-section variation in the size of 
impulse responses. For each time horizon we report two sets of regression 
coefficients, one including a Pacific islands dummy and one excluding such a 
dummy. In general, the size and significance level of the other coefficients are not 
substantially affected by the presence of the dummy variable. 
The coefficients on average output per head are all significant at the 1 per cent level 
and are all positive, as expected. In all cases, the estimated coefficient is close to 
unity. A unit increase in average income raises by one unit the cumulative effect on 
the real exchange rate of an increase in aid equivalent to one year's GDP. In order to 
interpret this coefficient, note that the standard deviations of both the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variable are also close to unity (Table 4).5 Therefore, 
approximately, a one standard deviation increase in average output per head is 
associated with a one standard deviation increase in the size of the real exchange rate 
appreciation (or a one standard deviation decrease in the size of the real exchange 
rate depreciation) that follows a rise in aid. 
Neither average government expenditure nor average inflation has any significant 
impact on the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to aid inflows in our sample. In this 
context, at least, high spending and high monetary growth do not make a difference, 
on average. However, both the openness and government effectiveness coefficients are 
negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in all regressions. States with a relatively 
high level of international trade and a relatively effective government experience 
significantly less real exchange rate appreciation after an increase in aid inflows. 
Across the different regressions, the openness coefficient varies between about -1. 5 
and -3. The sample standard deviation of openness is 0.32. This means that a one 
standard deviation increase in openness (a rise in imports plus exports equal to about 
one third of GDP) can be expected to reduce the cumulative effect of an increase in aid 
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on the real exchange rate by 0. 5-1.0 (that is, by roughly a half to one times its 
standard deviation). The government effectiveness coefficient varies between about -
1.5 and -2. The sample standard deviation of government effectiveness is 0.86. This 
means that a one standard deviation increase in government effectiveness can be 
expected to reduce the cumulative effect of an increase in aid on the real exchange rate 
by 1.3-1.9. 
By contrast, the coefficient on political stability is always positive and significant; 
point estimates lie in the region of 1.7-2.2. Greater political stability is associated 
with more real exchange rate appreciation following a rise in aid inflows. A one 
standard deviation rise in political stability (an increase in the stability index of 
around 0.5) can be expected to reduce the cumulative effect of an increase in aid on 
the real exchange rate by 0. 9-1 . I . 
The coefficient on the Pacific island dummy is equal to about-0.8. In other words, 
the conditional mean of the size of the real exchange rate response in Pacific islands 
is significantly lower than in other states. On average, conditional on measurable 
state-specific institutional characteristics, the appreciation is about half as large (or 
the depreciation is about twice as large) in the Pacific. The reasons for this difference 
are the subject of ongoing research. 
It is also possible to use our cross-section data to model the size of the response of 
real GDP in a particular state to an increase in aid. However, when we do this the 
explanatory variables are not jointly significant at the 10 per cent level. There is a great 
deal of unexplained variation in the response of output to an increase in aid inflows 
which renders our explanatory variables insignificant, so there is little to be said on the 
basis of our existing data; modelling this variation is the subject of ongoing research. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that states that experience large real exchange rate increases in 
response to a rise in aid inflows will experience corresponding reductions m 
international competitiveness, as in the standard Dutch Disease model. 
Policy Implications 
In order to illustrate the effect that policy and institutions have on the way in 
which aid impacts on the real exchange rate, we can use the results in Table 5 as 
the basis of some counterfactual analysis. First of all, consider the effect of trade 
openness on the response of the real exchange rate to aid. The lowest level of 
openness in our sample (0.505) is in French Polynesia, closely followed by New 
Caledonia (0.640). An increase in aid is not estimated to have the same effect on 
the real exchange rate in these two French Pacific territories, because their other 
characteristics are different. However, if both of these territories were to increase 
their level of openness to the average value in the whole sample (l.147), then we 
could expect the real exchange rate to be 3.6 per cent lower in French Polynesia 
and 2.9 per cent lower in New Caledonia, on average, in the five years following 
a temporary 10 per cent increase in aid as a fraction of GDP. 6 If these territories 
could increase their level of openness to that of the Netherlands Antilles (the 
most open territory in the sample), then these figures would become 7.3 per cent 
and 6.5 per cent respectively. It is worth noting that all 10 of our Pacific island 
territories have a level of openness lower than the average for the other 16 island 
states. Policies that brought the level of openness in the Pacific up to levels 
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comparable with similar islands elsewhere in the world would substantially 
mitigate any Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows. 
We can perform a similar thought experiment for changes in government 
effectiveness. Here, the worst performer is the Solomon Islands, with an effectiveness 
index of-1.290. If this could be raised to the average value in the whole sample (0.171), 
then we could expect the real exchange rate to be 5.8 per cent lower, on average, in the 
five years following a temporary 10 per cent increase in aid as a fraction of GDP.7 If 
the Solomon Islands could make its government as effective as that of the British 
Virgin Islands (the best in the sample), then this figure would become 13.3 per cent. It 
is worth noting that the only Pacific island territories with government effectiveness 
levels higher than the average for the other 16 island states are French Polynesia and 
New Caledonia. Interventions that brought government effectiveness in the English-
speaking Pacific up to levels comparable with similar islands elsewhere in the world 
would substantially mitigate any Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows. 
The exercise in the previous paragraph assumes that changes in government 
effectiveness are independent of changes in political stability. In fact, across the 
cross-section of countries there is a positive correlation between the two (p = 0.43, 
significant at the 5%). In our cross-section regressions, political stability mitigates 
the effect of government effectiveness. The figures in the previous paragraph would 
be somewhat smaller, were the increase in effectiveness accompanied by some 
increase in stability. A likely explanation for the political stability effect is that there 
is more local investment following an aid injection in politically stable territories. 
This is certainly not necessarily a bad thing, but it means that donors should not 
necessarily expect a general improvement in political institutions to reduce the Dutch 
Disease effect of aid inflows by very much. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
It has been conjectured that aid inflows can lead to real exchange rate appreciation 
and worsening competitiveness. When we fit a simple conditional VAR to time-series 
data for 10 Pacific economies in order to establish whether there is any evidence for 
such an effect, our results are as mixed as those in the existing literature on aid and 
Dutch Disease in other parts of the world. We find a significant effect in four out of 
the 10 economies, and in one of these the effect is in the opposite direction to that 
normally assumed. Heterogeneity in the response of the real exchange rate to aid 
inflows is consistent with existing theory, but what explains the variation across our 
sample of economies? 
In order to explain this variation, we supplement our sample of I 0 Pacific island 
economies with data from other small developing island states around the world. We 
find that the propensity for the real exchange rate to appreciate as a result of 
increased aid is associated with a number of institutional characteristics. Ceteris 
paribus, states with a high level of openness and a high level of measured 
government effectiveness are less likely to experience a large appreciation; so are 
poorer states. On the other hand, states with a high level of measured political 
stability are more likely to experience a large appreciation; one possible explanation 
for this effect is that in a politically unstable environment an increase in the amount 
of aid leads is less likely to stimulate a boom in domestic demand. 
119 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
Our results constitute a broad overview of the factors determining the macro-
economic consequences of aid inflows, identifying characteristics that on average are 
associated with a greater risk of a large real exchange rate appreciation. The results 
allow us to profile an aid recipient that is most likely to suffer from Dutch Disease 
effects: a middle-income economy that is relatively closed, with a stable but inefficient 
government. Donors to such an economy may find it worthwhile to devote resources to 
monitoring the macroeconomic consequences of an increase in the aid budget. 
Acknowledgements 
This is a revised version of a paper submitted to the UNU-WIDER project 'Fragility 
and Development.' The author would like to thank project participants and two 
anonymous referees for comments on previous drafts, but all errors and omissions 
are his own. 
Notes 
1. The term was originally applied to the consequences of a natural resource discovery in the Netherlands. 
2. In the national accounts statistics that we use, foreign aid (a component of net income from abroad) 
forms part of GNI but not of GDP. GNI =GDP+- net income from abroad. 
3. For the purposes of the figures we assume that aid is strongly exogenous to the variables of interest. 
Whether aid is in fact strongly exogenous is not relevant to the point of the exercise, which is to 
illustrate the effect of a purely hypothetical innovation in donor policy. The consistency of the 
underlying regression estimates depends only on the weak exogeneity of aid. See Appendix 1 for further 
details about the model. 
4. Kaufmann et al. (2008) report annual data over 1996-2007. We use average annual figures for those 
years available between 1996 and 2003 (the end of our time-series sample). Although there is likely to be 
substantial persistence in the government effectiveness time series, there may still be some measurement 
error due to the absence of figures for the early years of our time-series sample. 
5. In our time-series model the real exchange rate is measured as a natural logarithm, so a difference of 
one standard deviation in the dependent variable represents a change in the real exchange rate that is 
about e times as large. 
6. Because 3.6% = 10% x [1.147 - 0.505] x 2.816 (from the ninth column in Table 5)--;- 5. Similarly, 
2.9% = 10% x [l .147 - 0.640] x 2.816--;- 5. 
7. Because 5.8% = 10% x [1.290 + 0.171] x 1.993 (from the ninth column in Table 5)--;- 5. 
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Appendix 1. The Time-Series Model of the Impact of Aid 
on the Macro-Economy 
The time-series model on which the Section III results are based is constructed as 
follows. First of all, for territories with a flexible nominal exchange rate, we fit a 
VAR model of the form 
[
ln(yt)] [u~l 
B(L) ln~~t) = c(L)aidi + ~! (1) 
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where Yt is real GDP in year t, Sr is the real exchange rate and nt is the rate of growth 
of the GDP deflator. u~ is a reduced form regression residual for the ith dependent 
variable. B(L) is a 3 x 3 matrix of lag polynominals indicating the interaction of the 
three dependent variables, and c(L) is a 1 x 3 matrix of lag polynomials indicating 
the impact on the system of our aid variable, aidt. This framework allows the past 
values of any one of ln(yt), ln(sr) and n, to impact on the current value of any one of 
the three variables, and for the past values of aid to impact on the current value of 
any one of the three. The number of lags in the model is to be decided empirically. 
Equation (1) can be thought of as a reduced-form version of a structural model that 
contains contemporaneous interactions of ln(yt), ln(st) and n,, although for our 
purposes the reduced-form version of the model suffices. Aid itself may respond to 
past values ofln(yt), ln(sr) and ni. but we assume that it is weakly exogenous to (that 
is, independent of the contemporaneous values of) these variables. For our purposes, 
it is not necessary to fit an aid equation. 
Our aid variable is defined as the ratio of ODA in year t to nominal GDP in year 
t-1. (The use of lagged GDP makes more plausible the assumption that our aid 
variable is weakly exogenous.) In the absence of convincing data on the relative price 
of traded and nontraded goods in each territory,1 the real exchange rate is defined as 
the ratio of the territory's GDP deflator to the Australian GDP defiator, making a 
currency conversion at the prevailing official nominal exchange rate. We note in 
passing that the use of a PPP proxy for the real exchange rate introduces some 
measurement error in one of our dependent variables, and hence entails some 
efficiency loss in our estimator, relative to the (infeasible) option of using measured 
prices of traded and nontraded goods. See Palermo (2002) for a fuller discussion of 
alternative real exchange rate definitions. 
Equation (1) allows for the possibility that the real exchange rate and domestic 
inflation can evolve separately. This reflects the fact that some of the 10 
territories use a national currency, as indicated in Table 1 of the main text. In 
these cases, the nominal exchange rate regime is usually an adjustable (sometimes 
undeclared) peg to a basket of foreign currencies, or else a dirty float. There is no 
commitment to a hard peg, and the nominal exchange rate can adjust in response 
to external shocks. For a given real exchange rate, some domestic inflation is 
possible, through proportional growth in both the domestic price index and the 
domestic currency price of the Australian dollar. However, there are also some 
territories without any national currency; these territories use instead the 
Australian or New Zealand dollar, or the CFP Franc. In these cases, domestic 
inflation cannot evolve separately from the real exchange rate, so the fitted VAR 
1s: 
B(L)[ln(yt)l =c(L)aidt+ [u~l 
ln(sc) ut (2) 
omitting the inflation equation. 
The data we use are for 1970-2003. Annual real and nominal GDP figures (and 
hence the GDP deflator) are taken from the UN National Accounts statistics 
database, as are the relevant nominal exchange rates. ODA figures are taken from 
the OECD DAC.2 One should note as a caveat that private capital flows are 
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omitted from our model. Data on such flows are incomplete for many of the 
territories in our sample. However, what data do exist suggest that in most cases 
private flows have been very small relative to official flows, at least in the 
twentieth century. 
The lag orders in B(L) and c(L) are determined empirically, using the Akaike 
Criterion as a guide. In all cases except that of Tuvalu two lags in B(L) and one in 
c(L) suffice; in Tuvalu two lags in c(L) are necessary. 
We cannot assume that the variables appearing in equations (1-2) are stationary. 
Generally, it is not possible to reject the null that they are I(l) in a sample as small as 
ours. However, it would be silly to try to apply the Johansen cointegration test in 
such a small sample, and other cointegration tests assume the existence of a single 
cointegrating vector, an assumption that we have no good reason to make. 
Moreover, our main interest is in determining the size and sign of the impact of aid 
on the variables in our system, and we have no particular need to identify the 
parameters of a structural model from the reduced form parameters in B(L) and 
c(L).3 Our only real problem is in finding appropriate critical values for the t ratios 
on the reduced form parameters, particularly those in c(L). If some of the variables 
are I(I), then the t ratios will not have the standard student's t distribution. We 
address this problem by bootstrapping our own t distributions from 100,000 
replications of the fitted model.4 In the null data generating process, the dependent 
variables are independent of aid, but otherwise with the properties of the fitted 
model. The model of aid under the null is 11aidt = ct + Bt with the values of Gl and of 
the residual variance V(s) estimated from the data. 
Table Al provides summary statistics for ln(s) and ln(y) in our 10 territories. 
Average real growth rates over the last three decades vary from 1 per cent in Kiribati 
to over 4 per cent in Tonga and French Polynesia. However, in all cases the variance 
is very high relative to the mean. This is also true of growth in the real exchange rate. 
There is some trend in the real exchange rate in most territories, but one that is small 
relative to the year-on-year variation. The effects of aid discussed below should be 
seen in the context of a region in which the typical economy is often being subjected 
to large real and nominal shocks. 
Table Al. Annual percentage growth rates, 1970-2003 
GDP (y) Real exchange rate (s) 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Cook Islands 1.06 539 2.16 9.20 
Fiji 3. 17 4.69 -0.46 9.14 
French Polynesia 4.33 4.57 0.43 11.94 
Kiribati 0.95 15.58 -0.70 631 
New Caledonia 2.42 7.29 0.01 12.85 
Samoa 1.62 3.62 -0.95 7.87 
Solomon Islands 3.29 7.70 -1.53 11.40 
Tonga 4.28 7.07 -1.07 11.05 
Tuvalu 3.05 8.81 1.24 8.70 
Vanuatu 3.88 7.70 -2.24 13.18 
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Table A2. Fitted VAR coefficients 
Cook Islands Fiji Fr. Polynesia Kiribati N. Caledonia Samoa Solomon ls. Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu 
--- --
co elf. I raiio coeff. I ratio coeff. I ratio coeff. t ratio coeff. I ratio coelf. t ratio co elf. I ratio coelf. t ratio coelf. t ratio coeff. I ratio 
ln(y) eq. 
ln(y)_ 1 1.36 16.00 0.18 0.82 0.62 4-14 0.90 10.3 0.87 11.2 0.99 17.7 0.94 4.90 1.12 6.91 0.97 4.22 0.56 4.24 
ln(y)_ 2 -0.59 -5.93 0.12 0.56 0.33 2.34 -0.12 -U2 -om -· 1.20 -0.03 -0.19 -0.09 - 0.62 --0.24 -I.JI 0.23 1.99 
ln(s) __ 1 0.12 1.92 -0.04 -0.36 0.02 0.32 0.59 I.59 025 3.29 0.03 0.56 -0.29 -1.68 --0.34 -1.88 0.16 0.94 -0.35 -3.82 
ln(s)_2 -0.03 -0.42 . -0.05 - 0.6 I 0.()2 0.28 -0.71 2.1 019 2.74 0.14 0.71 0.47 2.30 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.06 
n_, 0.()2 11.14 0.06 -1.54 -0.01 -(}_{)4 0.40 1.73 0.12 0.65 
1r_2 -0.13 -0.79 0.14 0.87 -0.09 -/.OJ 0.20 1.23 
aid -003 -0.79 0.85 1.34 -0.34 0.64 -0.10 -(}))(} -0.78 -1.84 -0.17 -1.19 - 0.40 -1.68 0.05 0.53 -0.01 -0.90 --0.09 - 1.14 
aid_, -0.12 -3.26 -l.50 -1.19 0.77 1.47 -0.10 -0.60 1.08 2.58 0.00 0.()2 0.31 1.47 0.10 1.54 --0.01 - 1.11 -0.36 -f.68 
aid_2 -0.03 -2.37 
intercept 4.39 3.27 13.72 3.35 1.24 2.06 4.04 l.97 5.14 5.18 0.16 0.14 1.94 2.16 0.66 1.11 4.52 2.78 5.25 2.66 
rr 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.04 
Jn(s) eq. 
ln(y)_ 1 0.96 5.89 0.47 J.24 1.06 5.21 0.02 0.30 0.49 1.66 0.02 0.24 -0.08 -0.30 -0.90 - 2.81 0.08 0.43 103 3.22 
ln(y)_2 - 0.48 -2.43 0.28 0.61 -0.93 -4.21 0.05 1.30 ---0.24 ---·0.80 -0.02 -0.08 0.71 2.42 0.24 2.05 I.OJ -3.50 
ln(s) 1 0.81 10.9 0.73 4.20 0.70 4.00 0.58 4.68 0.62 2.43 0.65 6.00 0.90 3.01 1.26 3.59 0.45 2.41 1.06 8.62 
ln(s_ 2 0.01 () 17 --0.28 . 1.80 -0.47 --2.67 -0.04 -0.32 -037 ---1.58 -0.66 -1.57 -0.77 -2.34 0.37 2.28 - 0.14 -- 1.23 
rr .. 1 -0.13 -11.36 0.20 1.83 ·--0.94 -2.20 -0.81 -2.90 -0.01 --0.04 
7! .. 2 -0.10 .. 0.65 -0.44 -3.47 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.72 
aid 0.17 5.17 0.22 0.14 -0.95 -0.84 0.04 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.20 1.08 -0.27 -I.OJ -030 -2.19 0.03 2.02 0.13 -0.96 
aid 1 0.21 4.18 -4.38 -- 1.70 --0.69 -0.97 - 0.08 -0.84 -0.54 -0.54 - 0.56 -1.86 -0.43 - l.97 0.28 3.27 0.()3 2.17 0.01 0.07 
aid_2 0.03 2.29 
intercept -- 8.98 -5.56 -- 13.05 - l.54 -3.05 -1.54 -- l.17 -· 1.46 --6.42 3.22 -0.33 - 0.19 2.41 2.03 3.72 4.63 -5.31 -2.87 - 0.46 -0.32 
()" 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 
n: eq. 
ln(y)_ 1 0.38 1.32 -- 0.15 -1.28 -0.10 --0.51 0.84 -2.53 0.25 1.93 
ln(y) 2 -0.27 -0.79 0.05 0.32 0.62 2.12 --0.16 ··~ 1.52 
ln(s)_ 1 --0.20 -1.5(1 -0.24 -1.56 -0.27 -1.19 -0.26 -0.60 0.18 2.12 
ln(s)_2 0.11 1.30 -0.10 -054 -0.25 ~-0.56 -0.05 -0.57 
n_, 0.57 l.94 0.07 0.52 -0.65 -2.50 -0.23 -0.56 -0.44 -2.57 
n __ 2 -0.33 -1.81 -0.26 ---2.24 .. 0.01 -IW7 ·-0.04 -0.44 
aid - 1.33 -1.44 -0.14 -0.41 -0.12 -0.62 -0.32 -/.53 0.31 3.37 
aid ___ , ... 0.14 -· ()_!() -0.28 -0.75 -0.14 --0.63 0.23 2.10 0.32 3.76 
intercept .. 1.69 -0.41 3.24 1.33 1.34 1.12 4.14 2.98 -2.20 -2.69 
rr 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.03 
LM autocorr. test 0.25 O.o7 0.92 0.17 0.61 0.85 0.44 0.96 0.87 0.06 
(p value) 
Jarque-Bcra test 0.22 0.57 0.15 0.17 0.55 0.15 0.39 0.89 0.39 0.73 
(p value) 
Additional effects 1976 trend 1980 1981 1984 1986 1983 
dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy 
Appendix 2: Cross-Section Data 
Impact at Impact at Impact at Output Govt. Govt. Political Independ_ Pacific 
3 years 4 years 5 years per head expenditure Inflation Openness effectiveness stability currency island 
Anguilla - l.652 -2.189 -2.596 8.382 0.155 6.991 1.504 1.260 0.987 No No 
Antigua and Barbuda -1.724 -2.469 -2.989 8.364 0.194 6.717 l.483 0.471 0.838 No No 
British Virgin Islands -0.989 -1.726 -2.374 8.948 0.117 3.366 l.587 2.051 1.504 No No 
Cape Verde Islands 0.894 0.371 -0.191 6.761 0.198 7.621 0.884 -0.022 0.874 Yes No 
Comoros Islands -0.243 -0.146 -0.060 6.111 0.251 6.978 0.584 -1.244 -0.239 No No 
Cook Islands 0.616 0.661 0.671 7.677 0.366 5.559 1.076 -0.027 1.250 No Yes 
Dominica 1.020 1.325 1.516 7.542 0.219 6.106 1.113 -0.162 0.733 No No 
Fiji -1.492 -1.318 - 1.153 7.461 0.164 6.445 1.062 -0.147 0.268 Yes Yes 
French Polynesia -2.553 -1.996 -1.555 9.474 0.449 5.195 0.505 1.601 0.646 No Yes 
Grenada -0.043 -0.010 0.018 7.284 0.205 6.084 1.199 0.032 0.659 No No 
Kiribati -0.064 -0.101 -0.135 6.379 0.385 5.113 l. I 51 -0.403 1.151 No Yes 
Maldives -3.081 -3.954 -4.208 6.582 0.180 5.068 1.669 0.295 0.725 Yes No 
Mauritius -1.216 -0.599 -0.278 7.625 0.138 9.823 1.163 0.618 0.898 Yes No 
Montserrat -0.864 -1.071 -1.188 8.262 0.285 6.735 1.106 2.051 1.504 No No 
Netherlands Antilles - 1.183 -1.518 -1.860 9.201 0.255 4.864 1.795 1.050 0.767 No No 
New Caledonia -0.181 0.068 0.262 9.443 0.292 4.913 0.640 0.433 -0.571 No Yes 
Saint Kitts 0.642 1.225 1.630 7.801 0.199 6.269 I.324 -0.040 1.353 No No 
Saint Lucia -0.266 -0.377 -0.450 7.753 0.173 7.008 1.356 0.238 1.175 No No 
Saini Vincent -0.573 -0.571 -0.526 7.294 0.216 6.247 1.272 0.069 1.157 No No 
Samoa -0.411 -0.568 -0.690 6.569 0.212 7.864 0.886 0.105 0.955 Yes Yes 
Sao Tome e Principe -0.159 -0.229 -0.287 6.249 0.281 18.14 0.830 -0.736 0.466 Yes No 
Seychelles 1.266 1.228 1.045 8.383 0.279 6.521 1.365 -0.439 0.780 Yes No 
Solomon Islands -1.070 - Ll37 -1.098 6.420 0.284 9.907 1.065 -1.290 0.177 Yes Yes 
Tonga -0.173 -0.172 -0.162 7.009 0.162 6.914 0.875 -0.530 0.666 Yes Yes 
Tuvalu 0.129 0.163 0.191 6.946 0.453 7.211 l.217 -0.281 l.201 No Yes 
Vanuatu -0.850 -1.083 -1.109 6.871 0.305 2.767 1.098 -0.515 0.990 Yes Yes 
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Table A2 presents the results of fitting the VAR model to the data for our 10 
territories. Note that in many cases there is a single outlier in the distribution of 
regression residuals, and so many of the V ARs contain a single dummy for that 
outlier, in order to ensure that the residual distribution is approximately normal. 
Inclusion of the dummies does not make a substantial difference to the sizes and 
significance levels of the estimated coefficients. Results for the four territories in 
which there is a significant impact of aid on the macro-economy are presented in 
more detail in Table 3 of the main text. 
Notes 
I. Some territories report deflators for some components of GDP in some years. Even if the data were 
available for many countries for a substantial length of time, using these data would require some 
heroic assumptions about which sectors' output was internationally tradable. 
2. The figures also correspond to official development assistance data appearing in the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
3. If we were also fitting an equation for aid, and if all of the variables were I(l), then we should have to 
impose a restriction on the VAR, because the long-run feedback matrix could not have full rank. 
However, we have no need to fit an aid equation. The only assumption that we do make is that the 
variables of interest are all integrated to the same order, whether I(O) or 1(1). 
4. The model is fitted using Pc-Give 10.0, and the replications are performed using Pc-Naive 2.0. 
Reference 
Palermo, J. (2002) A critique of the purchasing power parity approach to the real exchange rate. Aportes, 
Revista de la Facultad de Economia, Benemerita Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla, 21, pp. 177-182. 
126 
Remittances in Small Island Developing 
States 
CATALINA AMUEDO-DORANTES*, SUSAN POZO** & 
CARLOS VARGAS-SILVA*** 
*Department of Economics, San Diego State University, USA, **Department of Economics, Western 
Michigan University, USA, ***International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, UK 
ABSTRACT We examine how remittances relate to the exchange rate, natural disasters and 
foreign aid focusing on Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Using panel VAR methods, we 
are able to compensate for both data limitations and endogeneity issues. While remittances 
respond to innovations in the macroeconomic variables included in the analysis, remittances also 
have important impacts on these variables. Furthermore, the impact of remittances differs in 
SIDS economies relative to the set of all developing economies. Remittances appear to depreciate 
the real exchange in SIDS economies, whereas they appreciate the real exchange rate when a 
broader sample of economies is considered. 
I. Introduction 
In 1970, about 2.2 per cent of the world's population lived in a country other than 
their country of birth. In contrast, by 2000, the foreign born accounted for close to 3 
per cent of the world's population (International Organisation for Migration, 2005). 
International migration has spurred public interest, not only on account of its 
continued growth, but also due to observed changes in its spread as well as in the 
geographic origin and socioeconomic status of migrants (Williamson, 2006). This 
has lead to spirited discussions about the economic impact of immigration in host 
countries. 
But a parallel discussion is now taking place that focuses on the various ways in 
which out migration affects migrant sending regions of the world. These outflows are 
thought to have both negative and positive impacts. For example, brain drain may 
disadvantage migrant sending regions by reducing the availability of highly skilled 
labour where it is sorely needed; thus questioning the domestic effectiveness of public 
expenditures on higher education in developing countries (Haque and Kim, 1995). 
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This negative impact, however, may be countered by remittances flowing from 
emigrants to their families and friends in poor areas of the world (Lucas, 2007). This 
may, in fact, be the case owing to the observation that remittances have grown faster 
than migration flows over the past decades. Indeed, while worldwide remittance 
inflows were US$68 billion in 1990, they grew nearly four-fold to US$263 billion in 
2005, while the total world stock of migrants rose by only 23 per cent, from 155 
million to 190 million, over the same time period. 1 
Several reasons have been put forth to explain the rise in remittances, including 
reductions in transportation and communications costs. Secular declines in 
transportation and telecommunication costs have facilitated emigration while 
allowing these same emigrants to maintain frequent and closer contacts with 
families in their communities of origin. If emigrants are appraised of the needs back 
home, they are more likely to remit and to display longer lasting remitting patterns. 
The growing importance of natural disasters around the globe also likely contributes 
to remittance growth with family and friends contributing toward the well-being of 
loved ones. Natural disasters appear to be impacting greater shares of the 
population, not because of a rise in the number of extreme events, but because of 
the growth in the concentration of individuals in areas affected by disasters (see the 
Emergency Event Database (EMDAT)). 
This paper explores remittance receiving patterns in Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) and their impacts on relevant macroeconomic variables. In particular, we 
trace how workers' remittances are linked to other important macroeconomic 
variables in developing countries, specifically natural disasters, official foreign aid 
flows, and the real exchange rate. The focus on SIDS is justified given the well-
documented economic and environmental vulnerabilities of these economies. In this 
regard, Briguglio (1995) reports that SIDS' vulnerabilities stem from their small size, 
lack of product diversification, economic openness, import dependence and 
remoteness. Their small size curtails diversification and the attainment of economies 
of scale in the production of goods and services. SIDS' vulnerability to natural 
disasters, coupled with their small size, tends to make these economies more import 
dependent, and more susceptible to outside shocks. This characteristic is further 
emphasised by their remote location and by the relatively high transportation costs 
that accompany trade. 
Remittance flows can potentially have large macroeconomic impacts in SIDS given 
the large volume of remittance inflows in comparison to the size of these islands' 
economies. In 2007, remittances to several SIDS accounted for close to IO per cent of 
their gross domestic product (GDP) (for example, Cape Verde 9.2%, Dominica 8.0%, 
Dominican Republic 9.3%, Guinea-Bissau 8.3%) and, for some SIDS, this figure was 
close to 20 per cent (for example, Guyana 23.5%, Haiti 20.0%, Jamaica 19.4%).2 
These flows may positively impact economic development in SIDS by serving as an 
external source of income. For instance, remittances can be used to finance business 
investments (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006a; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007) and 
the acquisition of human capital through the increased schooling of children 
(Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Gitter and Barham, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). 
However, remittances also have the potential to unfavourably impact SIDS. 
Inflows of foreign exchange can appreciate the real exchange rate, potentially putting 
export industries at a disadvantage in world markets (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 
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2004). Likewise, remittances can create work disincentives (Funkhouser, 1992; 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006b). These concerns parallel those expressed in the 
macroeconomic literature on official aid and its effectiveness in promoting economic 
growth (see for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000), as well as Pavlov and Sugden 
(2006) for Pacific Islands). 
We thus seek to further our understanding of the role of remittances in SIDS using 
a utility maximising framework that first addresses some of the determinants of 
individual emigrants' remittance flows to SIDS. We then discuss how remittance 
flows may affect relevant macroeconomic variables. Subsequently, we examine how 
remittances and major macroeconomic variables within SIDS economies are related. 
The model is estimated for SIDS economies as well as for a broader group of 
developing economies to discern if there are any differences in the determinants and 
impacts of remittances in both sets of countries. 
II. Conceptual Framework 
In order to gain a better understanding of remittance flows to SIDS, we consider the 
typical migrant who maximises utility (U) subject to a budget constraint. Utility is 
increasing in the migrant's own consumption (Cu) and in her family's consumption 
back home (CH): 
(1) 
Consumption by the home family is dependent on the macroeconomic conditions of 
the home country (yH) and on any remittances (r) received from the migrant. 
Because r is expressed in the host country currency, we use the current exchange rate 
e to express remittances in local (home) currency: 
(2) 
Home country macroeconomic conditions, in turn, are impacted negatively by 
natural disasters (D) and positively by the receipt of foreign aid (A) from 
international agencies. 3 
(3) 
Using this framework, we reason that altruistically minded migrants are likely to 
increase remittances in response to natural disasters in an attempt to compensate 
families facing misfortunes. By the same token, it is conceivable that remitters make 
decisions about how much to remit based on the level of aid extended by 
international agencies. If international agencies are very generous, private 
individuals may remit less. That is, migrants may adjust their transfers after 
increases in foreign aid because it is presumed that aid will help improve the short 
run macroeconomic conditions of the receiving country. Likewise, movements in 
exchange rates might also influence remittance inflows by altering the amount of 
local currency that one unit of the host currency may buy. If migrants are interested 
in having their families receive a certain local currency amount, depreciation of the 
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currency may result in a decrease in host currency inflows. On the other hand, after 
depreciation migrants may be encouraged to take advantage of this relative gain in 
purchasing power by buying more home country goods, resulting in more money 
being sent to their families. Hence, using a simple utility maximisation framework, it 
is easy to envision how aggregated remittance flows to SIDS can be impacted by 
natural disasters, foreign aid and the level of the exchange rate. 
While we can easily argue that macroeconomic conditions will influence 
remittance levels, causality may also run in the other direction. Aggregate remittance 
inflows may affect foreign aid levels and the exchange rate. For example, remittances 
might affect the level of foreign aid if institutional and government donors believe 
that remittances can serve as an indicator of the potential effectiveness of aid. The 
fact that migrants trust their money to their home countries may signal that migrants 
view the political and economic environment as favourable and offer some 
indications that official development assistance will prove effective. Likewise, 
remittances may also influence the exchange rate. Large inflows can appreciate the 
(real) exchange rate just as natural resource discoveries do (Lopez et al., 2007). Real 
exchange rate appreciation may take place because additional spending on non-
traded goods caused by the infusion of foreign currency can change relative prices 
and lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. While it might be less obvious how 
remittances could impact natural disaster, there are avenues by which such effects 
may take place. We measure the severity of natural disasters by their dollar costs and 
it is possible that natural disasters become more costly following remittances. For 
example, remittances that induce population movement from more rural to more 
urban (perhaps coastal) population centres could be responsible for larger disaster 
costs as larger proportions of the population become more vulnerable to the 
destructive effects of natural disasters. Also, if remittances are invested in housing 
and consumer durables infrastructure, there may be more infrastructure damaged in 
disasters. 
In sum, while disasters, foreign aid and the real exchange rate are likely to impact 
the level of remittances flowing to SIDS, remittances may also affect foreign aid, the 
real exchange rate and natural disaster (costs). To get a broader and more complete 
understanding of remittances and the macroeconomy, we use a methodology that 
accounts for the endogeneity resulting from this reverse causality. In this way, we can 
explore how the macroeconomy affects remittances and how remittances, in turn, 
affect the macroeconomy. 
III. Data 
We work with annual panel data on remittances, natural disasters, official foreign 
aid, and the real exchange rate that run from 1990 through 2006. Annual data on 
workers' remittances and official development assistance (both in current US$) were 
obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. Disaster costs 
(in current US$) were downloaded from the disaster database EMDAT.4 Multi-
lateral real effective exchange rates were acquired from International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). Since IFS does not publish real effective exchange rate indexes for a 
significant portion of the countries used in the analysis, the remaining effective index 
series were constructed by determining the top trading partners of the country in 
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question and computing an average real exchange rate index. 5 Remittances, foreign 
aid, and disaster costs, all in current US$, were standardised by dividing each by its 
corresponding country GDP expressed in current US$ (also obtained from WDI). 
One concern is whether the remittances series that we employ is reliable. There are 
several reasons for expressing concerns about the remittance data, which range from 
inconsistencies in reporting formats by central banks to difficulties in measuring 
informal flows. We acknowledge these limitations and further note that the 
inconsistencies are likely to vary over time due to systematic decreases in reporting 
errors as governments become more eager and devote more resources and attention 
to correctly tracking remittance flows. 
In addition to variations over time in the reliability of data, remittance researchers 
need to be concerned with data inconsistencies across countries. These inconsistencies 
are due to differences in what central banks report to the International Monetary 
Fund. These reporting inconsistencies originate from various factors. For example, in 
some cases, central banks reporting requirements do not allow for the separation of 
workers' remittances from compensation of employees. In such instances, central 
banks report workers' remittances and compensation of employees together as 
workers' remittances. In other cases, workers' remittances and compensation of 
employees are reported separately, allowing researchers to track variations in both 
series. Acknowledging these differences in the reporting of remittance data, we use a 
broad measure of remittance transfers that includes workers' remittances and 
compensation of employees obtained from WDI. The benefit of using the broader 
series is that it provides us with a more consistent series across countries. 
We approached this project with the intent of including all of the countries 
identified by the United Nations (UN) as SIDS economies. However, on account 
of data availability, only 27 of the 38 UN designated SIDS are included in the 
analysis. 6 These are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, 
Comoros Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Fiji, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu. For the most 
part, lack of a consistent remittance series is what prevented us from including the 
other island states. 
For several reasons (spelled out below in the methodology section), we also carry 
out the analysis using a larger sample of countries that includes the sample of SIDS 
plus 125 other developing economies. This results in a sample of 152 countries and 
includes all countries classified as low, lower middle and upper middle income in 
WDI for which the requisite data series were available or computable (see Appendix 
1 for more details). We refer to this second sample as the DC sample. 
Figure 1 shows the average remittances as a per cent of GDP received by SIDS 
and by the larger set of developing countries in our sample. While remittances 
received by developing countries have been rising constantly (especially since 2001), 
remittances as a per cent of GDP to SIDS tend to fluctuate up and down. The fact 
that SIDS endure greater swings in the share of remittance inflows relative to the 
broader sample of developing economies highlights the importance of studying the 
macroeconomic determinants of remittances to see if we can find any plausible 
explanations for these swings. 
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In addition to gaining a better understanding of their fluctuations, the analysis of 
remittance inflows in SIDS compared to other DC is of interest due to their 
magnitude. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, remittances are relatively more important for 
the SIDS economies when compared to remittances in other developing countries. 
For our sample of SIDS, remittances averaged 9.1 per cent of GDP over the time 
period under consideration. This share is significantly greater than found for other 
developing countries, where remittances averaged 4.1 per cent of GDP. However, in 
both cases (SIDS and other developing countries), remittances trail foreign aid in 
terms of importance (remittances represent 66 to 70% of foreign aid flows). 
Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between annual average remittances and 
foreign aid is positive for the SIDS, while it is negative for other developing 
countries, which hints on the distinct link between remittances and foreign aid in 
each sample. These patterns may also reflect the tendency for aid to be reduced over 
time for middle income DCs, while remittances tend to trend upward. However, the 
data in Figure 1 and Table I do not account for other concurrent factors or for the 
endogeneity of our series. Hence, in what follows we conduct an econometric 
examination of the impact of macroeconomic variables on remittances and of 
remittances on macroeconomic variables. We also analyse if some of the apparent 
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Figure 1. Remittances as a per cent of GDP for SIDS and other developing countries. 
Table 1. Remittances and aid as a per cent of GDP for SIDS and other DC 
Variable 
Remittances as % of GDP 
Aid as % of GDP 
Correlation Coefficient 
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SIDS 
9.1 
13.2 
0.18 
Other DC 
4.1 
6.0 
-0.33 
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differences in remittance behaviour across the two groups of countries can be 
substantiated and further understood. 
IV. Methodology 
In addition to the data reliability problem discussed in the previous section, we face 
two additional challenges when conducting the empirical analysis. First, macro-
economic data on SIDS are scarce. There are no long macroeconomic time series for 
these countries and the data are typically reported at relatively low frequencies 
consisting of annual data in place of quarterly or monthly data. A second challenge, 
common to most macroeconomic studies, revolves around the observation that 
macroeconomic series are endogenous. Endogeneity makes it difficult to accurately 
discern causal relationships. We have noted this in Section II, where we posited, for 
example, that remittances may affect exchange rates through the familiar 'resource 
curse' effect, with remittance inflows causing real exchange rate appreciation. Yet, 
exchange rates may, in turn, also influence how much is remitted by individual 
migrants and, as such, determine aggregate remittance inflows. To account for these 
endogeneities and to compensate for short (low frequency) data series, we estimate 
panel data vector autoregressive (VAR) models. 7 
The use of a panel VAR addresses the endogeneity problem because this 
methodology treats all the variables in the system as endogenous. Moreover, the 
panel VAR also helps us overcome a data limitation problem by stacking the data 
from various countries, allowing, in effect, many short data series to be joined into 
one long data series. An added advantage of the panel VAR is that it allows us to 
take into account unobserved country specific heterogeneity. This is extremely 
important in our analysis given the diversity of countries in our sample with regards 
to location and size, among other characteristics. As such, the use of panel V ARs 
seems appropriate for our analysis. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) show that panel data 
are suitable for VARs as a few years of data are sufficient to estimate such models. 
This is possible because the sampling properties depend on the number of countries 
(i) and not on the number of years (t). For a more detail description of the 
methodology used in this analysis, please refer to Appendix 2. 
We initially estimate the model for the sample of SIDS described earlier. However, 
for comparison purposes, as we explained earlier, we also carry out the analysis using 
a large sample of 152 countries, the DC sample. The DC sample has the added 
advantage of being large enough to permit the computation of meaningful 
confidence intervals for our estimates. 
Once we estimate the panel VAR, we derive variance decompositions (VCDs) and 
impulse response functions (IRFs). The VCDs allow us to determine how much of 
the forecast error variance of each variable can be attributed to shocks to itself and 
to other variables in the system. As such, VDCs allow us to gauge the relative 
importance of shocks to variables in the system in explaining the forecast error 
variance of a particular variable in the model. The IRFs provide additional insights 
by allowing us to trace, over time, how a particular variable responds to shocks to 
other variables in the system. While VDCs provide information on the relative sizes 
of the responses to shocks to each of the variables, IRFs provide information on the 
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direction of the response, that is, whether the variable in question increases or 
decreases in response to a shock to another variable in the system. 
Finally, a few words are in order regarding the ordering of the series in our 
model. To compute VDCs and IRFs, a method needs to be chosen to 
orthogonalise the residuals. We choose a recursive ordering. The assumption 
behind such ordering is that series listed earlier in the ordering impact other 
variables contemporaneously, while series listed later in the ordering impact those 
listed earlier only with lags. Consequently, variables listed earlier in the ordering 
are considered to be more exogenous. In our case, it is natural to list the disaster 
series at the beginning of the ordering. Natural disasters can have immediate 
impacts on foreign aid, the real exchange rate and remittances, but natural 
disasters are not likely to be propagated by contemporaneous shocks to foreign 
aid, the exchange rate and remittances. 8 Next in the ordering is foreign aid, as it 
typically responds to ongoing disasters. The real exchange rate index follows, so 
that remittances are placed last in the ordering. The rationale for listing the real 
exchange before remittances is because prior research suggests that remitters 
respond to current exchange rate movements, factoring in ongoing exchange rate 
conditions when remitting home (Faini, 1994; Hysenbegasi and Pozo, 2006). 
While it is also likely that the real exchange rate responds to remittance inflows, 
those responses often take place with a lag. As such, the final ordering is: disaster 
costs, foreign aid, the real exchange rate index and remittances. 
V. Results 
We report on two sets of results using the two samples of data: the SIDS and DC 
samples. The VDCs for each of the samples are displayed in Table 2. The top panel 
Table 2. Variance decompositions after 10 Periods 
Percentage of the Variance Explained by 
Variable Disaster Aid Exchange Rate Remittances 
SIDS sample 
Disaster 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Foreign Aid 0.06 0.61 0.03 0.30 
Exchange Rate 0.00 0.03 0.95 0.02 
Remittances 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.95 
DC sample 
Disaster 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Foreign Aid 0.07 0.64 0.17 0.12 
Exchange Rate 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01 
Remittances 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.91 
Note: Variance decompositions allow us to determine how much of the forecast error variance 
of the variable listed in the first column is attributable to shocks to system variables (listed in 
the column headings). For example, under the DC sample, 7 per cent of the forecast error 
variance of foreign aid can be explained by natural disasters, 17 per cent can be attributed to 
real exchange rate shocks, 12 per cent to remittances and the remaining forecast error variance 
to shocks to the foreign aid series itself. 
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of Table 2 contains the VDCs for the SIDS sample of countries, while the bottom 
panel of Table 2 contains the VDCs for the larger DC sample of countries. Recall 
that the VDCs help us understand the portion of the forecast error variance 
explained by shocks to other variables in the system. Hence, the VDCs inform about 
the relative importance of variables in the system in explaining the variability of a 
particular variable. 
Using the SIDS sample, we find that, after 10 periods, only 5 per cent of 
remittances' error forecast variance is explained by innovations in the real exchange 
rate, foreign aid and disaster costs (0.05 = 0.03 + 0.00 + 0.02). In the case of the DC 
sample, 8 per cent of the forecast error variance of remittances is explained by 
innovations to the real exchange rate, disaster and foreign aid series (0.08 = 0.01 + 
0.01+0.06). In other words, shocks to these three variables explain a relatively small 
portion of the forecast error variance of remittances. 
Yet, remittances explain as much as 30 per cent of foreign aid's error forecast 
variance for the SIDS sample and 12 per cent for the DC sample. Likewise, 
remittances explain about 17 and 16 per cent of the forecast variance of the other 
variables in the system in the SIDS and DC samples, respectively. These results 
suggest that remittances play a role in affecting the macroeconomies of all 
developing economies and that they play an even greater bigger role in determining 
macroeconomic dynamics in SIDS, underscoring the importance of better under-
standing these money flows. 
While VDCs help us appreciate the importance of each variable in the system, 
IRFs allow us to determine whether one variable responds positively or negatively to 
shocks to another variable. That is, IRFs allow us to trace how remittances respond 
over time to disaster, foreign aid or exchange rate shocks. Additionally, due to the 
nature of the modelling, we can also see how disaster costs, foreign aid and the 
exchange rate respond, in turn, to a shock in remittance inflows. We provide separate 
explanations of how each system variable responds to shocks to all other variables in 
the model. The direction of such responses is summarised in Table 3. Additionally, 
detailed plots of the responses of the variables in the system to shocks to other 
variables are presented in the body of the paper for the first variable discussed 
(natural disaster) and in Appendix 3 for each of the other variables in the system 
(Figures Al to A3). 
Macroeconomic Responses to a Disaster Shock 
Figure 2 displays the time path of each variable in the system following a disaster 
shock in the SIDS (Panel A) and in the DC (Panel B) samples. Consider, for example, 
the second graph in the top panel of Figure 2. This graph indicates that foreign aid 
inflows increase by 0.6 per cent of GDP following a one standard deviation increase in 
disaster costs.9 After seven periods, the response of foreign aid flows is still positive, 
but has lessened to about 0.3 per cent of GDP. Table 3 summarises this relationship 
with a '+' sign in the first entry in the column labelled 'Aid', thus suggesting that 
disaster shocks raise aid inflows. A similar response is observed in the larger DC 
sample with foreign aid sharply rising during the first year following a disaster shock 
and declining to normal levels thereafter. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that 
donors increase foreign aid following a natural disaster. For instance, following a visit 
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Table 3. Summary of responses from the IRFs 
Panel A - SIDS Sample Sign of Response of 
Variable Disaster Aid E. Rate Remittances 
Shock to Disaster + + +/- + 
Aid + + + 
E. Rate +/- + + 
Remittances + + + 
Panel B - DC Sample Sign of Response of 
Variable Disaster Aid E. Rate Remittances 
Shock to Disaster + YES + YES +/- NO + NO 
Aid + NO + YES + YES NO 
E. Rate + NO + YES + YES NO 
Remittances + NO + YES + NO + YES 
Note: YES/NO indicates if the results are statistically significant. Given the small SIDS sample 
size, statistical significance cannot be established for that group. 
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Figure 2. Response to a shock to the disaster series. Note: Ranges (dashed lines) represent two 
standard deviation confidence intervals. Confidence intervals are computed by way of Monte 
Carlo simulations with 1000 draws. Given the small sample of SIDS countries we do not 
estimate confidence intervals for the SIDS group. The shock corresponds to a one standard 
deviation shock. 
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to Grenada (shortly after Hurricane Ivan hit the island) by US Secretary of State Colin 
L. Powell, the US President asked the US Congress for an additional US$50 million in 
aid for the Caribbean region (Brown, 2004). 
Likewise, our estimates indicate that a disaster shock is accompanied by an 
increase in remittance transfers over six consecutive periods. This pattern is 
consistent with the notion that migrants send money home altruistically to care for 
family and friends left behind and are especially prone to do so in response to 
hardships in the home community. Empirical evidence of how remittances are an 
important source of support during humanitarian crises can be found in the report 
by Savage and Harvey (2007), pointing to the Sri Lankan Central Bank's report of 
substantial increase in remittances, especially from the Gulf region where Sri Lankan 
emigrants tend to concentrate, following the 2004 tsunami. Yet, for our sample of 
SIDS, the response of remittance is smaller (less than 0.2% at its peak) than the 
response measured for foreign aid and, for the DC sample, it is not statistically 
different from zero. That foreign aid is more responsive to disasters than remittances 
is logical. While many emigrants may remit in response to natural disasters, remitters 
are unlikely to have pockets as deep as those of governmental agencies in the richer 
countries of the world. Furthermore, governments may shift their donations from 
countries not currently affected by disasters, to countries suffering from a natural 
disaster. Individual remitters do not usually remit to several countries and are, 
therefore, unable to shift their money flows from one country to another. 
Macroeconomic Responses to a Foreign Aid Shock 
According to our results, there is evidence that foreign aid flows have a 'resource 
curse' effect. The real exchange rate appreciates following a shock to the foreign aid 
series. The impact on the exchange rate seems to be long lasting and relatively large 
in size (about 3%). This is consistent with the idea that foreign aid spending is more 
heavily directed at the non-traded goods sector, leading to appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The appreciated exchange rate makes export sectors less competitive 
in international markets, hence the curse. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that remittance inflows drop following an 
increase in foreign aid. It is in this regard that migrants appear to be factoring in the 
levels of international public transfers when remitting, reducing their own private 
flows when there is an increase in official international aid flows to their home 
economies. Yet, the impact of an increase in foreign aid on remittance inflows does 
not seem to be statistically different from zero in the case of the larger DC sample. It 
is only for the SIDS subsample that we find evidence of a negative impact that lasts 
about four years. 
Why might remittances respond in this way? It may be (as we argued in the 
theoretical section) that migrants reduce their transfers after increases in foreign aid 
because aid is perceived to alleviate the most urgent macroeconomic problems of the 
receiving country, at least in the short run. Alternatively, individual remitters may 
simply be unable to remit during periods of turmoil (periods during which aid 
usually increases) due to interruptions in money transfer mechanisms. Moreover, 
during these periods, non-altruistic investment minded remitters may cut back on 
their remittance flows, not because they are reacting directly to increased flows by 
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international organisations and governments, but because they may view the time as 
inopportune for additional investments in the home community. 
Macroeconomic Responses to a Real Exchange Rate Shock 
How do changes in the exchange rate impact remittances? Appreciation of the home 
currency reduces the number of home currency units that the household is able to 
purchase with a given level of host currency. Remittances lose purchasing power 
following home country depreciations. Therefore, some migrants may be inclined to 
remit less substituting for host country consumption instead. However, if the 
remitter cares about her/his family receiving a specific lump sum of money in the 
home currency, s/he will need to use more host currency and would, in that instance, 
remit more. Hence, whether the remitter remits more or less is an empirical question 
and it depends on which of the two effects dominates. Our analysis suggests that, for 
both country samples, appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces remittances. 
This finding is consistent with the results from other studies that have gauged the 
effect of real exchange rate changes on remittance flows (Faini, 1994; Hysenbegasi 
and Pozo, 2006; Pozo and Vargas-Silva, 2008). 
Macroeconomic Responses to Remittance Shocks 
We have so far examined how shocks to each macroeconomic variable in our system 
affects remittances and concluded that shocks to disasters increase remittances, 
whereas shocks to foreign aid and the real exchange rate (appreciation) decrease 
them. We now ask ourselves: how do remittance shocks, in turn, affect each of the 
macroeconomic variables being examined in the recipient nations? 
Remittance shocks seem to be causing depreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate for the SIDS sample. But the result differs in the DC sample, for which 
remittances appear to be appreciating the real exchange rate. Appreciation of the 
real exchange rate due to remittance inflows is the usual finding in the literature 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Vargas-Silva, 2009). 
Why do results differ for the SIDS sample? It is possible that remittances are 
primarily consumed on traded goods (rather than on non-traded goods) in the case 
of SIDS. Perhaps SIDS, being more import dependent due to little domestic 
production diversification, end up spending the bulk of resource inflows on traded 
goods, causing this unusual result. Or perhaps the remoteness of SIDS makes it 
difficult for suppliers to continue to supply traded goods at constant prices. Hence, 
traded goods prices rise as demand for them increases. This is an interesting result 
and underscores the need to distinguish SIDS economies from other developing 
economies. 
We also find that, in the SIDS and DC samples, foreign aid rises in response to 
remittance shocks. As noted earlier, it is possible that international donors track 
remittances flows to gain information on the likelihood of aid effectiveness, serving 
as an explanation for this statistically positive impact of remittances on foreign aid. 
It is also worth noting that aid agencies do not seem to distinguish SIDS economies 
from other DC economies in this dimension. We obtain similar results in the two sets 
of countries. 
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In sum, we find several determinants of remittance inflows and a number of 
macroeconomic variables that are impacted by remittances in SIDS and DC 
economies. Additionally, we find that SIDS economies and DC economies differ in a 
number of ways. In what follows, we summarise and discuss these findings in the 
context of SIDS economies. 
VI. Summary and Discussion 
While the macroeconomic variables in our model help explain remittance inflows, we 
find an even bigger role for the converse; shocks to remittances explain even greater 
portions of the forecast error variance of the other variables in our model. Further, 
when comparing across groups of countries, remittances play a larger role in SIDS in 
terms of explaining (proportionately) the forecast error variance of the other three 
variables in the system: aid, the exchange rate and disaster costs. This finding is 
important for policymakers as it suggests that policies intended to either promote or 
discourage remittances (for example, reductions in money transfer fees or taxation of 
remittances income) will have relatively large secondary impacts on other variables 
of interest to policymakers. These secondary impacts are even greater for SIDS 
economies. Thus SIDS policymakers need to be cognisant and forewarned of these 
impacts in the event that policies are implemented to influence the flows of 
remittances to these economies. 
What are some of the findings regarding the determinants of remittance inflows? 
First, as expected, we find that disasters tend to elicit increases in remittances as well 
as in foreign aid in both SIDS and DC economies. Both emigrants and foreign 
governments respond to natural disasters by opening their pocketbooks. Hence, 
evidence consistent with altruistic behaviour on the part of emigrants is readily 
observed in these data. However, it is also interesting to note that shocks to foreign 
aid, in turn, tend to reduce remittances. Perhaps remitters view their transfers and 
government transfers as substitutable and choose to cut back on their generosity 
when governments step in. Alternatively, emigrants may hold back and save their 
transfers for when governments are less generous. In any event, this finding suggests 
that, in addition to being altruistic, emigrants may be behaving in a more strategic 
manner, conditioning their remittances on other inflows. That is, inflows of foreign 
aid may result in some crowding out of remittances. It is important for policymakers 
to acknowledge this possibility in their work. 
Finally, as with other studies, we also confirm that local currency (real) 
appreciation discourages remittance inflows. The emigrant, who is paid in the host 
country currency, finds that the purchasing power of remittances back home has 
dropped, causing a decrease in her remittance flows. Hence policymakers also need 
to be aware that exchange rate policies, which result in changes to the real exchange 
rate, can influence the volume of remittance inflows. 
In turn, we also find that remittances have significant impacts on foreign aid 
and on the real exchange rate. Foreign aid responds positively to remittance 
shocks, dismissing the fear that official donors will reduce foreign aid on account 
of observations that private funds are fl.owing into a given country. In fact, it 
may be that international donors keep track of remittance inflows to gain 
information on the odds of aid effectiveness. The fact that migrants trust their 
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money to their home country may encourage donors to extend aid. Therefore, 
contrary to what we find regarding the impact of foreign aid on migrants' 
remittances, remittances do not appear to crowd out donations from foreign 
governments and organisations. 
In addition to impacting foreign aid, remittances may also affect the real exchange 
rate. While we do not obtain a clear statistical result, it seems that remittances tend 
to cause real exchange rate appreciation in the larger DC sample, while the opposite 
appears to be the case in the SIDS subsample. This finding is interesting as it suggests 
that remittances may be used differently in SIDS versus non-SIDS countries. While 
spending in DC economies appears to be increasing non-traded goods prices (and 
hence causing real appreciation of the currency), spending seems to favour traded 
goods in SIDS economies. The structure and remoteness of SIDS economies may be 
responsible for the rise in traded goods prices following remittance inflows, leading 
to a depreciation of the SIDS' currencies. It is important to stress this result along 
with other differences regarding remittances in SIDS and developing countries in 
general. In some respects, remittances impact SIDS economies and other developing 
countries differently. Therefore, much caution is needed when recommending 
policies as 'one size does not fit all'. While policymakers may be concerned that 
remittances may cause Dutch Disease in developing economies, such a fear is not 
warranted for the SIDS economies. 
Due to some methodological and, primarily, data limitations, our final results 
need to be interpreted cautiously. A couple of caveats in the analysis are worth 
noticing. First, the methods only allow us to identify differences in the determinants 
of remittance inflows and in how remittances affect the macroeconomy in SIDS as 
compared to a larger sample of DC economies. However, they do not allow us to 
explore the reasons behind such differences. To do so, good micro level data on 
remittances would be required. Second, more consistent and accurate macroeco-
nomic data on remittances may result in crisper conclusions regarding the behaviour 
of SIDS economies. While data series have become more reliable over time, the series 
are still deficient in capturing informal flows and in providing a consistent remittance 
measure across countries. 
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Notes 
L See http://esa.un.org/migration/. The World Bank's World Development Indicators online database 
provides series for workers' remittances and compensation of employees aggregated at the world level. 
2. World Bank (2008). 
3. In reality, there are a wide range of variables likely to impact home country macroeconomic conditions. 
However, for practicality and computational reasons, we choose to focus on the ones we consider most 
important in the case of SIDS economies. 
4. See http:;/www.emdat.be/ 
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5. For dollarised economies, real exchange rates are constructed as domestic to foreign price ratios. 
6. The total member list is available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm 
7. The empirical analysis is conducted using the package provided in Love (2001). 
8. While it might be difficult to conceive that remittances or aid or exchange rates cause natural disasters, 
the possibility is not so far-fetched in terms of the cost of disasters. It can be argued that development 
projects can exacerbate the destructive effects of natural disasters (which we measure as dollar 
damages). For example, many believe that the costs (measured in dollar or lives) of Hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans rose as a result of the canal constructed years earlier by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers. In that case, causality runs from government financed dollar investments into New Orleans 
to a larger disaster (measured in dollars). 
9. These variables are expressed as percentages of GDP. 
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Appendix 1 
Samples 
SIDS 
DC 
Master Database: 
Data description 
Description 
Small Island Developing States 
Developing Countries 
Obs. 
372 
1,499 
Countries 
27 
125 
All countries classified as low income, lower middle income and upper middle 
income in the World Development Indicators (WDI) database were considered of 
interest. Data from 1990 through 2006 for workers' remittances, GDP, and official 
development assistance were extracted from WDI. Next, data from EMDAT: the 
International Disaster Database was appended detailing the total estimated US 
dollar value of disasters taking place in each of the years. Finally, if a real effective 
exchange rate index was available, it was merged into the master database. 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index: 
The International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) was 
consulted for series on real effective exchange rates (REER). When a real effective 
exchange rate series could not be found either in IFS or elsewhere, the authors 
constructed a REER series on their own. Weighted bilateral real exchange rates for 
each country's major trading partners were averaged together to compute a series. 
The bilateral exchange rates and price series required to construct the indexes were 
obtained from IFS and WDI respectively. 
Appendix 2. Methodology description 
The R_th equation of a 1 lag panel VAR can be written as: 
(Al) 
where rxf is the country specific effect, 1·; is the year specific effect, X;i is an fxl vector 
of lagged endogenous variables, b£ is an fxl vector of slope coefficients, and eft is the 
idiosyncratic error. We transform all variables in the model to deviations from 
forward means (Helmert's transformation). Since country specific effects are 
correlated with the regressors (xir) by virtue of the lag dependent variable, the 
mean differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate these fixed effects will 
create biased coefficients (Love and Zicchino, 2006). To avoid this problem, we use 
forward mean differencing (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). Let yfl' Xif and efc denote 
the means constructed from the future values of yf P xit and eft· Then, our 
transformations are given by: 
Y-,£ - <5 . ( i/ - Y'l ) it - It J it it (A2) 
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(A3) 
and 
(A4) 
where <5ir = J (Ti - t) / (Ti - t + 1) and Ti denotes the last year of data available for 
a given country series. We are not able to calculate this transformation for the last 
year of data, since there are no future values for the construction of the forward 
means. Accordingly, we lose this observation. The final transformed model is given 
by: 
(A5) 
Thus, we used an orthogonal deviation, in which we express each observation as a 
deviation of average future observations. We weight each observation to standardise 
the variance. If the original errors are not autocorrelated and have a constant 
variance, the transformed errors should exhibit similar properties. This transforma-
tion, therefore, preserves homocedasticity and does not induce serial correlation 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). Additionally, we use lagged regressors as instruments in 
our GMM estimation. To the extent that the instruments are lagged values of xu, 
they remain uncorrelated with the transformed error term, that is, E[xit-sefr] = 0 for 
alls;;:: 0 (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988, Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998). 
Once we have estimated all coefficients of the panel VAR, we proceed to estimate 
variance decompositions (VDCs) and impulse response functions (IRFs). VDCs 
inform us on the portion of the forecast error variance for each variable that is 
attributable to its own innovations and to innovations from the other variables in 
the system. In turn, the IRFs provide us with the direction and time trajectory of the 
impact of a one standard deviation shock to one of the variables in the system on the 
outcome of interest. 
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Appendix 3. Impulse response functions 
Disaster 
.0006-----~ 
I 
.00041 
.0002~ 
1 
.0000-<-1-1 -1 ~1~1-1 _, 
123456 
Period 
Panel A - SIDS Sample 
Disaster 
.002-----~ 
.001 
. ODO _J4::=::::.::=::::::=====i 
-- -
-.OQj ' I I I I I 
1234567 
Period 
Panel B - DC Sample 
Aid 
:~_J 
0 I I I ; : I I 
1234567 
Period 
Aid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period 
Exchange Rate 
4...,------~ 
-2 ---j--.,--,---,-~1--.---i 
1234567 
Period 
Exchange Rate 
s~----~ 
4 
123456 
Period 
Remittances 
.10 .o 
-.1 
-.2 I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period 
Remittances 
.2~, ____ ,.,.,.~---------------~ 
.0 
-.2 ---··--·-·-------------: 
-.4 I I I I : I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period 
Figure Al. Response to a shock to the aid series. Note: Ranges (dashed lines) represent two 
standard deviation confidence intervals. Confidence intervals are computed by way of Monte 
Carlo simulations with 1,000 draws. Given the small sample of SIDS countries we cannot 
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ABSTRACT Globally, state failure is hugely costly, in terms of lost output and the high costs 
imposed by failing states on their neighbours. This paper examines the cost of failing states in the 
Pacific. The Pacific region differs from other regions: since its countries are islands the 
neighbourhood spillovers that normally generate these costs do not apply. The cost of state failure 
for an island is much lower than for other states, but state failure is more costly to the state itself, 
as opposed to its neighbours, if the state is an island. This may be due to the greater openness of 
islands, implying greater flight of financial and human capital. Because neighbours are not 
directly affected by state failure in the Pacific, any possible interventions should be centred on the 
humanitarian concern. 
I. Introduction 
In this paper we estimate the costs of a 'failing state' and apply this concept speci-
fically to the island states in the Pacific Ocean. This study draws closely on the results 
obtained in our companion paper on the cost of failing states globally (Chauvet et al., 
2007). There we estimated the total cost of failing states at around $276bn per year, 
although of course any such estimate can only be highly approximate. 
States can 'fail' in two distinct senses. The most basic role of the state is to provide 
physical security to its citizens through maintaining a monopoly of organised 
violence within the society. Where the government fails to do this and rival 
organisations of violence emerge, the state descends into civil war. However, in the 
modern world the demands legitimately placed upon the state extend beyond this 
basic function of security. Governments in all modern societies play some role as 
regulators of private economic activity, and as suppliers of public goods such as 
transport infrastructure, health and education. The quality of regulation and public 
goods is important for the capacity of citizens to earn a living. Increasingly, as 
globalisation makes economic activity more mobile between countries, the quality of 
government matters in a relative rather than an absolute sense: governments that are 
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much worse than others are likely to lose economic activities and this will rebound 
upon their citizens. Hence, a state can fail because its government provides a quality 
of regulation and public goods which is markedly worse than that provided by other 
governments. Henceforth, we will refer to the provision of regulation and public 
goods by the shorthand term 'governance'. 
Our paper is concerned with the costs of state failure. Evidently, the costs of failure 
arising from organised violence are likely to be different from the costs arising from a 
failure of governance. We measure each separately. In estimating the cost of failure to 
the countries of the Pacific there are two possible approaches. One, the route most 
commonly taken by country specialists, is to focus on a few countries in detail. Our 
approach is radically different but complementary to this country-focused approach. 
We start from our global analysis, and investigate whether there are reasons to believe 
that the Pacific is distinctive from the global pattern. The major advantage of this 
approach is that because global analysis provides far more observations, we are able 
to use more sophisticated and robust techniques for estimating the 'counterfactual': 
how societies would have evolved had they not 'failed'. The risk in the approach is 
that it might miss distinctiveness: reasons why global patterns do not apply in the 
Pacific. Part of our analysis is designed to do just this. Indeed, we find that in one very 
important respect the Pacific is distinctive, so that the costs of a failing state are 
considerably lower than implied by the global pattern. 
Our approach is complementary to a country-focused approach but not an 
alternative to it. Comparative global statistical analysis necessarily omits much of 
importance that can only be understood by serious immersion into area-specific 
knowledge. Hence, the limitations of our analysis must be understood alongside its 
strengths. 
Failing states generate many different types of costs. If there is large-scale 
organised violence people are killed, people flee, people get sick as diseases spread, 
and the economy is damaged. Many of these costs are difficult to quantify and 
attempts to do so would consequently be contentious. Rather than make inevitably 
fragile estimates of the costs of incommensurable effects, we confine our analysis to 
the readily quantified costs of failure, focusing primarily upon the costs to the 
economy. These estimates are therefore a lower bound to the true costs and should 
be understood as such rather than as a central estimate of all likely costs. Of course, 
as economic costs are estimated with error and these unquantifiable costs will be 
reflected in economic performance, there is not necessarily a serious underestimate. 
In our total cost estimate (Chauvet et al., 2007) we distinguish three distinct costs 
of a failing state: the costs to citizens of such states of poor policy and governance, 
the costs to these citizens of civil war, and the cost of both these types of failure to 
neighbours. The largest component of the cost of failing states is the effects on their 
neighbours: 86 per cent of the total costs of failing states are those inflicted on other 
countries. Around 12 per cent of the total cost is borne by the citizens of the failing 
state and the additional risk of future civil war accounts for about 2 per cent of the 
total cost. 
In this paper we focus specifically on the island states of the Pacific. Out of the 11 
Pacific islands on which we have some data, two have been categorised as failing 
during the period 1977-2004: Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. As 
discussed below, Fiji may have become failing towards the end of the period. In 
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Section II we discuss our definition of state failure and apply it to the Pacific island 
states. In Section III we discuss the basis for external intervention. In Section IV we 
estimate the consequences of state failure for the economy of the failing state itself. 
First we summarise the global pattern and then investigate whether costs are likely to 
be distinctive in the islands of the Pacific. In Section V we turn to the consequences 
for neighbours. Again, we start from the global pattern and then investigate whether 
the islands of the Pacific are different. In Section VI we bring our analysis together, 
applying it to the costs of state failure among the islands of the Pacific. Section VII 
concludes. 
II. Defining a Failing State: an Application to the Pacific 
Our definition of state failure focuses on the provision of security and the provision 
of public goods, that is, development opportunities. As an initial assessment of the 
situation in the Pacific we present recent economic data for islands in Table 1. We 
concentrate our analysis on fully independent states and do not consider territories 
such as for example Guam and New Caledonia. 1 
In terms of population Papua New Guinea is the largest of the 11 Pacific states; 
with over 6 million inhabitants, it is over six times larger than the next biggest 
country, East Timar. Although it also has the largest economy in terms of GDP, the 
per capita income of US$ 990 is well below the average for the region. Other poor 
countries are the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and the poorest is East Timor (US$ 371 ). 
As a comparison the World Bank estimates the average per capita income for the 
East Asia-Pacific region at $2,320 in 2007. Growth rates for the 11 countries have in 
general been poor, with the exception of Samoa and Tonga. In some cases the growth 
rates have been extremely volatile over the past decade: Fiji's growth rates varied 
between 8 per cent and -5 per cent. The region is highly dependent on aid; in East 
Table 1. Selected economic indicators for 11 Pacific states (2007) 
Annual growth 
Total GDP per (per capita ODA per ODA/ 
Country population capita (US$) GDP) capita (US$) GNI (%) 
East Timor 1,065,900 371 -1.87 203 46.5 
Fiji 838,200 4,095 1.29 56 2.0 
Kiribati 101,900 851 1.36 214 19.4 
Marshall Islands 66,500 2,448 -0.12 1,002 37.6 
Micronesia 111,000 2,313 0.28 980 44.3 
Palau 20,200 8,148 -0.16 1,240 26.8 
Papua New Guinea 6,324,100 990 -1.17 46 7.2 
Samoa 186,800 2,579 2.97 198 12.1 
Solomon Islands 495,400 745 -1.81 230 34.7 
Tonga 100,600 2,298 1.88 240 13.5 
Vanuatu 225,900 2,001 -0.21 196 13.9 
Notes: Average annual growth rate measured over the period 1998-2007, all other figures are 
for 2007. GDP and ODA per capita are measured in current US$. 
Sources: World Bank (2009) and OECD-DAC (2009). 
149 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
Timor and Micronesia the share of overseas development assistance (ODA) makes up 
about 45 per cent of GNI. 2 While these descriptive data are interesting they do not 
answer the question of which states have been failing. First, the data are not informative 
about the security situation and second, countries may be poor due to other 
reasons than state failure. We thus turn to a more detailed discussion of state failure 
for the time period which we can examine in a global data set, namely 1977-2004. 
Our concepts of state failure, organised violence and bad governance, are 
continua. The scale of organised violence in a society can range from being a minor 
irritant, as in youth gangs in a city, to a devastating scourge, as with the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia; similarly, limitations in the quality of governance can range 
from occasional malfunctions in implementation to gross systematic deficiencies. 
However, it is often helpful analytically to impose thresholds that thereby create 
distinct categories of failing states: where the level of non-government organised 
violence exceeds some level, or where the quality of governance falls short of some 
level. We have done this globally, and we apply these same concepts to the Pacific. 
For organised violence we use the standard definition of a civil war from the well-
known database Correlates of War, which adopts a threshold of at least 1000 
combat-related deaths during a year. An advantage of using the standard definition 
is that we are then able to use data sets which have classified countries globally 
according to it. According to this definition, there have been no episodes of civil war 
in the Pacific Islands. The war in East Timor, which led to her independence, is 
coded as a civil war in Indonesia. The Uppsala/Prio Armed Conflict Database 
(ACD) lists two episodes of minor armed conflict - more than 25 combat-related 
deaths per year - for Papua New Guinea: 1989 and 1990 and from 1992 until 1996 
(see Table 2). The intensity of the conflict was never more than 1,000 in any given 
year and the conflict is classified as internal. 
Recall that by bad governance we mean that the provision of public goods is 
inadequate relative to the underlying capabilities of the society to pay for them, and 
that regulatory policies are dysfunctional. Economic policies and governance differ 
massively between countries. Poor policies and governance are themselves the 
consequence of other factors such as particular configurations of interest groups. 
These deeper factors may reduce growth directly as well as via policies and 
governance. As a result, an apparent improvement that is divorced from underlying 
change may have only modest effects on growth. For example, interest groups may 
use other instruments to achieve their objectives and these may also be detrimental to 
growth. The poor policies and governance that define failing states should thus 
probably be regarded as the observable manifestations of a dysfunctional society. 
They can be thought of as lying on a continuum determined by their likely 
consequences for growth and poverty reduction. A government fails if it adopts 
policies and governance that persistently fall below some low threshold and so 
inflicts slow growth or even absolute economic decline on its citizens. 
We adopt the World Bank criterion for Low Income Countries Under Stress 
(LICUS) as defining such a threshold (World Bank, 2002) and combine it with a 
concept of persistence of such poor policies and governance. To define failure, the 
World Bank uses the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score. 
The CPIA assesses economic policies and structural reforms since 1977 in 136 
developing countries on a scale from 1 to 6. 3 Our sample of fragile states corresponds 
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to the lower range of the CPIA: those countries with a CPIA lower than 2.5. To meet 
our criterion of persistence a country must fall below 2.5 for a continuous period of 
at least four years. This is designed to exclude from the category of failing states 
those that merely suffer a temporary crash. Analogously, we wish to retain in the 
category of failing states those that having a CPIA lower than 2.5 temporarily or 
weakly improve policies and governance a little above the threshold. A country exits 
the category of failing state only if it achieves a decisive improvement, by which we 
mean sustaining a level of policies and governance clearly above 3.5 for at least two 
years. Among the Pacific islands, only Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands 
are failing according to our definition. Neither Papua New Guinea nor the Solomon 
Islands managed to exit the category of failing states during the period under 
analysis. 4 
How does our classification of state failure in the Pacific compare to other 
categorisations? A few security and development organisations publish lists of failing 
states and in Table 2 we compare their assessments. The Political Instability Task 
Force (PITF) definition of state failure centres on security aspects: a state is failing if 
the country suffers a revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime changes or 
genocides and politicides. For the 11 Pacific states PITF lists one ethnic war in Papua 
New Guinea. For Fiji the PITF lists two episodes of regime change (1987 and 2006) 
and for the Solomon Islands one (2000-2003). 
The definition of state failure used by The Fund for Peace is a broad one; it uses 12 
social, economic, political, and military indicators in order to assess a state's 
vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. For 2007 Somalia 
received the lowest score and was thus ranked as the country most at risk of state 
failure. Norway received the highest score and was thus ranked as the country least at 
risk of state failure. We list the combined score for each of the Pacific countries, and 
provide their rank among the 177 listed countries. The country judged at the highest 
risk of state failure is East Tim or (rank 25), followed by the Solomon Islands (rank 30). 5 
Based on various different definitions East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands tend to be classified as failing states. Since East Timor only became 
fully recognised in 2002 we did not have sufficient data to include the country in our 
panel analysis, but Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands experienced 
sustained periods of poor governance and thus enter our analysis as failed states. A 
further two states have experienced poor governance, Fiji and Vanuatu, but the 
episodes were not of sufficient length to classify them as failed states. Until recently 
the CPIA scores were not publicly available, but we can show the most recent 
assessment in Table 3. 
The last column lists the average CPIA score for the six Pacific countries for which 
data were available. As the last two rows indicate, on average their scores are slightly 
lower (3.14) than the ones of other aid recipients (3.27). These average scores are 
calculated from 16 criteria. These are grouped in four clusters: (A) economic 
management; (B) structural policies; (C) policies for social inclusion and equity; and 
(D) public sector management and institutions. Further details on these clusters are 
listed in Appendix A. This breakdown gives us some indication why the World Bank 
rates governance as poor. Clusters C and D, policies for social inclusion and equity 
and public sector management and institutions, tend to receive lower scores. Lower 
than average scores are highlighted in bold in Table 3. Although clusters C and Dare 
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Table 2. Classification of state failure in the Pacific 
Political Failed 
CPIA Instability States Uppsala/Prio 
average Task Force, Index, BMZ, Armed Conflict 
1977-2004 2007 2007 2007 Data Set 
East Timor n.a. n.a. 93.4 (25) Failed n.a. 
Fiji 3.1 Regime changes 76.6 (87) 
in 1987 and 2006 
Kiribati 3.2 n.a. n.a. 
Marshall Islands 3.0 n.a. n.a. 
Micronesia 3.0 n.a. 74.0 (97) 
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Papua New Guinea 2.8 Ethnic war 84.6 (52) Failed Internal minor armed 
1989-1997 conflict, 1998-1990 
and 1992-1996 
Samoa 3.0 n.a. 72.4 (101) 
Solomon Islands 2.6 Regime change 92.4 (30) Failed 
2000-2003 
Tonga 3.2 n.a. n.a. 
Vanuatu 2.9 n.a. n.a. Failed 
Sources and notes: CPIA scores were provided by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009). 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data were obtained from http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ 
pitf. PITF defines ethnic wars as episodes of violent conflict between governments and ethnic 
or other communal minorities. There are the two minimum thresholds for including an ethnic 
war event in the state failure problem set: a mobilisation threshold, wherein each party must 
mobilise 1,000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops), and a conflict intensity 
threshold, whereby there must be at least 1,000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full 
course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual conflict-related death toll 
exceeds I 00 fatalities. 
Adverse regime changes are defined as: major, adverse shifts in patterns of governance, including 
major and abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to more closed, authoritarian 
systems; revolutionary changes in political elites and the mode of governance; contested 
dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial area of a state by extra judicial means; 
and/or near-total collapse of central state authority and the ability to govern. The main criterion 
used to identify adverse regime changes is the record of a six or more point drop in the value of a 
state's POLITY index score over a period of three years or less. Most of the cases of adverse 
regime changes are identified in this way. Such changes may be accomplished by coup, fiat, or 
popular referendum. The POLITY index is a measure of the institutionalised regime authority 
characteristics of the central state; the index scale ranges from minus 10 (-10, fully 
institutionalised autocracy) to plus 10 ( + 10, fully institutionalised democracy). 
The Failed States Index was downloaded from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ 
cms.php?story_id=4350. Figures in brackets provide the ranking. 
BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) data from BMZ (2007). 
The Uppsala/Prio Armed Conflict Data Set is available from http://www.prio.no/Data. We 
used v4.-2008. 
also lower for all aid recipients, the numbers for the Pacific countries suggest that it is 
in particular the low scores on the criteria for cluster C which reduce the CPIA. 
Thus, with the exception of Tonga, the Pacific islands score low on social inclusion 
and equity which is based on an assessment of: gender equality, equity of public 
resource use, building human resources, social protection and labour policies and 
institutions for environmental sustainability. Ware (2005) offers an explanation why 
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Table 3. Recent CPIA scores 
A B c D CPIA 
East Timor 3.00 2.61 2.67 2.63 2.73 
Kiribati 3.17 3.00 2.87 3.17 3.05 
Papua New Guinea 4.00 3.44 2.60 2.90 3.24 
Samoa 3.94 4.00 3.87 3.90 3.93 
Solomon Islands 3.00 2.89 2.60 2.53 2.76 
Tonga 2.83 3.11 3.23 2.97 3.04 
Vanuatu 3.67 3.22 2.87 3.17 3.23 
Average (6 Pacific countries) 3.37 3.18 2.96 3.04 3.14 
Average (all countries) 3.48 3.34 3.23 3.03 3.27 
Note: Averages for 2006~2008. A, Economic management; B, structural policies; C, policies 
for social inclusion and equity; D, public sector management and institutions. Lower than 
average scores are highlighted in bold. 
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/governance. 
governance is so poor in this social dimension. She argues that the high population 
growth in the region outstrips economic growth and employment opportunities. This 
leads to pressures on land, sea and other natural resources which are currently not 
mediated by social arrangements, mainly due to government failure. None of the 
countries currently has an average score of below 2.5, which is the benchmark for the 
severe LICUS definition. However, East Timor and the Solomon Islands have very 
low scores of about 2. 7. East Timar is a young state; after a long armed fight against 
Indonesian rule the population voted in favour of independence in 1999. A number 
of UN missions were deployed and this post-conflict country is one of the poorest 
nations. East Timor has suffered from recent riots and in 2006 Australia and other 
nations sent troops to stop the violence. Thus, the security situation is precarious and 
the economy suffers from structural weaknesses (Lundahl and Sjoholm, 2009). 
Population growth is high, there is only a tiny modern private sector, subsistence 
agriculture dominates the economy, the oil sector generates revenue but no local jobs 
and the country remains dependent on foreign aid (on average 40 per cent of GNI 
since 2002). All of these characteristics indicate a risk of state failure. 
The Solomon Islands have also experienced organised violent conflict. The 
country consists of more than I 000 islands with little sense of unity or nationhood. 
In 1999 civil unrest on the main island of Guadalcanal broke out. This conflict is 
often referred to as 'ethnic tension' between the Guales and the immigrant 
Malaitians. However, Dinnen (2002) argues that this conflict is not only due to 
ethnic differences but that various actors use this disorder to pursue their own 
political and personal agenda. Despite the Townsville Peace Agreement in 2000 and 
an Australian-led security operation in 2003, the security situation remains fragile. In 
2006 rioting in the capital followed allegations that the prime minister had received 
bribes from a Chinese businessman. Hundreds of foreigners, mainly Chinese, had to 
be evacuated. 6 As discussed above the Solomon Islands are also very poor with an 
average per capita income of about $745 in 2007. The security and development 
situation remain uncertain and we consider the Solomon Islands as a failing state. 
Papua New Guinea has a record of highly fragile institutions and poor economic 
policy. Its aggregate CPIA has ranged between 2.3 and 3.4 during the 1980s and 
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1990s and the country did not manage to turn around within the period under study. 
Despite the fact that Papua New Guinea is a resource rich country, around one third 
of the population lives under the $2 per day poverty line. Moreover, Gibson and 
Olivia (2002) estimate that it would take on average 20 years for poor Papua New 
Guineans to escape from poverty, and even longer for the rural poor who tend to 
face slower growth rates. Adding to these structural weaknesses and poor 
governance, Papua New Guinea has had to face the secessionist tensions of the 
copper-rich island Bougainville (1987-1997). This conflict opposed the government 
to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army led by Francis Ona, and is estimated to 
have caused between 10,000 and 15,000 fatalities. A peace agreement led to the 
establishment of an Autonomous Bougainville Government. 
Among the Pacific island states that may be classified as failing, Fiji is probably 
the most contentious. The country has experienced four coups d'etat (May and 
October 1987, 2000, 2006). The economic performance of Fiji has suffered from this 
political instability. As noted by Gounder (1999, 2002) Fiji has experienced slow 
growth and an exodus of its skilled labour force since the 1987 coups. The coups 
induced uncertainty, notably relating to land ownership, which had a negative 
impact on private investment. The coups d'etat in Fiji reflect the ethnic tensions the 
Fiji islands have to deal with. With a population mainly composed of native Fijians 
(Melanesians, 54.3%) and Inda-Fijians (38.1 %) Fiji is ethnically polarised. Gounder 
(2004) clearly highlights the differences in policies for these two ethnic groups and 
their likely implications in terms of sub-optimal policy choices in many areas. While 
the CPIA rating of the World Bank for Fiji never fell below 2.5 and averaged 3.1 
during 1977-2004, Fiji's economic and political situation gives cause to concern. In 
April 2009, the Court of Appeal judged the 2006 coup d'etat against the democratic 
government of Laisenia Qarase as illegal. Commodore Bainimarama who took over 
power in 2006 resigned, but President Iloilo suspended the Constitution and shortly 
after re-appointed Commodore Bainimarama as Interim Prime Minister.7 
While East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji have 
different histories of violence, they have some common characteristics which explain 
their difficulties. Ware (2005) provides an excellent overview of the security situation 
in the Pacific. She argues that the region experiences high population growth which 
puts pressure on the predominant sectors, namely subsistence agriculture and fishing. 
Many young people migrate to the capital cities but are unable to find jobs there. 
High youth unemployment rates generate a large number of disaffected young men 
who can be recruited for civil unrest. 
III. What are the Limits to Sovereignty? 
In part a quantification of the costs of failing states is of interest because this is a 
necessary first step towards a cost-benefit analysis of remedies. However, the costs of 
a failing state also have a more fundamental significance. Although the term 'failing 
state' is sometimes used loosely, its distinctive meaning is that the government of 
such a state should not have the usual untrammelled rights of national sovereignty. 
The limits to government sovereignty come through three distinct types of argument. 
The first, exemplified in the new United Nations concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect, 8 is that, beyond some point, if a government harms its own citizens this 
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breaches international norms of acceptable standards and the international 
community has an obligation to intervene to arrest the harm. 
The second is that poverty reduction is not seen as an exclusively national 
responsibility. The Monterrey Consensus of 2002 formally recognises the respon-
sibilities of international aid donors as well as recipients. 9 The UN norm is that 
governments of OECD countries should contribute 0. 7 per cent of their national 
income as aid and there is a counterpart responsibility of the governments of 
recipient countries to manage their affairs in such a way as to be conducive to 
poverty reduction. However, the threshold of policies and governance necessary for 
poverty reduction is currently less well defined than that for aid. 
The third, exemplified in the international treaties on global public goods such as 
Kyoto, is that a state does not have the right to harm the citizens of other countries. 
Thus, if failing states generate large costs for neighbours, this gives the neighbouring 
states some rights of intervention to curtail the harm. A failing state would, in this 
case, be a regional public bad, needing regional collective action to resolve it 
analogous, for example, to the regional water authorities that override national 
sovereignty where a river flows through several countries. 
The implications for national sovereignty versus international and regional 
intervention thus rest, to an extent, on who bears the costs of a failing state. If the 
costs of failure are essentially borne by the citizens of the failing state, the basis for 
external intervention is a breach in international norms. Where this occurs the 
authorising environment for intervention is, in some sense, the global community. 
The actual operation of intervention may be devolved from the international 
community to some regional actor, but the latter is empowered by the international 
norms. In contrast, if the costs of failure are substantially borne by neighbours of a 
failing state, then the neighbours have a direct right of intervention that does not rest 
on any actual or notional global authorisation. By the principle of subsidiarity, 
regions have the prime responsibility for organising the provision of their own 
regional public goods, and correspondingly for curtailing their own regional public 
bads. Hence, a critical issue for the Pacific region is who bears the costs of failure. 
IV. The Costs of State Failure to the Citizens of Failing States 
We now estimate the costs of state failure to the citizens of failing states. Our 
approach is to quantify the loss to growth resulting from each of the types of state 
failure, and then to cumulate these losses over the period during which the state is 
failing. In Chauvet et al. (2007) we set out in detail how we estimate these costs. Here 
we provide a brief overview of our estimation results for the global sample before 
extending the analysis to the context of the Pacific Islands. 
Based on a comprehensive global sample of countries over the period 1974-2001 
we estimate a standard growth regression and introduce into it a dummy variable for 
failing states. Because we wish to have a single regression that can be used for all the 
costs to be considered, we confine the present concept of failing states to those which 
are at peace, and introduce a second dummy for those which are in civil war. We also 
include dummy variables for neighbourhood spillovers. These other dummy 
variables will be discussed in subsequent sections. Our core regression is OLS. 
However, to check the robustness of the results we repeat the regression using 
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Income per capita, t-4 
Dummy non-Failing States countries at war 
Dummy Failing States at war 
Dummy Failing States at peace 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at war 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at peace 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
Number of countries 
Number of FS 
Number of islands 
Number of FS Islands 
Number of Pacific Islands 
Number of FS Pacific Islands 
Hansen test of over-
identification (p-value) 
Number of instruments 
AR(l) (p-value) 
AR(2) (p-value) 
Table 4. Growth effect of failing states, 1974--2001 
(1) 
-0.008 (3.50)*** 
-0.013 (3.02)*** 
-0.042 (4.87)*** 
-0.026 (6.96)*** 
-0.018 (2.20)** 
-0.018 (3.70)*** 
0.105 (4.89)*** 
600 
0.17 
105 
45 
19 
5 
2 
1 
OLS 
PWT 
90% Confidence 
interval 
-0.012 -0.005 
-0.021 -0.006 
-0.056 -0.028 
-0.032 -0.020 
-0.032 -0.005 
-0.026 -0.010 
0.070 0.140 
SYS-GMM 
PWT 
(2) 
-0.005 (1.08) 
-0.008 (0.83) 
-0.033 (2.56)** 
-0.024 (3.64)*** 
-0.062 (3.09)*** 
-0.021 (1.94)* 
0.077 (2.22)** 
600 
105 
0.79 
116 
0.00 I 
0.507 
OLS 
WDI 
(3) 
-0.008 (4.61)*** 
-0.013 (2.14)** 
-0.051 (4.06)*** 
-0.022 (6.22)*** 
-0.016 (1.88)* 
-0.021 (4.61)*** 
0.090 (6.26)*** 
664 
0.14 
1l8 
49 
25 
6 
6 
2 
Notes: Regression (1) and (3) are estimated with OLS. Regression (2) is estimated with System-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). All right-hand 
side variables are instrumented. Robust t statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant al 5%; ***significant at 1 %. Dependent 
variable: Growth rate of real income per capita, Penn World Tables 6.1 in regression (I) and (2) and WDI in regression (3). All regressions include 
time dummies. 
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GMM. 10 The results of both regressions are reported in Table 4. The GMM results 
coincide with those of the OLS: being a failing state at peace significantly reduces the 
growth rate by 2.6 per cent relative to being at peace with adequate policies and 
governance. The 90 per cent confidence interval around this estimate, which we can 
use to provide confidence intervals around our estimates of cost, is also shown in the 
Table. The last column of Table 4 also shows the results when using the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) instead of the Penn World Tables data. This is 
because more islands are included in the sample when using the WDI dataset, which 
is thus used in the remainder of the paper. 
Having arrived at the annual cost in terms of reduced growth, the remaining 
dimension of cost is the likely persistence of these losses. Our criteria of persistence 
of the definition of state failure have excluded both temporary crashes that swiftly 
rebound and temporary improvements that quickly collapse, but they do not 
necessarily imply that the phase of inadequate policies and governance is prolonged. 
Chauvet and Collier (2008) use a logit regression to estimate the probability that a 
failing state will achieve a decisive exit from the condition. A few characteristics 
make exit significantly less likely: a small population and a low incidence of 
secondary education. In effect, turnaround is made harder if there are in absolute 
terms few well-educated people in the society. Compared with other developing 
countries the typical failing state indeed has both of the characteristics that predict 
persistence. The typical failing state has a population of only 15 million as compared 
with 42 million for elsewhere, and a far lower proportion of its population have 
completed secondary education: 3 per cent against 12 per cent for other developing 
countries. At the mean of failing state characteristics the predicted annual 
probability of exit is a mere 1.7 per cent. In turn, this probability can be converted 
into the mathematical expectation of the duration of being a failing state: in effect, 
how long the typical failing state will remain in the condition. The expectation is 59 
years. Hence, the typical low-income failing state will indeed experience a prolonged 
period in which policies and governance are inadequate and so a high incidence of 
poverty is likely to be prolonged. 
We then combine the annual loss of growth with our estimate of the probability of 
a decisive turnaround from the condition, namely 1. 7 per cent per year. For example, 
if a failing state is very fortunate, in the first year it will lose 2.6 per cent of GDP 
relative to the counterfactual of adequate policies whereupon it will achieve a 
decisive turnaround. The ultimate costs of having been a failing state then depend 
upon what is assumed about post-turnaround recovery. At one extreme growth post-
turnaround is merely the same as if the country had always had adequate policies. In 
this case the loss is perpetual: every year in the future the country is 2.6 per cent 
worse off than if it had not had the phase of inadequate policies and governance. We 
adopt the more hopeful, and probably more reasonable, assumption that during the 
recovery phase growth is unusually rapid: the economy recovers to where it would 
have been without the failing state phase, and the recovery takes as many years as 
that phase has lasted. The cost of having been a failing state is then the loss of GDP 
in each year until the economy attains the level it would have reached had it not been 
a failing state, discounted to the present. We adopt a discount rate of 5 per cent. We 
allow for the possibility of turnaround in each year, weighted by the probability that 
a turnaround will occur in that year, and sum across all of these possible paths of 
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development. This generates the mathematical expectation of the discounted present 
value of the cost of being a failing state, viewed from the first year in which the 
country enters the condition. Chauvet et al. (2007) provide the detailed calculation of 
the cost. Our central estimate of the costs of the typical failing state at peace is about 
five times their average GDP, with the 90 per cent confidence interval from the 
growth regression giving a range of 4.2 to 5.8 times their GDP. 
We now investigate whether the Pacific conforms to this global pattern. There are 
two ways in which a region might be distinctive from the global pattern, which we 
might think of as cultural and structural. A cultural account of distinctiveness would 
be that because of certain culturally-specific features of the Pacific the consequences 
of civil war or bad governance would be different from elsewhere. A structural 
account of distinctiveness would be that because the economies of the Pacific had 
important structural differences from the global norm the consequences would be 
different. In principle it is possible to test for each of these statistically. 
Unfortunately, in the case of the Pacific it is not possible to check for the cultural 
account of difference. This is because there are too few failing states in the region to 
rely upon the statistical approach. It is therefore better for regional specialists to 
apply their judgement to this issue. 
It is far easier to incorporate structural as opposed to cultural distinctiveness in 
our statistical analysis. This is because, although all Pacific countries may have a 
particular structural characteristic that is less common elsewhere, they will not be 
the only countries that have this characteristic. The structural question is not 
whether Pacific islands are distinctive, but rather whether countries with this 
characteristic are distinctive, in which case the Pacific will be distinctive from the 
global average. 
One structural characteristic of Pacific countries that may have important 
consequences for the costs of being a failing state is that Pacific countries are islands. 
The cost of failure might be higher than average in small islands because they are 
atypically highly exposed to the global economy. In effect, far from being atypically 
isolated, small islands might be atypically integrated into global or regional markets. 
In particular, both capital and labour are likely to be highly mobile internationally in 
small islands (Ware, 2005). Such factor mobility would tend to increase the cost of 
bad governance because of the amplified exit that it entailed. Whether this is correct 
is entirely an empirical matter. To test it we create a dummy variable for countries 
that are islands and investigate whether its interaction with our dummy variable of 
failing states is significant in the growth regression. This will provide information as 
to whether failing island states suffer a different cost than other failing states. To 
avoid confusion with any direct effect of being an island on growth performance we 
also include the island dummy directly in the regression. We report this in Table 5, 
column 1. The interaction term is significant and negative: island failing states suffer 
substantially larger losses from state failure than do other countries, around an 
additional 2.1 per cent reduction in the growth rate. 
Before accepting this result we need to consider alternative explanations. One 
possibility is that it is due to a compositional effect: islands happen to suffer 
disproportionately from the more costly form of failure, namely organised violence. 
In fact, the opposite is the case, so this is not the explanation. There seems some 
basis for accepting that state failure in islands inflicts considerably larger costs on 
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Table 5. Growth effect of islands 
OLS estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income per capita, t-4 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
(5.16)*** (5.17)*** (5.08)*** (5.14)*** 
Dummy non-Failing -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
States countries at war (1.83)* (1.87)* (1.89)* (1.89)* 
Dummy Failing States at war(!) -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.048 
(3.89)*** (3.86)*** (3.85)*** (3.82)*** 
Dummy Failing States at peace(l) -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
(4.98)*** (5.06)*** (4.95)*** (4.90)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being -0.015 
FS at war (excl. islands)(2) (1.76)* 
Proportion of neighbours being -0.023 
FS at peace (excl. islands)C2) (4.92)*** 
Dummy Island 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 
(2.78)*** (2.74)*** (3.15)*** (1.84)* 
Dummy FS Island -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
(2.70)*** (2.67)*** (2.70)*** (2.72)*** 
Proportion of neighbours -0.021 
being FS ( excl. islands) (4.68)*** 
Proportion of neighbours -0.021 -0.023 
being FS (incl. islands) ( 4.35)*** (4.49)*** 
Proportion of neighbours 0.023 
being FS islands (1.65)* 
Constant 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.097 
(6.65)*** (6.67)*** (6.57)*** (6.61)*** 
Observations 664 664 664 664 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
(1) probability that the two 0.01 
coefficients are equal 
(2) probability that the two 0.35 
coefficients are equal 
All regressions include time dummies. Robust t statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 %. Dependent variable: Growth rate of real income per 
capita, WDI (2004). 
citizens than is the case elsewhere in the world. At the least, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the global cost is a lower bound to the cost for islands. 
If islands indeed suffer larger growth losses from bad governance then the present 
value of the costs is larger than the global estimate of five times annual GDP. The 
annual loss of growth of a failing island state is 3.9 per cent - adding the 2.1 per cent 
that is specific to island failing states to the 1.8 per cent of growth that a typical 
failing state at peace loses. Cumulating over years and discounting, this leads to a 
loss of 6. 7 times the initial GDP. The 90 per cent confidence interval from the growth 
regression gives a range of 4.2 to 8.4 times the initial GDP. 
V. The Costs of State Failure to Neighbours 
We now turn to the second cost, namely that inflicted on neighbours. Neighbours 
suffer a variety of costs from failing states, but here we concentrate upon the 
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economic losses. Globally, growth spills over onto neighbours. We now again 
investigate whether the Pacific conforms to this global pattern. As previously, the 
possible basis for exceptionalism is either cultural or structural. Again we cannot test 
for the cultural explanation, but we can test for the structural. We therefore turn to 
the structurally specific aspects of the Pacific. In what respects, if any, are the 
countries of the Pacific region likely to be structurally distinctive in a way that affects 
the spillover costs to neighbours? Again, the same characteristic stands out: the 
countries of the Pacific are islands, whereas most countries elsewhere are part of 
large land masses. However, the reason why being an island might generate 
distinctive spillover effects is quite different from the reason why it might generate 
distinctive costs to citizens. The key issue is whether islands have neighbours, or 
more precisely whether proximate islands experience economic spillovers. 
Spillovers might arise through several different routes. For example, compare 
spillovers arising from trade between neighbours and spillovers arising from the 
reputation of the neighbourhood. Trade between neighbours is likely to be less 
important for neighbours if they are islands than if they are spatially contiguous. 
Neighbouring islands are too similar to generate much trade with each other, and 
trade is limited by transport costs (most of the costs of sea transport are end-costs of 
loading and unloading). Hence, being proximate to another country by sea 
connection is of very little advantage in trade. By contrast, the costs of land 
transport are both much larger and more closely related to distance, hence proximity 
matters. If, however, the key spillover is through the reputation of the 
neighbourhood with investors, then physical contiguity may be unimportant. Pacific 
islands might be viewed as a group and investor risks and opportunities to an extent 
assessed collectively, so that reputation becomes a regional public good. 
To test for whether island neighbourhoods are distinctive, we first had to create 
the empirical concept of an island neighbourhood. We did this by recoding islands 
from having no neighbours, which is how they are conventionally treated, to being 
part of neighbourhoods within which each island was deemed to be a neighbour of 
every other island in the same region. Thus, in the case of the West Indies each island 
was treated as being in the 'West Indies island neighbourhood', and contiguous to 
every other member of this neighbourhood. We undertook such a coding globally, 
for each likely group of islands, including of course the Pacific islands. The resulting 
coding produced five groups of 'island neighbourhoods' (reported in Appendix B). 
The total of 664 observations (in Table 5) comprises mostly islands in the Caribbean, 
Pacific and East Africa. The island groups for South Europe and Asia are very small 
and of little economic significance (they may be geographically proximate as islands 
but have few if any economic ties). We therefore re-estimated Table 5 without South 
Europe and Asian islands (13 observations dropped); the results presented in 
Appendix Table 3 are very similar to those of Table 5. 
Having constructed these island neighbourhoods we then tested to see whether 
being the neighbour of other islands had similar effects to being a neighbour in the 
more conventionally defined sense of a contiguous land border. For this, we first 
pooled all the island neighbourhoods into the global data, thus reclassifying islands 
as having neighbours instead of being isolated. Because the joint significance test of 
the coefficients of neighbours at war and at peace suggests that the two coefficients 
are not significantly different (last row of Table 5), we aggregate neighbours at peace 
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and at war into one variable: in column 2 the neighbour variables excludes islands 
while in column 3 it includes islands. Then we introduce a dummy for being an island 
and interact it with the dummy for being the neighbour of a failing state (Table 5, 
column 4). As previously, we controlled for the direct effects of being an island and a 
failing island state. Indeed, these effects were investigated as part of the same 
regression as that previously reported. 
The interaction of the island dummy with the dummy for being the neighbour of a 
failing state is significant and positive. Indeed, the coefficient is virtually identical, 
though with opposite sign, to that on being the neighbour of a failing state, a 
category which now includes the islands. These results suggest that islands do not 
have neighbours in the sense of regional spillover costs to growth from being a 
failing state. 11 
An immediate implication is that the costs of a failing state in an island 
neighbourhood are essentially due to those costs that are borne by citizens of the 
failing state itself. Going back to our analysis of sovereignty, this implies that the 
basis for international action in failing island states is closer to the responsibility to 
protect than to the right to curtail regional public bads. In consequence, the rights of 
regional actors seem likely to flow more from devolved authority from global 
concerns about the breach of basic norms rather than directly from the right to 
protect one's own citizens from spillovers. 
VI. The Costs of State Failure in the Pacific 
The cost of state failure in the Pacific can now be built up from the incidence of state 
failure in the region and the cost per failing country. We take these in turn. 
The Incidence of State Failure in the Pacific 
State failure has two manifestations: bad governance, and the collapse into internal 
violence. On our criteria discussed above, the incidence of bad governance in the 
Pacific islands is 19 per cent. This is identical to the global incidence of bad 
governance among low-income countries. This at least cautions against region-
specific pessimism. Further, among the 11 smaller Pacific Islands there has been no 
situation that meets the standard international criteria for a civil war. While this may 
imply that the Pacific region lives up to its name, unfortunately East Timor has had a 
long history of sustained violence with very high mortality, so the neighbourhood 
has clearly not been immune from violent conflict. The low incidence of civil war 
may be due to something especially favourable about the neighbourhood, or it may 
be structural: globally, countries with the structural characteristics of the Pacific 
islands may not experience civil war. We included a dummy variable for islands in 
the Collier et al. (2009) core regression and found it to be insignificant: island states 
do not seem either more or less conflict prone than other countries. 
Although the low incidence of civil war in the neighbourhood indeed appears most 
likely to be structural, it is not because they are islands but because they are small. 
Small societies seldom generate the scale of violence that exceeds the threshold 
definition of civil war even though they may suffer more modest levels of violence. 
The atypically high prevalence of resort to violence in East Timor is also consistent 
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Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Total Cost 
Table 6. The cost of failure in Pacific islands 
Population 
(in mn) GDP (in bn $) 
1998-2004 1998-2004 
4.3 
0.38 
5 
0.32 
Proportion of 
income that is lost 
due to failure 
6. 7 [4.2, 8.4] 
6. 7 [4.2, 8.4] 
Cost of failure 
(in bn $) 
33.5 [21, 42] 
2.2 [1.3, 2.7] 
35.7 [22.3, 44.7] 
with an important feature of the global pattern: the conflict trap. Once a society has 
experienced violent conflict it is considerably more prone to further bouts of 
violence, partly due to the legacy of guns and organisations, and perhaps also due to 
the examples set by past experience. 
The Total Cost of State Failure in the Pacific 
Finally, we turn to the calculation of the cost of failure in Pacific islands. Recall that 
the cost of failure in fragile island states is essentially due to the costs that are borne 
by citizens of the failing island itself, since the loss of growth due to neighbours is nil. 
On average, the loss of growth due to failure in islands implies a loss of 6. 7 times the 
initial GDP. 
In our sample, two Pacific islands enter into the fragile state category: Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands. With a population of 4.3 million people in 1998-
2004, Papua New Guinea is more than 10 times bigger than the Solomon Islands 
(378,000). So is its average GDP, as shown in Table 6. 12 Thus the total cost of failure 
in Papua New Guinea amounts to $33.5 bn ($1. 7 bn per year) while that of Solomon 
Islands amounts to $2.2 bn ($0.1 bn per year). 
The value of turning round these two fragile states would thus be of the order of 
$36 bn, expressed as a present value and $1.8 bn per year. It is worth noting that in 
2007 Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands together received $567 million of 
aid, which represents around one third of the annual cost of their failure. 
VII. Conclusion 
Globally, state failure is hugely costly and so warrants serious attention. The policy 
instruments appropriate for addressing state failure are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but are likely to include security, governance and trade policies as well as aid. 
We have attempted to apply our global framework and methodology to the specific 
context of the Pacific. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses which it is 
important to recognise. Our approach necessarily lacks the richness of detail 
provided by the case-study method. It is best seen as a supplement and complement 
to such an approach rather than a rival. However, we have attempted to discover in 
what ways the Pacific is distinctive from the global pattern as well as the ways in 
which it conforms to it. 
Globally, failing states inflict very large costs on their neighbours and this both 
justifies and requires regional intervention in decision processes that would normally 
162 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
be the sovereign domain of nation states. One respect in which the Pacific is 
distinctive is that, because its countries are islands, the neighbourhood spillovers that 
normally generate these costs do not apply. As far as we can discern, islands do not 
have neighbours in this economic sense. Hence, the basis for regional concern is 
somewhat reduced, and indeed shifted from the self-interest of other states to their 
humanitarian concern with the wellbeing of the directly affected populations. The 
second respect in which the Pacific is distinctive reinforces this latter conclusion. 
Although neighbours are not affected by state failure, the failing states themselves 
suffer considerably more in terms of income losses if they are islands. We have 
speculated that this may be because of the greater openness of islands, implying 
greater flight of capital and skilled labour. Hence, the humanitarian case is 
particularly strong. 
Finally, we have attempted to put a cost on state failure in the Pacific. This is 
evidently a heroic undertaking and the results should be treated with due caution. 
Nevertheless, our estimate of a present value of around $36bn is so large that the 
implication is clear: state failure in the Pacific should be a major policy concern. This 
estimate of lost output omits costs that are likely to be important both to the 
societies themselves, and globally. Most notably, within societies we have omitted 
the costs of heightened morbidity and mortality, while globally we have omitted 
costs arising from the heightened risk that the failing state will become a haven for 
pandemics, international crime and terrorism. 
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Notes 
l. The only independent country for which data was not available from the World Bank was Nauru. 
2. For a discussion of foreign aid to the region see Feeny (2007). 
3. The CPIA is one of the possible indicators available to measure the quality of policy and institutions, 
and is therefore likely to be subject to inaccuracy. It has the advantage of being available for a long 
period of time and many developing countries. The ICRG is an alternative indicator, which is highly 
correlated with the CPIA and available for fewer countries/periods. 
4. It is worth noting that the CPIA is not available for East Timor before the mid-2000s. 
5. Development agencies typically do not publish lists of failing states, one exception being the German 
Ministry of Development (BMZ). They list four of the 11 Pacific states as failed: East Timor, Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ljhi;world;asia-pacific/4930994.stm, accessed on 13 July 2009. 
7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300477.stm, accessed on 13 July 2009. 
8. The full text of UN Resolution A/RES/60/1 can be found at: http://www.who.int/hiv/universal 
access2010/worldsummit.pdf. The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is set out in paragraphs 138 and 139. 
9. Full text at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey;MonterreyConsensus.pdf. 
l 0. Chauvet et al. (2007) also provide some robustness checks on the specification. Including education, 
investment and democracy in regression (1) of Table 4 does not alter the results. 
11. We performed specification tests on regression (4) of Table 5. We included alternative control 
variables for education, investment and democracy. These checks suggest that our results are robust to 
the introduction of these control variables. (Available upon request). 
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12. The difference in numbers of Table 1 and 6 are due to different time periods (respectively 2007 and 
1998-2004). 
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Appendix A. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Clusters 
A. Economic Management 1 Macroeconomic Management 
2 Fiscal Policy 
3 Debt Policy 
B. Structural Policies 4 Trade 
5 Financial Sector 
6 Business Regulatory Environ. 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 7 Gender Equality 
8 Equity of Public Resource Use 
9 Building Human Resources 
10 Social Protection & Labour 
11 Pol. & Institutions for Environ. 
Sustainability 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 12 Property Rights & Rule-based Govern. 
13 Quality of Budget & Financial 
Appendix B. Island Classification 
Pacific: 
Management 
14 Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation 
15 Quality of Public Admin. 
16 Transparency, Accountability & 
Corruption in Pub. Sector 
East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Fed. States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. 
Caribbean: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
East Africa: 
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. 
South Europe: 
Cyprus, Malta. 
Asia: 
Maldives, Singapore and Sri Lanka. 
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Appendix C. Robustness Checks on Island Classification 
Estimations w/o South European and Asian islands. 
OLS estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income p.c. t-4 -0.00990*** -0.00995*** -0.00966*** -0.0102*** 
5.28 5.29 5.14 5.33 
Dummy non-Failing -0.0110* -0.0113* -0.0112* -0.0116* 
States countries at war 
1.73 1.78 1.77 1.83 
Dummy Failing States at war -0.0543*** -0.0537*** -0.0535*** -0.0534*** 
4.14 4.10 4.08 4.07 
Dummy Failing States at peace -0.0176*** -0.0180*** -0.0177*** -0.0174*** 
4.82 4.92 4.82 4.75 
Proportion of neighbours being -0.013 
FS at war (excl. islands) 
1.55 
Proportion of neighbours being -0.0230*** 
FS at peace ( excl. islands) 
4.95 
Dummy Island 0.00926** 0.00891 ** 0.0108*** 0.00288 
2.25 2.19 2.61 0.57 
Dummy FS Island -0.0275*** -0.0263*** -0.0260*** -0.0277*** 
3.63 3.53 3.52 3.67 
Proportion of neighbours -0.0207*** 
being FS ( excl. islands) 
4.60 
Proportion of neighbours -0.0200*** -0.0233*** 
being FS (incl. islands) 
4.14 4.59 
Proportion of neighbours 0.0438*** 
being FS islands 
3.55 
Constant 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 
7.43 7.41 7.25 7.45 
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